<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net, branch v6.1.187</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.187</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.187'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kyle Zeng</name>
<email>kylebot@openai.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-17T08:58:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9039e4f3e1c0ffe2b575b655b3f58fdd10f7e40c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9039e4f3e1c0ffe2b575b655b3f58fdd10f7e40c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 44930446dde45a7a90fe1446fa38eb0e2c561646 upstream.

End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through
decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner
packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB
before IPv4 interprets skb-&gt;cb.

The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and
IPCB use the same skb-&gt;cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)-&gt;lastopt overlaps
IPCB(skb)-&gt;opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)-&gt;nhoff overlaps rr and
ts.

The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer
extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination
Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the
Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled
Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to
40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees
optlen = 40 and rr = 40.

Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying
when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates
room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The
stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the
Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled
byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte
option-data area.

Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5
kernel both produced:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()
  Write of size 255

The relevant End.DX4 call path is:

  __ip_options_echo
  tcp_v4_route_req
  tcp_conn_request
  tcp_v4_conn_request
  tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_v4_do_rcv
  tcp_v4_rcv
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
  ip_local_deliver_finish
  ip_local_deliver
  input_action_end_dx4_finish
  input_action_end_dx4

The relevant End.DT4 call path is:

  __ip_options_echo
  tcp_v4_route_req
  tcp_conn_request
  tcp_v4_conn_request
  tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_v4_do_rcv
  tcp_v4_rcv
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
  ip_local_deliver_finish
  ip_local_deliver
  input_action_end_dt4

tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so
it does not appear as a separate frame.

When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress
interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing
this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and
End.DT46's IPv4 arm.

Use IP6CB(skb)-&gt;iif rather than skb-&gt;skb_iif. These actions run after
l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master;
IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.

Fixes: 891ef8dd2a8d ("ipv6: sr: implement additional seg6local actions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Andrea Mayer &lt;andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;kylebot@openai.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: David Lee &lt;david.lee@trailofbits.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Lee &lt;david.lee@trailofbits.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer &lt;andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260817085839.946321-1-david.lee@trailofbits.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLAN's multicast context</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Norbert Szetei</name>
<email>norbert@doyensec.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T09:12:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=22226a2c3b90f15b0925f1464470d3baa6c5677e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22226a2c3b90f15b0925f1464470d3baa6c5677e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 50e5c6605cc9c2dd57bd2d1b3459674d19738983 upstream.

br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under
br-&gt;multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context.  That is
the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through
br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -&gt; br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so
once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again.

For a master VLAN the handshake never runs.  __vlan_del() clears
BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so
br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on
!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br-&gt;multicast_lock is
never taken.  br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a
reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and
re-arms it.  The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no
br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br-&gt;multicast_lock,
so it is not affected.

The reader is the bridge transmit path.  For a master VLAN
br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &amp;vlan-&gt;br_mcast_ctx with
pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's
timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601
   __mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50
   br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390
   __br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530
   br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260
   br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0
   br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540
  Allocated by task 610:
   br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40
   br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0
  Freed by task 0:
   kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0
   rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0

Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the
br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it.  Disabling then
always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br-&gt;multicast_lock before
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context.

Fixes: 7b54aaaf53cb ("net: bridge: multicast: add vlan state initialization and control")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei &lt;norbert@doyensec.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;razor@blackwall.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/D400F6C7-543A-4B79-9E5B-D1D8974DE5C9@doyensec.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zihan Xi</name>
<email>zihanx@nebusec.ai</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-27T17:30:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ba0c110c205855b3f1e3130d8c0fdb484d704c8c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ba0c110c205855b3f1e3130d8c0fdb484d704c8c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream.

attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x-&gt;aalg while leaving
x-&gt;props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no
sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes).

xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x-&gt;props.aalgo as "no auth
algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites
x-&gt;aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown
only frees the replacement pointer.

Check whether x-&gt;aalg is already attached instead of inferring that
state from x-&gt;props.aalgo.

Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega &lt;vega@nebusec.ai&gt;
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi &lt;zihanx@nebusec.ai&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;enjou1224z@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada</name>
<email>manizada@pm.me</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-23T09:35:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1b7e066eabcc7d6d8f476c34739b45932f2f4c31'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b7e066eabcc7d6d8f476c34739b45932f2f4c31</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7bad4bda74dc4713f398d3b7624ff05478e3a568 upstream.

AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the
ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than
the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field.

That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with
hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary
segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves
its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to
memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access.

Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or
performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header
errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: avom-custom-harness:gpt-5.5-qwen3.6-mod-mix
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada &lt;manizada@pm.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhiling Zou</name>
<email>roxy520tt@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-18T07:12:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6af5cdb03819a5ce6e945992635c6c5e91045367'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6af5cdb03819a5ce6e945992635c6c5e91045367</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e1d7c5ac1c246ce5775f604515de0a59fbf2116e upstream.

ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp()
restores skb-&gt;dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into
the XFRM input path.

Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has
been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that
case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input
paths both expect skb-&gt;dev to be valid while building the route lookup,
so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device.

Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved.
Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive
path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress
device still exists.

Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega &lt;vega@nebusec.ai&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou &lt;roxy520tt@gmail.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Reviewed-by: Ren Wei &lt;enjou1224z@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabrina Dubroca</name>
<email>sd@queasysnail.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-16T20:54:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4bc0dfa28dca6fc0084203732695968049c44072'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4bc0dfa28dca6fc0084203732695968049c44072</id>
<content type='text'>
commit deb232e884877bf10b4ce2580909eedec986c284 upstream.

ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp
sockets:

    espintcp_close() frees emsg-&gt;skb via kfree_skb() without holding
    any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue
    invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -&gt; espintcp_push_skb() -&gt;
    espintcp_push_msgs() -&gt; skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the
    same skb as a data source.

Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot,
since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket
with sk_prot == &amp;tcp_prot.  Simply taking the socket lock in
espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish()
re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing
barrier() is no longer needed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag()</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiayuan Chen</name>
<email>jiayuan.chen@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-23T08:47:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=03ced5da6120965d80ed56dbb7d78fa5c9128906'/>
<id>urn:sha1:03ced5da6120965d80ed56dbb7d78fa5c9128906</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b17cf742eaad70ae29ac558cefb3aa9bbeea03d4 upstream.

Found with syzkaller and a local syzbot instance running on top of a
netdevsim TLS offload emulation; tls_device.c is otherwise only reachable
on a machine with a NIC that implements the offload.

tls_push_data() only checks whether the open record still has room for
another frag at the bottom of its loop, and the MSG_MORE early break
skips that check.  The record survives to the next syscall with the frag
count it already had, and tls_append_frag() does not check either, so
with TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO every splice(SPLICE_F_MORE) of a byte or two adds
a non-coalescing pipe page and num_frags walks off the end of
tls_record_info.frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS].  Once the record is pushed,
tls_push_record() runs the same index over sg_tx_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS] and
the sg_set_page() writes land on the destruct_work that follows it, which
the workqueue then calls.

The byte limit is fine because copy drops to 0 and the loop falls through
to the same check; the frag count has no such feedback.

Push the record rather than keep a full one open, which is what a plain
TCP socket does - tcp_sendmsg_locked() uses tcp_mark_push() and
new_segment in both the copy and the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES paths, and tls_sw
already sets full_record when the sk_msg ring fills up, MSG_MORE or not.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tls_append_frag ( net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881104d1530 by task tls_oob/450

  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 450 Comm: tls_oob Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7+ #329 PREEMPT
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
   print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   tls_append_frag (net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
   tls_push_data (net/tls/tls_device.c:518)
   tls_device_sendmsg (net/tls/tls_device.c:583)
   inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:865)
   sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775 net/socket.c:790 net/socket.c:813)
   splice_to_socket (fs/splice.c:884)
   do_splice (fs/splice.c:936 fs/splice.c:1349)
   __do_splice (fs/splice.c:1431)
   __x64_sys_splice (fs/splice.c:1634 fs/splice.c:1616)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

and, once the record is pushed:

  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:300:24
  index 18 is out of range for type 'skb_frag_t [17]'
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:301:41
  index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:302:39
  index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:307:38
  index 26 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'

  kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea000411a680
  #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
  Oops: Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
  Workqueue: ktls_device_destruct 0xffffea000411a680
  RIP: 0010:0xffffea000411a680
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3405 kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260823084758.20936-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: igmp: Fix potential UAF in igmp_gq_start_timer()</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-05T18:17:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=74b301f7f197517016befb5f5dfab01f7bc64be5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:74b301f7f197517016befb5f5dfab01f7bc64be5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7b19c0f81ed1fdaec6bc522569be367199a9edf3 upstream.

A race condition exists between device teardown (inetdev_destroy) and
incoming IGMP query processing (igmp_rcv), leading to a Use-After-Free
in the IGMP timer callback.

During device destruction, inetdev_destroy() drops the primary reference
to in_device, which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of
in_device memory is deferred via RCU (using call_rcu()).

Concurrently, igmp_rcv() runs under RCU read lock and obtains the
in_device pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can safely
dereference in_device even if its refcount has hit 0.

However, if CPU-0 calls igmp_gq_start_timer() and re-arms the timer, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the in_device memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period (as the free callback does not check the refcount again),
the device is freed while the timer is still armed. When the timer
expires, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.

Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not arm the timer.

A similar issue in IPv6 MLD is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative &lt;zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260705181756.963063-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
[Denis Arefev: adapted for 6.1: keep prandom_u32_max(),
get_random_u32_below() not used here]
Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev &lt;arefev@swemel.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_event: validate LE Set CIG Parameters response</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laxman Acharya Padhya</name>
<email>acharyalaxman8848@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T18:48:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9e05783d0bb96a7b853cc058a7c7de2dc4a62154'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e05783d0bb96a7b853cc058a7c7de2dc4a62154</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0acd4eeb4b225b9bebbf9ef96cc10cdd79b94899 ]

The Command Complete dispatch validates only the fixed part of the LE Set
CIG Parameters response. After that part is pulled from the skb,
hci_cc_le_set_cig_params() trusts num_handles and reads each entry in the
trailing handle array.

Matching num_handles against the command's num_cis does not guarantee
that the response contains the advertised handles. A truncated response
from a malfunctioning controller can therefore make the handler read
beyond the skb data.

Validate that the remaining skb data contains all advertised handles.
Include this in the existing response validation so malformed responses
also follow the established CIG failure handling.

Fixes: 26afbd826ee3 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laxman Acharya Padhya &lt;acharyalaxman8848@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_event: fix Set CIG Parameters error status handling</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:28:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pauli Virtanen</name>
<email>pav@iki.fi</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T18:48:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8317afc5d532213620efc232a212b9091ba72565'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8317afc5d532213620efc232a212b9091ba72565</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit db9cbcadc16e8b9f0b3ef5870f3a38ebafcbe8e0 ]

If the event has error status, return right error code and don't show
incorrect "response malformed" messages.

Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen &lt;pav@iki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 0acd4eeb4b22 ("Bluetooth: hci_event: validate LE Set CIG Parameters response")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
