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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/Kconfig, branch v5.0.15</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.0.15</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.0.15'/>
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<updated>2019-01-02T17:43:14+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-01-02T17:43:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-02T17:43:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f218a29c25ad8abdb961435d6b8139f462061364'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f218a29c25ad8abdb961435d6b8139f462061364</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
  upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
  kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
  loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
  independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
  boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.

  In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
  ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
  the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
  kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.

  (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
  preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
  use case scenario, are included here)"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  integrity: Remove references to module keyring
  ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
  ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
  efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
  efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
  efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
  efi: Add EFI signature data types
  integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
  integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
  selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
  ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
  x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
  docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
  x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
  ima: add support for arch specific policies
  ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
  ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
  x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
  integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotes</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T15:25:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-11T11:01:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8636a1f9677db4f883f29a072f401303acfc2edd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8636a1f9677db4f883f29a072f401303acfc2edd</id>
<content type='text'>
The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in
the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to
support bare file paths in the source statement.

I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of
ambiguity.

The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes,
and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals.

Make it treewide consistent now.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa@the-dreams.de&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring</title>
<updated>2018-12-13T03:02:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-08T20:26:59+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9dc92c45177ab70e20ae94baa2f2e558da63a9c7</id>
<content type='text'>
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec
additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing
to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In
such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel
image.

It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party
keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable.
The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an
administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage.
In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the
necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to
store platform keys.

This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys
provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to
facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this
keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from
userspace.

This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: integrity: Remove select to deleted option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA</title>
<updated>2016-04-12T18:54:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Ziegler</name>
<email>andreas.ziegler@fau.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-12T18:54:58+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:93da17b18539cb021f1075f8620ee8f6da9b42aa</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit d43de6c780a8 ("akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to
the crypto layer") removed the Kconfig option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA,
but forgot to remove a 'select' to this option in the definition of
INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.

Let's remove the select, as it's ineffective now.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Ziegler &lt;andreas.ziegler@fau.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: convert digsig to akcipher api</title>
<updated>2016-02-18T14:52:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tadeusz Struk</name>
<email>tadeusz.struk@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-02T18:08:58+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:eb5798f2e28f3b43091cecc71c84c3f6fb35c7de</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.

Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk &lt;tadeusz.struk@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option</title>
<updated>2016-02-10T10:13:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-03T15:04:40+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:50d35015ff0c00a464e35b109231145d2beec1bd</id>
<content type='text'>
CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now
mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in
userspace).

The defconfig references were removed with:

	perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \
	    `git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y`

and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Andreas Ziegler &lt;andreas.ziegler@fau.de&gt;
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring</title>
<updated>2015-11-23T19:30:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-22T18:26:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f4dc37785e9b3373d0cb93125d5579fed2af3a43'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f4dc37785e9b3373d0cb93125d5579fed2af3a43</id>
<content type='text'>
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.

This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().

Changes in v3:
* Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
  keyring instead of using  __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
* Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING

Changes in v2:
* Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
  CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
* Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
  file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes</title>
<updated>2015-01-07T12:08:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Jaeger</name>
<email>cj@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-20T20:41:11+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6341e62b212a2541efb0160c470e90bd226d5496</id>
<content type='text'>
Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on.

No functional change.

Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger &lt;cj@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: base integrity subsystem kconfig options on integrity</title>
<updated>2014-09-09T14:28:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-17T12:07:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7ef84e65ecc60289281e8e7e83a8bb6a97d7df5c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7ef84e65ecc60289281e8e7e83a8bb6a97d7df5c</id>
<content type='text'>
The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than
half of the security menu.  This patch consolidates the options
under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled.  This change
does not affect existing configurations.  Re-configuration is not
needed.

Changes v4:
- no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as
options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi)
- add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description

Changes v3:
- dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY'

Changes v2:
- previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu.
  This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi).

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: move asymmetric keys config option</title>
<updated>2014-09-09T14:28:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-17T11:41:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1ae8f41c23ff6a75c1432faed7281aea5ce7c236'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ae8f41c23ff6a75c1432faed7281aea5ce7c236</id>
<content type='text'>
For better visual appearance it is better to co-locate
asymmetric key options together with signature support.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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