<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net, branch v4.4.41</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.41</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.41'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-01-09T07:07:52+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>libceph: verify authorize reply on connect</title>
<updated>2017-01-09T07:07:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilya Dryomov</name>
<email>idryomov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-02T15:35:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b66e3126569e25e11bc3913e41f6f39445508338'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b66e3126569e25e11bc3913e41f6f39445508338</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 upstream.

After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.

AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").

The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down.  Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil &lt;sage@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cfg80211/mac80211: fix BSS leaks when abandoning assoc attempts</title>
<updated>2017-01-09T07:07:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-08T16:22:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b63929e8e130a97303dfacc28f558262f0605708'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b63929e8e130a97303dfacc28f558262f0605708</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6f462df9acd2a3295e5d34eb29e2823220cf129 upstream.

When mac80211 abandons an association attempt, it may free
all the data structures, but inform cfg80211 and userspace
about it only by sending the deauth frame it received, in
which case cfg80211 has no link to the BSS struct that was
used and will not cfg80211_unhold_bss() it.

Fix this by providing a way to inform cfg80211 of this with
the BSS entry passed, so that it can clean up properly, and
use this ability in the appropriate places in mac80211.

This isn't ideal: some code is more or less duplicated and
tracing is missing. However, it's a fairly small change and
it's thus easier to backport - cleanups can come later.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>batman-adv: Check for alloc errors when preparing TT local data</title>
<updated>2016-12-15T16:49:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Eckelmann</name>
<email>sven@narfation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-30T20:47:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=537e42d759aeb833bfc6dbb3711bc45e5fddb308'/>
<id>urn:sha1:537e42d759aeb833bfc6dbb3711bc45e5fddb308</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c2d0f48a13e53b4747704c9e692f5e765e52041a upstream.

batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data can fail to allocate the memory for the
new TVLV block. The caller is informed about this problem with the returned
length of 0. Not checking this value results in an invalid memory access
when either tt_data or tt_change is accessed.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Fixes: 7ea7b4a14275 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: raw: raw_setsockopt: limit number of can_filter that can be set</title>
<updated>2016-12-15T16:49:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Kleine-Budde</name>
<email>mkl@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-05T10:44:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=083021bdba1e6d480170a4ae86cddc10f88c54d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:083021bdba1e6d480170a4ae86cddc10f88c54d5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 332b05ca7a438f857c61a3c21a88489a21532364 upstream.

This patch adds a check to limit the number of can_filters that can be
set via setsockopt on CAN_RAW sockets. Otherwise allocations &gt; MAX_ORDER
are not prevented resulting in a warning.

Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/2/230

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>esp6: Fix integrity verification when ESN are used</title>
<updated>2016-12-10T18:07:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobias Brunner</name>
<email>tobias@strongswan.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-29T16:05:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=52783ada69b4741cf0122bd593493cc6c3217b9b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:52783ada69b4741cf0122bd593493cc6c3217b9b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a55e23864d381c5a4ef110df94b00b2fe121a70d upstream.

When handling inbound packets, the two halves of the sequence number
stored on the skb are already in network order.

Fixes: 000ae7b2690e ("esp6: Switch to new AEAD interface")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner &lt;tobias@strongswan.org&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>esp4: Fix integrity verification when ESN are used</title>
<updated>2016-12-10T18:07:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobias Brunner</name>
<email>tobias@strongswan.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-29T16:05:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3bf28ce9c7499477aff4e6ecf07071978c2cabcf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3bf28ce9c7499477aff4e6ecf07071978c2cabcf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c7fedd51c02f4418e8b2eed64bdab601f882aa4 upstream.

When handling inbound packets, the two halves of the sequence number
stored on the skb are already in network order.

Fixes: 7021b2e1cddd ("esp4: Switch to new AEAD interface")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner &lt;tobias@strongswan.org&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: Set skb-&gt;protocol properly for local output</title>
<updated>2016-12-10T18:07:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eli Cooper</name>
<email>elicooper@gmx.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T02:05:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2176ec1c82eae70a9d43a974455d9bfe3dcd7bd2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2176ec1c82eae70a9d43a974455d9bfe3dcd7bd2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f4180439109aa720774baafdd798b3234ab1a0d2 upstream.

When xfrm is applied to TSO/GSO packets, it follows this path:

    xfrm_output() -&gt; xfrm_output_gso() -&gt; skb_gso_segment()

where skb_gso_segment() relies on skb-&gt;protocol to function properly.

This patch sets skb-&gt;protocol to ETH_P_IP before dst_output() is called,
fixing a bug where GSO packets sent through a sit tunnel are dropped
when xfrm is involved.

Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper &lt;elicooper@gmx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Set skb-&gt;protocol properly for local output</title>
<updated>2016-12-10T18:07:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eli Cooper</name>
<email>elicooper@gmx.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T02:05:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=25d8b7c105e13df4a0b14159a85c448158570909'/>
<id>urn:sha1:25d8b7c105e13df4a0b14159a85c448158570909</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b4e479a96fc398ccf83bb1cffb4ffef8631beaf1 upstream.

When xfrm is applied to TSO/GSO packets, it follows this path:

    xfrm_output() -&gt; xfrm_output_gso() -&gt; skb_gso_segment()

where skb_gso_segment() relies on skb-&gt;protocol to function properly.

This patch sets skb-&gt;protocol to ETH_P_IPV6 before dst_output() is called,
fixing a bug where GSO packets sent through an ipip6 tunnel are dropped
when xfrm is involved.

Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper &lt;elicooper@gmx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ping: check minimum size on ICMP header length</title>
<updated>2016-12-10T18:07:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-05T18:34:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=06cdad2b6d921dee33c8efc84922533dfb1458c6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:06cdad2b6d921dee33c8efc84922533dfb1458c6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0eab121ef8750a5c8637d51534d5e9143fb0633f ]

Prior to commit c0371da6047a ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there
was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header,
and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the
iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is
EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem
prior to v3.19.

This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G    BU         3.18.0-dirty #15
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[&lt;ffffffc000209c98&gt;] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[&lt;ffffffc000209e54&gt;] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[&lt;ffffffc000f18dc4&gt;] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[&lt;ffffffc000373dcc&gt;] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[&lt;ffffffc00037352c&gt;] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[&lt;ffffffc0005b9624&gt;] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[&lt;ffffffc000ddeba0&gt;] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[&lt;ffffffc000dded30&gt;] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[&lt;ffffffc000dc91dc&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[&lt;ffffffc000cab61c&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[&lt;ffffffc000cad270&gt;] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761

CVE-2016-8399

Reported-by: Qidan He &lt;i@flanker017.me&gt;
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE</title>
<updated>2016-12-10T18:07:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-02T17:44:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=77125815f058d587cac9217ac2c468038a7285c4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:77125815f058d587cac9217ac2c468038a7285c4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 ]

CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...

Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.

This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.

Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
