<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/apparmor/policy.c, branch v7.0.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v7.0.12</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v7.0.12'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:44+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-24T18:20:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.

The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference.  However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.

Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.

Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair &lt;maxime.belair@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-07T16:36:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425</id>
<content type='text'>
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by
opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by
passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the
privileged process to write to the interface.

This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do
the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is
achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible
implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or
target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the
unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for
a local privilege escalation.

The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply
changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able
to load policy to different policy namespaces.

Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that
are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already
done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate
access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.

Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles()</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-10T13:22:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5df0c44e8f5f619d3beb871207aded7c78414502'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5df0c44e8f5f619d3beb871207aded7c78414502</id>
<content type='text'>
if ns_name is NULL after
1071         error = aa_unpack(udata, &amp;lh, &amp;ns_name);

and if ent-&gt;ns_name contains an ns_name in
1089                 } else if (ent-&gt;ns_name) {

then ns_name is assigned the ent-&gt;ns_name
1095                         ns_name = ent-&gt;ns_name;

however ent-&gt;ns_name is freed at
1262                 aa_load_ent_free(ent);

and then again when freeing ns_name at
1270         kfree(ns_name);

Fix this by NULLing out ent-&gt;ns_name after it is transferred to ns_name

Fixes: 145a0ef21c8e9 ("apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load
")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Massimiliano Pellizzer</name>
<email>massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-13T08:09:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747</id>
<content type='text'>
The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles,
which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes.

Reproducer:
  $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i&lt;1024; i++)); do
      echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a;
      pf="$pf//x";
  done
  $ echo -n a &gt; /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove

Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an
iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly
finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed,
maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion.

Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer &lt;massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types</title>
<updated>2026-02-21T09:02:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-21T07:49:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: guard against free routines being called with a NULL</title>
<updated>2026-01-29T09:27:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-04T05:07:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e16eee7895502bc3c07043169940b005d44bba8f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e16eee7895502bc3c07043169940b005d44bba8f</id>
<content type='text'>
aa_free_data() and free_attachment() don't guard against having
a NULL parameter passed to them. Fix this.

Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: add support loading per permission tagging</title>
<updated>2026-01-29T09:27:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-01T22:51:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for the per permission tag index for a given permission
set. This will be used by both meta-data tagging, to allow annotating
accept states with context and debug information. As well as by rule
tainting and triggers to specify the taint or trigger to be applied.

Since these are low frequency ancillary data items they are stored
in a tighter packed format to that allows for sharing and reuse of the
strings between permissions and accept states. Reducing the amount of
kernel memory use at the cost of having to go through a couple if
index based indirections.

The tags are just strings that has no meaning with out context. When
used as meta-data for auditing and debugging its entirely information
for userspace, but triggers, and tainting can be used to affect the
domain. However they all exist in the same packed data set and can
be shared between different uses.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: make str table more generic and be able to have multiple entries</title>
<updated>2026-01-22T12:56:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-01T09:21:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c140dcd1246bfe705921ca881bbb247ff1ba2bca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c140dcd1246bfe705921ca881bbb247ff1ba2bca</id>
<content type='text'>
The strtable is currently limited to a single entry string on unpack
even though domain has the concept of multiple entries within it. Make
this a reality as it will be used for tags and more advanced domain
transitions.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: replace sprintf with snprintf in aa_new_learning_profile</title>
<updated>2026-01-16T18:46:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thorsten Blum</name>
<email>thorsten.blum@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-22T11:54:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7db8c3c738118b6d9e5c3eb54e352fdae1bb0faf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7db8c3c738118b6d9e5c3eb54e352fdae1bb0faf</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace unbounded sprintf() calls with snprintf() to prevent potential
buffer overflows in aa_new_learning_profile(). While the current code
works correctly, snprintf() is safer and follows secure coding best
practices.  No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum &lt;thorsten.blum@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix: oops when trying to free null ruleset</title>
<updated>2025-08-04T08:14:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-02T03:36:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5f49c2d1f422c660c726ac5e0499c66c901633c2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5f49c2d1f422c660c726ac5e0499c66c901633c2</id>
<content type='text'>
profile allocation is wrongly setting the number of entries on the
rules vector before any ruleset is assigned. If profile allocation
fails between ruleset allocation and assigning the first ruleset,
free_ruleset() will be called with a null pointer resulting in an
oops.

[  107.350226] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:545!
[  107.350912] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  107.351447] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.14.6-hwe-rlee287-dev+ #5
[  107.353279] Hardware name:[   107.350218] -QE-----------[ cutMU here ]--------- Ub---
[  107.3502untu26] kernel BUG a 24t mm/slub.c:545.!04 P
[  107.350912]C ( Oops: invalid oi4pcode: 0000 [#1]40 PREEMPT SMP NOPFXTI
 + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  107.356054] RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x152/0x340
[  107.356444] Code: 00 4c 89 ff e8 0f ac df 00 48 8b 14 24 48 8b 4c 24 20 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 03 48 c1 e8 09 83 e0 01 88 44 24 13 e9 71 ff ff ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 41 f7 44 24 08 87 04 00 00 75 b2 eb a8 41 f7 44 24 08 87 04
[  107.357856] RSP: 0018:ffffad4a800fbbb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  107.358937] RAX: ffff97ebc2a88e70 RBX: ffffd759400aa200 RCX: 0000000000800074
[  107.359976] RDX: ffff97ebc2a88e60 RSI: ffffd759400aa200 RDI: ffffad4a800fbc20
[  107.360600] RBP: ffffad4a800fbc50 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff86f02cf2
[  107.361254] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff97ecc0049400
[  107.361934] R13: ffff97ebc2a88e60 R14: ffff97ecc0049400 R15: 0000000000000000
[  107.362597] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff97ecfb200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  107.363332] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  107.363784] CR2: 000061c9545ac000 CR3: 0000000047aa6000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  107.364331] PKRU: 55555554
[  107.364545] Call Trace:
[  107.364761]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  107.364931]  ? local_clock+0x15/0x30
[  107.365219]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  107.365593]  ? kfree_sensitive+0x32/0x70
[  107.365900]  kfree+0x29d/0x3a0
[  107.366144]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  107.366510]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0
[  107.366841]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  107.367209]  kfree_sensitive+0x32/0x70
[  107.367502]  aa_free_profile.part.0+0xa2/0x400
[  107.367850]  ? rcu_do_batch+0x1e6/0x5e0
[  107.368148]  aa_free_profile+0x23/0x60
[  107.368438]  label_free_switch+0x4c/0x80
[  107.368751]  label_free_rcu+0x1c/0x50
[  107.369038]  rcu_do_batch+0x1e8/0x5e0
[  107.369324]  ? rcu_do_batch+0x157/0x5e0
[  107.369626]  rcu_core+0x1b0/0x2f0
[  107.369888]  rcu_core_si+0xe/0x20
[  107.370156]  handle_softirqs+0x9b/0x3d0
[  107.370460]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x26/0x210
[  107.370790]  run_ksoftirqd+0x3a/0x70
[  107.371070]  smpboot_thread_fn+0xf9/0x210
[  107.371383]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[  107.371746]  kthread+0x10d/0x280
[  107.372010]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  107.372310]  ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
[  107.372655]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  107.372974]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  107.373316]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[  107.373505] Modules linked in: af_packet_diag mptcp_diag tcp_diag udp_diag raw_diag inet_diag snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer snd soundcore qrtr binfmt_misc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd i2c_piix4 i2c_smbus input_leds joydev sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock vmw_vmci dmi_sysfs qemu_fw_cfg ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid psmouse serio_raw floppy bochs pata_acpi
[  107.379086] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Don't set the count until a ruleset is actually allocated and
guard against free_ruleset() being called with a null pointer.

Reported-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Fixes: 217af7e2f4de ("apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
