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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/Kconfig, branch linux-2.6.34.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-2.6.34.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-2.6.34.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2009-11-24T04:06:47+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option</title>
<updated>2009-11-24T04:06:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Serge E. Hallyn</name>
<email>serue@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-23T22:21:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b3a222e52e4d4be77cc4520a57af1a4a0d8222d1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b3a222e52e4d4be77cc4520a57af1a4a0d8222d1</id>
<content type='text'>
As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y.  Since having the option on
leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities,
the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves
you (on my s390x partition) 5k.  In particular, vmlinux sizes
came to:

without patch fscaps=n:		 	53598392
without patch fscaps=y:		 	53603406
with this patch applied:		53603342

with the security-next tree.

Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for
userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,
while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding
sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported
with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for
applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why
something failed.

It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must
maintain at the risk of severe security regressions.

So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile
option.  It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock
SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the
cap_limit_ptraced_target() function.

Changelog:
	Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic
		was ifndef'ed.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan" &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Config option to set a default LSM</title>
<updated>2009-11-08T21:40:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-06T01:03:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6e65f92ff0d6f18580737321718d09035085a3fb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6e65f92ff0d6f18580737321718d09035085a3fb</id>
<content type='text'>
The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select
a specific LSM.  This adds a config option that allows specifying a default
LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter.
If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM
to register is used.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: remove root_plug</title>
<updated>2009-10-20T05:26:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-20T04:48:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3e1c2515acf70448cad1ae3ab835ca80be043d33'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e1c2515acf70448cad1ae3ab835ca80be043d33</id>
<content type='text'>
    Remove the root_plug example LSM code.  It's unmaintained and
    increasingly broken in various ways.

    Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!

    Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
    Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge commit 'v2.6.31-rc8' into x86/txt</title>
<updated>2009-09-02T06:17:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@elte.hu</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-02T06:17:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=936e894a976dd3b0f07f1f6f43c17b77b7e6146d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:936e894a976dd3b0f07f1f6f43c17b77b7e6146d</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
	security/Kconfig

Merge reason: resolve the conflicts, bump up from rc3 to rc8.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86</title>
<updated>2009-09-02T01:25:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shane Wang</name>
<email>shane.wang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-02T01:25:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=69575d388603365f2afbf4166df93152df59b165'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69575d388603365f2afbf4166df93152df59b165</id>
<content type='text'>
Move tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt
patch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code
init/main.c and kernel/cpu.c.

Signed-off-by: Shane Wang &lt;shane.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR</title>
<updated>2009-08-18T22:42:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Schwab</name>
<email>schwab@linux-m68k.org</email>
</author>
<published>2009-08-18T20:14:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=024e6cb408307de41cbfcb1e5a170d9af60ab2a9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:024e6cb408307de41cbfcb1e5a170d9af60ab2a9</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

(Verbs are cool!)

Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab &lt;schwab@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Make LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR default match its help text.</title>
<updated>2009-08-18T22:38:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Jones</name>
<email>davej@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-08-18T17:47:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a58578e47f004017cf47803ad372490806630e58'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a58578e47f004017cf47803ad372490806630e58</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3 added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
option, whose help text states "For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots
of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems."
Which implies that it's default setting was typoed.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr</title>
<updated>2009-08-17T05:09:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-07-31T16:54:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.

The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help</title>
<updated>2009-08-14T23:43:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo</name>
<email>acme@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-08-12T15:00:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3c556e4198926b284ff5ff6756111a64e1e98cb0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3c556e4198926b284ff5ff6756111a64e1e98cb0</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support</title>
<updated>2009-07-21T18:49:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joseph Cihula</name>
<email>joseph.cihula@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-07-01T02:30:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3162534069597e34dd0ac9eb711be8dc23835ae7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3162534069597e34dd0ac9eb711be8dc23835ae7</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted
Execution Technology (Intel TXT).

Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution
Technology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that
provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms.

Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).

Intel TXT in Brief:
o  Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
o  Data protection in case of improper shutdown
o  Measurement and verification of launched environment

Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some
non-vPro systems.  It is currently available on desktop systems based on
the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP
dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45
Express chipsets.

For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which
has been updated for the new released platforms.

A much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to
configure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file
in this patch.

This patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality,
documentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure,
and boot detection of a TXT launch.  Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system
will result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes
properly.

 Documentation/intel_txt.txt      |  210 +++++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt  |    1
 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h |    3
 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h    |    3
 arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h     |  197 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile         |    1
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c          |    4
 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c          |  379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/Kconfig                 |   30 +++
 9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Signed-off-by: Joseph Cihula &lt;joseph.cihula@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shane Wang &lt;shane.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei &lt;gang.wei@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
