<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net, branch v5.4.130</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.4.130</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.4.130'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:48+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: annotate accesses to po-&gt;ifindex</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-16T13:42:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f12a5b48bcc8b23929308fee96297568058329aa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f12a5b48bcc8b23929308fee96297568058329aa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7cefffcfb79b9fc16c53011d2d9d11f ]

Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po-&gt;ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po-&gt;ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po-&gt;ifindex.

KCSAN reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname

write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
 packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
 packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
 __sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
 __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -&gt; 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: annotate accesses to po-&gt;bind</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-16T13:42:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cdcedd3c8683f87d157a360a3b4cbbdbdb3a6f9c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cdcedd3c8683f87d157a360a3b4cbbdbdb3a6f9c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4b03ed0ee1d13bc0c55f9cf62d49bd6 ]

tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po-&gt;num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po-&gt;num at the same time.

KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.

[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg

write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
 packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -&gt; 0x1200

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ping: Check return value of function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb'</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zheng Yongjun</name>
<email>zhengyongjun3@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T01:41:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d40ff07a7b7ded638099d85f6785fcd051c5d341'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d40ff07a7b7ded638099d85f6785fcd051c5d341</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50cc91691896934d106c86e4027e61ca ]

Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun &lt;zhengyongjun3@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ethtool: clear heap allocations for ethtool function</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Austin Kim</name>
<email>austindh.kim@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T02:34:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9df4f031536b993c77f8248d7851537404df69d2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9df4f031536b993c77f8248d7851537404df69d2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 80ec82e3d2c1fab42eeb730aaa7985494a963d3f ]

Several ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. This will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and
might copy the full contents back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim &lt;austindh.kim@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: drop multicast fragments</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T14:13:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=62aed2df294a8a635c3b29af48b73bc779867809'/>
<id>urn:sha1:62aed2df294a8a635c3b29af48b73bc779867809</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a9799541ca34652d9996e45f80e8e03144c12949 ]

These are not permitted by the spec, just drop them.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609161305.23def022b750.Ibd6dd3cdce573dae262fcdc47f8ac52b883a9c50@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ipv4: Remove unneed BUG() function</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zheng Yongjun</name>
<email>zhengyongjun3@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-08T01:53:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=eb2b1216bc8f48d6537de8ff2eb8fb9bdc623892'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eb2b1216bc8f48d6537de8ff2eb8fb9bdc623892</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5ac6b198d7e312bd10ebe7d58c64690dc59cc49a ]

When 'nla_parse_nested_deprecated' failed, it's no need to
BUG() here, return -EINVAL is ok.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun &lt;zhengyongjun3@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cfg80211: call cfg80211_leave_ocb when switching away from OCB</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Du Cheng</name>
<email>ducheng2@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-28T06:39:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f2c027a7750f2d7a35cd95858163cce9aae4c1aa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f2c027a7750f2d7a35cd95858163cce9aae4c1aa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a64b6a25dd9f984ed05fade603a00e2eae787d2f ]

If the userland switches back-and-forth between NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB and
NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), there is a
chance where the cleanup cfg80211_leave_ocb() is not called. This leads
to initialization of in-use memory (e.g. init u.ibss while in-use by
u.ocb) due to a shared struct/union within ieee80211_sub_if_data:

struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
    ...
    union {
        struct ieee80211_if_ap ap;
        struct ieee80211_if_vlan vlan;
        struct ieee80211_if_managed mgd;
        struct ieee80211_if_ibss ibss; // &lt;- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mesh mesh;
        struct ieee80211_if_ocb ocb; // &lt;- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mntr mntr;
        struct ieee80211_if_nan nan;
    } u;
    ...
}

Therefore add handling of otype == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB, during
cfg80211_change_iface() to perform cleanup when leaving OCB mode.

link to syzkaller bug:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0612dbfa595bf4b9b680ff7b4948257b8e3732d5

Reported-by: syzbot+105896fac213f26056f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Du Cheng &lt;ducheng2@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063941.105161-1-ducheng2@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: remove warning in ieee80211_get_sband()</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-17T14:47:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ae9de9444b54c867c9fc1383a6dcba1018cddaea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae9de9444b54c867c9fc1383a6dcba1018cddaea</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0ee4d55534f82a0624701d0bb9fc2304d4529086 ]

Syzbot reports that it's possible to hit this from userspace,
by trying to add a station before any other connection setup
has been done. Instead of trying to catch this in some other
way simply remove the warning, that will appropriately reject
the call from userspace.

