<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/apparmor/include/lib.h, branch v6.1.168</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.168</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.168'/>
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<updated>2025-08-28T14:26:01+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: use the condition in AA_BUG_FMT even with debug disabled</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:26:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Guzik</name>
<email>mjguzik@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-27T20:54:04+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:91e10ec23a70432d90a62d51bca40e569d1580ae</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 67e370aa7f968f6a4f3573ed61a77b36d1b26475 ]

This follows the established practice and fixes a build failure for me:
security/apparmor/file.c: In function ‘__file_sock_perm’:
security/apparmor/file.c:544:24: error: unused variable ‘sock’ [-Werror=unused-variable]
  544 |         struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file-&gt;private_data;
      |                        ^~~~

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Free up __cleanup() name</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T08:12:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-09T07:48:59+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:579cfab21b59fbf4bba2a564c5810ad72e7f868a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9a1f37ebcfe061721564042254719dc8fd5c9fa0 upstream.

In order to use __cleanup for __attribute__((__cleanup__(func))) the
name must not be used for anything else. Avoid the conflict.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230612093537.536441207%40infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix absroot causing audited secids to begin with =</title>
<updated>2022-07-09T22:13:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-14T10:59:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=511f7b5b835726e844a5fc7444c18e4b8672edfd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:511f7b5b835726e844a5fc7444c18e4b8672edfd</id>
<content type='text'>
AppArmor is prefixing secids that are converted to secctx with the =
to indicate the secctx should only be parsed from an absolute root
POV. This allows catching errors where secctx are reparsed back into
internal labels.

Unfortunately because audit is using secid to secctx conversion this
means that subject and object labels can result in a very unfortunate
== that can break audit parsing.

eg. the subj==unconfined term in the below audit message

type=USER_LOGIN msg=audit(1639443365.233:160): pid=1633 uid=0 auid=1000
ses=3 subj==unconfined msg='op=login id=1000 exe="/usr/sbin/sshd"
hostname=192.168.122.1 addr=192.168.122.1 terminal=/dev/pts/1 res=success'

Fix this by switch the prepending of = to a _. This still works as a
special character to flag this case without breaking audit. Also move
this check behind debug as it should not be needed during normal
operqation.

Fixes: 26b7899510ae ("apparmor: add support for absolute root view based labels")
Reported-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix zero-length compiler warning in AA_BUG()</title>
<updated>2021-11-03T08:08:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-03T06:27:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4d47fbbe54bf75b72eac3f5a0caa664300937620'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d47fbbe54bf75b72eac3f5a0caa664300937620</id>
<content type='text'>
Uses of AA_BUG() without a message can result in the compiler warning

  warning: zero-length gnu_printf format string [-Wformat-zero-length]

Fix this with a pragma for now. A larger rework of AA_BUG() will
follow.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: avoid -Wempty-body warning</title>
<updated>2021-11-03T07:46:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T11:00:08+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c75ea024094e7307219a4f9c706dad5ea461509a</id>
<content type='text'>
Building with 'make W=1' shows a warning for an empty macro:

security/apparmor/label.c: In function '__label_update':
security/apparmor/label.c:2096:59: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'else' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
 2096 |                 AA_BUG(labels_ns(label) != labels_ns(new));

Change the macro definition to use no_printk(), which improves
format string checking and avoids the warning.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Infrastructure management of the cred security blob</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-12T17:30:56+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:bbd3662a834813730912a58efb44dd6df6d952e6</id>
<content type='text'>
Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -&gt; SB_xyz)</title>
<updated>2017-11-27T21:05:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-27T21:05:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1751e8a6cb935e555fcdbcb9ab4f0446e322ca3e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1751e8a6cb935e555fcdbcb9ab4f0446e322ca3e</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.

The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.

Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb-&gt;s_flags.

The script to do this was:

    # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
    # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
    # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
    FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
            include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
            security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
    # the list of MS_... constants
    SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
          DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
          POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \
          I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \
          ACTIVE NOUSER"

    SED_PROG=
    for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done

    # we want files that contain at least one of MS_...,
    # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded.
    L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c')

    for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done

Requested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>locking/rwsem, security/apparmor: Replace homebrew use of write_can_lock() with lockdep</title>
<updated>2017-10-10T09:50:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-03T18:25:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=26c4eb192c6224e5297496cead36404b62fb071b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:26c4eb192c6224e5297496cead36404b62fb071b</id>
<content type='text'>
The lockdep subsystem provides a robust way to assert that a lock is
held, so use that instead of write_can_lock, which can give incorrect
results for qrwlocks.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507055129-12300-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: move exec domain mediation to using labels</title>
<updated>2017-06-11T00:11:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-09T23:55:04+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:93c98a484c4900f0d2c65c16466d45f90ea5b175</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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