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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c, branch linux-5.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.3.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.3.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event</title>
<updated>2019-03-27T22:11:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T18:49:20+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a1aa08a01f734d48a8f76b12aca9f4e4adae7649</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of
verified xattrs"), the call to audit_log_start() is missing a context to
link it to an audit event. Since this event is in user context, add
the process' syscall context to the record.

In addition, the orphaned keyword "locked" appears in the record.
Normalize this by changing it to logging the locking string "." as any
other user input in the "xattr=" field.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/109

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h</title>
<updated>2018-12-12T22:58:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-09T20:36:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=876979c9308b7228cdaf6785909c57eebc85d911'/>
<id>urn:sha1:876979c9308b7228cdaf6785909c57eebc85d911</id>
<content type='text'>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.

The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.

Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.

Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()</title>
<updated>2018-07-22T18:49:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>weiyongjun1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-11T13:28:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b</id>
<content type='text'>
In case of error, the function audit_log_start() returns NULL pointer
not ERR_PTR(). The IS_ERR() test in the return value check should be
replaced with NULL test.

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs()</title>
<updated>2018-06-01T10:03:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-01T08:00:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b5c90a7526fe39164c2204f0404ce8f8ff21e522'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5c90a7526fe39164c2204f0404ce8f8ff21e522</id>
<content type='text'>
We need to unlock before returning on this error path.

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs()</title>
<updated>2018-05-31T14:13:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-29T13:11:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a41d80acfa2764e9b1ce49aa303a263e609d91f7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a41d80acfa2764e9b1ce49aa303a263e609d91f7</id>
<content type='text'>
If the user sets xattr-&gt;name[0] to NUL then we would read one character
before the start of the array.  This bug seems harmless as far as I can
see but perhaps it would trigger a warning in KASAN.

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocate</title>
<updated>2018-05-31T14:13:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-27T22:55:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=72acd64df4561593d2ec3227b4aca9b0d7ded50e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72acd64df4561593d2ec3227b4aca9b0d7ded50e</id>
<content type='text'>
In the case where the allocation of xattr fails and xattr is NULL, the
error exit return path via label 'out' will dereference xattr when
kfree'ing xattr-name.  Fix this by only kfree'ing xattr-&gt;name and xattr
when xattr is non-null.

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1469366 ("Dereference after null check")

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: fix memory leak of temporary buffer 'temp'</title>
<updated>2018-05-31T14:13:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-27T22:15:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=825b8650dc3dd064969ce343e918d0eb6bf907fb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:825b8650dc3dd064969ce343e918d0eb6bf907fb</id>
<content type='text'>
The allocation of 'temp' is not kfree'd and hence there is a memory
leak on each call of evm_read_xattrs.  Fix this by kfree'ing it
after copying data from it back to the user space buffer 'buf'.

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1469386 ("Resource Leak")

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs</title>
<updated>2018-05-18T19:34:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-15T17:38:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fa516b66a1bfce1d72f1620c54bdfebc493000d1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa516b66a1bfce1d72f1620c54bdfebc493000d1</id>
<content type='text'>
Sites may wish to provide additional metadata alongside files in order
to make more fine-grained security decisions[1]. The security of this is
enhanced if this metadata is protected, something that EVM makes
possible. However, the kernel cannot know about the set of extended
attributes that local admins may wish to protect, and hardcoding this
policy in the kernel makes it difficult to change over time and less
convenient for distributions to enable.

This patch adds a new /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs node,
which can be read to obtain the current set of EVM-protected extended
attributes or written to in order to add new entries. Extending this list
will not change the validity of any existing signatures provided that the
file in question does not have any of the additional extended attributes -
missing xattrs are skipped when calculating the EVM hash.

[1] For instance, a package manager could install information about the
package uploader in an additional extended attribute. Local LSM policy
could then be associated with that extended attribute in order to
restrict the privileges available to packages from less trusted
uploaders.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs</title>
<updated>2018-05-17T12:03:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-11T23:12:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0c343af8065be5ceb0c03a876af7c513e960e2ff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c343af8065be5ceb0c03a876af7c513e960e2ff</id>
<content type='text'>
We want to add additional evm control nodes, and it'd be preferable not
to clutter up the securityfs root directory any further. Create a new
integrity directory, move the ima directory into it, create an evm
directory for the evm attribute and add compatibility symlinks.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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