Reported-by: syzbot+7716dbc401d9a437890d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517164715.f537da276d17.Id05f40ec8761d6a8cc2df87f1aa09c651988a586@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst refcnt when egressing</title>
<updated>2021-06-23T12:41:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolay Aleksandrov</name>
<email>nikolay@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T12:04:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=79855be6445b6592bddb7bd7167083ec8cdbd73f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79855be6445b6592bddb7bd7167083ec8cdbd73f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cfc579f9d89af4ada58c69b03bcaa4887840f3b3 upstream.

The egress tunnel code uses dst_clone() and directly sets the result
which is wrong because the entry might have 0 refcnt or be already deleted,
causing number of problems. It also triggers the WARN_ON() in dst_hold()[1]
when a refcnt couldn't be taken. Fix it by using dst_hold_safe() and
checking if a reference was actually taken before setting the dst.

[1] dmesg WARN_ON log and following refcnt errors
 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 38 at include/net/dst.h:230 br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
 Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp bridge stp llc bonding ipv6 virtio_net
 CPU: 5 PID: 38 Comm: ksoftirqd/5 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc3+ #360
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
 Code: e8 85 bc 01 e1 45 84 f6 74 90 45 31 f6 85 db 48 c7 c7 a0 02 19 a0 41 0f 94 c6 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 e8 64 bc 01 e1 85 db 75 02 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 48 c7 c7 70 02 19 a0 e8 4b bc 01 e1 49
 RSP: 0018:ffff8881003d39e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa01902a0
 RBP: ffff8881040c6700 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
 R10: 2ce93d0054fe0d00 R11: 54fe0d00000e0000 R12: ffff888109515000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000401
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88822bf40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f42ba70f030 CR3: 0000000109926000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 Call Trace:
  br_handle_vlan+0xbc/0xca [bridge]
  __br_forward+0x23/0x164 [bridge]
  deliver_clone+0x41/0x48 [bridge]
  br_handle_frame_finish+0x36f/0x3aa [bridge]
  ? skb_dst+0x2e/0x38 [bridge]
  ? br_handle_ingress_vlan_tunnel+0x3e/0x1c8 [bridge]
  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
  br_handle_frame+0x2c3/0x377 [bridge]
  ? __skb_pull+0x33/0x51
  ? vlan_do_receive+0x4f/0x36a
  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x539/0x7c6
  ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x16e/0x1c2
  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6d/0xd6
  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d9/0x1fa
  gro_normal_list+0x22/0x3e
  dev_gro_receive+0x55b/0x600
  ? detach_buf_split+0x58/0x140
  napi_gro_receive+0x94/0x12e
  virtnet_poll+0x15d/0x315 [virtio_net]
  __napi_poll+0x2c/0x1c9
  net_rx_action+0xe6/0x1fb
  __do_softirq+0x115/0x2d8
  run_ksoftirqd+0x18/0x20
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x183/0x19c
  ? smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread+0x66/0x66
  kthread+0x10a/0x10f
  ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xb6/0xb6
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
 ---[ end trace 49f61b07f775fd2b ]---
 dst_release: dst:00000000c02d677a refcnt:-1
 dst_release underflow

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 11538d039ac6 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst null pointer dereference</title>
<updated>2021-06-23T12:41:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolay Aleksandrov</name>
<email>nikolay@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T12:04:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a2241e62f6b4a774d8a92048fdf59c45f6c2fe5c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a2241e62f6b4a774d8a92048fdf59c45f6c2fe5c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 58e2071742e38f29f051b709a5cca014ba51166f upstream.

This patch fixes a tunnel_dst null pointer dereference due to lockless
access in the tunnel egress path. When deleting a vlan tunnel the
tunnel_dst pointer is set to NULL without waiting a grace period (i.e.
while it's still usable) and packets egressing are dereferencing it
without checking. Use READ/WRITE_ONCE to annotate the lockless use of
tunnel_id, use RCU for accessing tunnel_dst and make sure it is read
only once and checked in the egress path. The dst is already properly RCU
protected so we don't need to do anything fancy than to make sure
tunnel_id and tunnel_dst are read only once and checked in the egress path.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 11538d039ac6 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
