kernel/linux.git/security/apparmor/include/policy.h, branch v6.12.80

apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it

2026-03-13T16:20:48+00:00

commit 8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3 upstream. AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction. Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management

2026-03-13T16:20:48+00:00

commit 6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425 upstream. An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface. This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation. The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces. Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check. Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: allow restricting unprivileged change_profile

2023-10-18T22:48:44+00:00

unprivileged unconfined can use change_profile to alter the confinement set by the mac admin. Allow restricting unprivileged unconfined by still allowing change_profile but stacking the change against unconfined. This allows unconfined to still apply system policy but allows the task to enter the new confinement. If unprivileged unconfined is required a sysctl is provided to switch to the previous behavior. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia Signed-off-by: John Johansen

apparmor: refcount the pdb

2023-10-18T22:30:47+00:00

With the move to permission tables the dfa is no longer a stand alone entity when used, needing a minimum of a permission table. However it still could be shared among different pdbs each using a different permission table. Instead of duping the permission table when sharing a pdb, add a refcount to the pdb so it can be easily shared. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia Signed-off-by: John Johansen

apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.

2023-10-18T22:30:38+00:00

The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia Signed-off-by: John Johansen

apparmor: remove unused PROF_* macros

2023-08-08T20:24:48+00:00

The last usage of PROF_{ADD,REPLACE} were removed by commit 18e99f191a8e ("apparmor: provide finer control over policy management"). So remove these two unused macros. Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi Signed-off-by: John Johansen

apparmor: cleanup unused declarations in policy.h

2023-08-08T20:15:39+00:00

The implementions of these declarations do not exist, remove them all. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng Signed-off-by: John Johansen

apparmor: refactor code that alloc null profiles

2022-10-25T05:35:36+00:00

Bother unconfined and learning profiles use the null profile as their base. Refactor so they are share a common base routine. This doesn't save much atm but will be important when the feature set of the parent is inherited. Signed-off-by: John Johansen

apparmor: rework profile->rules to be a list

2022-10-03T21:49:04+00:00

Convert profile->rules to a list as the next step towards supporting multiple rulesets in a profile. For this step only support a single list entry item. The logic for iterating the list will come as a separate step. Signed-off-by: John Johansen

apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments

2022-10-03T21:49:04+00:00

In preparation for moving from a single set of rules and a single attachment to multiple rulesets and attachments separate from the profile refactor attachment information and ruleset info into their own structures. Signed-off-by: John Johansen