<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c, branch linux-7.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-7.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-7.1.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-04-01T14:16:53+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>evm: Enforce signatures version 3 with new EVM policy 'bit 3'</title>
<updated>2026-04-01T14:16:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-25T21:33:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=82bbd447199ff1441031d2eaf9afe041550cf525'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82bbd447199ff1441031d2eaf9afe041550cf525</id>
<content type='text'>
Enable the configuration of EVM so that it requires that asymmetric
signatures it accepts are of version 3 (sigv3). To enable this, introduce
bit 3 (value 0x0008) that the user may write to EVM's securityfs policy
configuration file 'evm' for sigv3 enforcement.

Mention bit 3 in the documentation.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Define asymmetric_verify_v3() to verify IMA sigv3 signatures</title>
<updated>2026-04-01T14:14:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-10T23:42:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=dccfbafb1f34a98898ac685e0f3f86eeaf25ecc6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dccfbafb1f34a98898ac685e0f3f86eeaf25ecc6</id>
<content type='text'>
Define asymmetric_verify_v3() to calculate the hash of the struct
ima_file_id, before calling asymmetric_verify() to verify the
signature.

Move and update the existing calc_file_id_hash() function with a
simpler, self contained version.  In addition to the existing hash
data and hash data length arguments, also pass the hash algorithm.

Suggested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix security.evm for a file with IMA signature</title>
<updated>2026-03-05T16:39:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Coiby Xu</name>
<email>coxu@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-30T02:26:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0ec959cf4b5a609d7f27bf84064ef5372e30ab80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0ec959cf4b5a609d7f27bf84064ef5372e30ab80</id>
<content type='text'>
When both IMA and EVM fix modes are enabled, accessing a file with IMA
signature but missing EVM HMAC won't cause security.evm to be fixed.

Add a function evm_fix_hmac which will be explicitly called to fix EVM
HMAC for this case.

Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu &lt;coxu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Don't enable fix mode when secure boot is enabled</title>
<updated>2026-03-05T16:10:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Coiby Xu</name>
<email>coxu@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-13T01:28:47+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cf75c8632034da568146f4005db746d4a3998292</id>
<content type='text'>
Similar to IMA fix mode, forbid EVM fix mode when secure boot is
enabled.

Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu &lt;coxu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types</title>
<updated>2026-02-21T09:02:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-21T07:49:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima,evm: move initcalls to the LSM framework</title>
<updated>2025-10-22T23:24:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-02T12:54:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=82fe7932e84f618c6ec217203606f0c27ebef94b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82fe7932e84f618c6ec217203606f0c27ebef94b</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch converts IMA and EVM to use the LSM frameworks's initcall
mechanism. It moved the integrity_fs_init() call to ima_fs_init() and
evm_init_secfs(), to work around the fact that there is no "integrity" LSM,
and introduced integrity_fs_fini() to remove the integrity directory, if
empty. Both integrity_fs_init() and integrity_fs_fini() support the
scenario of being called by both the IMA and EVM LSMs.

This patch does not touch any of the platform certificate code that
lives under the security/integrity/platform_certs directory as the
IMA/EVM developers would prefer to address that in a future patchset.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
[PM: adjust description as discussed over email]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: replace the name field with a pointer to the lsm_id struct</title>
<updated>2025-10-22T23:24:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-12T19:45:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9f9dc69e06ecbc61e7a50b823b82a78daf130dc0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9f9dc69e06ecbc61e7a50b823b82a78daf130dc0</id>
<content type='text'>
Reduce the duplication between the lsm_id struct and the DEFINE_LSM()
definition by linking the lsm_id struct directly into the individual
LSM's DEFINE_LSM() instance.

Linking the lsm_id into the LSM definition also allows us to simplify
the security_add_hooks() function by removing the code which populates
the lsm_idlist[] array and moving it into the normal LSM startup code
where the LSM list is parsed and the individual LSMs are enabled,
making for a cleaner implementation with less overhead at boot.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: fix typos and spelling errors</title>
<updated>2025-02-05T02:36:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tanya Agarwal</name>
<email>tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-23T19:37:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ceb5faef848b2fbb5d1e99617093cc9d4deb2b30'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ceb5faef848b2fbb5d1e99617093cc9d4deb2b30</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix typos and spelling errors in integrity module comments that were
identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.

Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal &lt;tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T02:49:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Guzik</name>
<email>mjguzik@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-06T13:36:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=699ae6241920b0fa837fa57e61f7d5b0e2e65b58'/>
<id>urn:sha1:699ae6241920b0fa837fa57e61f7d5b0e2e65b58</id>
<content type='text'>
The EVM_NEW_FILE flag is unset if the file already existed at the time
of open and this can be checked without looking at i_writecount.

Not accessing it reduces traffic on the cacheline during parallel open
of the same file and drop the evm_file_release routine from second place
to bottom of the profile.

Fixes: 75a323e604fc ("evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr</title>
<updated>2024-07-31T18:47:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xu Kuohai</name>
<email>xukuohai@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-24T02:06:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=924e19c39e8f0bbd581ab8a049f95a0ed02235b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:924e19c39e8f0bbd581ab8a049f95a0ed02235b1</id>
<content type='text'>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code.

Before:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when
  discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any
  other negative error code otherwise.

After:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED*
  when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or
  any other negative error code otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
