<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net, branch v4.4.275</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.275</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.275'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:37+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ping: Check return value of function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb'</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zheng Yongjun</name>
<email>zhengyongjun3@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T01:41:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=563bd9fbba96e5912fa2510b2f0ea4ff851e8f67'/>
<id>urn:sha1:563bd9fbba96e5912fa2510b2f0ea4ff851e8f67</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50cc91691896934d106c86e4027e61ca ]

Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun &lt;zhengyongjun3@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: drop multicast fragments</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T14:13:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=deb0f05255ad4478aae7964a1eb8a20893eb9bce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:deb0f05255ad4478aae7964a1eb8a20893eb9bce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a9799541ca34652d9996e45f80e8e03144c12949 ]

These are not permitted by the spec, just drop them.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609161305.23def022b750.Ibd6dd3cdce573dae262fcdc47f8ac52b883a9c50@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cfg80211: call cfg80211_leave_ocb when switching away from OCB</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Du Cheng</name>
<email>ducheng2@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-28T06:39:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c49b86ba5a25541531c501c4fa3c6a53bf8160ff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c49b86ba5a25541531c501c4fa3c6a53bf8160ff</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a64b6a25dd9f984ed05fade603a00e2eae787d2f ]

If the userland switches back-and-forth between NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB and
NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), there is a
chance where the cleanup cfg80211_leave_ocb() is not called. This leads
to initialization of in-use memory (e.g. init u.ibss while in-use by
u.ocb) due to a shared struct/union within ieee80211_sub_if_data:

struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
    ...
    union {
        struct ieee80211_if_ap ap;
        struct ieee80211_if_vlan vlan;
        struct ieee80211_if_managed mgd;
        struct ieee80211_if_ibss ibss; // &lt;- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mesh mesh;
        struct ieee80211_if_ocb ocb; // &lt;- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mntr mntr;
        struct ieee80211_if_nan nan;
    } u;
    ...
}

Therefore add handling of otype == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB, during
cfg80211_change_iface() to perform cleanup when leaving OCB mode.

link to syzkaller bug:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0612dbfa595bf4b9b680ff7b4948257b8e3732d5

Reported-by: syzbot+105896fac213f26056f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Du Cheng &lt;ducheng2@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063941.105161-1-ducheng2@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-24T21:53:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8fb8c138b5d69128964e54e1b5ee49fc395f011c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8fb8c138b5d69128964e54e1b5ee49fc395f011c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aa6dd211e4b1dde9d5dc25d699d35f789ae7eeba upstream.

In commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count")
I used a very small hash table that could be abused
by patient attackers to reveal sensitive information.

Switch to a dynamic sizing, depending on RAM size.

Typical big hosts will now use 128x more storage (2 MB)
to get a similar increase in security and reduction
of hash collisions.

As a bonus, use of alloc_large_system_hash() spreads
allocated memory among all NUMA nodes.

Fixes: 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count")
Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-05T10:26:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=41f2317f1f307e94d3c30c73b73124bfbd07ac0b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:41f2317f1f307e94d3c30c73b73124bfbd07ac0b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8d0caedb759683041d9db82069937525999ada53 upstream.

syzbot is reporting hung task at register_netdevice_notifier() [1] and
unregister_netdevice_notifier() [2], for cleanup_net() might perform
time consuming operations while CAN driver's raw/bcm/isotp modules are
calling {register,unregister}_netdevice_notifier() on each socket.

Change raw/bcm/isotp modules to call register_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __init function and call unregister_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __exit function, as with gw/j1939 modules are doing.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=391b9498827788b3cc6830226d4ff5be87107c30 [1]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1724d278c83ca6e6df100a2e320c10d991cf2bce [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/54a5f451-05ed-f977-8534-79e7aa2bcc8f@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Cc: linux-stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+355f8edb2ff45d5f95fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+0f1827363a305f74996f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Tested-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+355f8edb2ff45d5f95fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm: fix infoleak in struct bcm_msg_head</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Norbert Slusarek</name>
<email>nslusarek@gmx.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-12T20:18:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f638caa211e7a121a5596986d29ebbdaf9156398'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f638caa211e7a121a5596986d29ebbdaf9156398</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5e87ddbe3942e27e939bdc02deb8579b0cbd8ecc upstream.

On 64-bit systems, struct bcm_msg_head has an added padding of 4 bytes between
struct members count and ival1. Even though all struct members are initialized,
the 4-byte hole will contain data from the kernel stack. This patch zeroes out
struct bcm_msg_head before usage, preventing infoleaks to userspace.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/trinity-7c1b2e82-e34f-4885-8060-2cd7a13769ce-1623532166177@3c-app-gmx-bs52
Cc: linux-stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Norbert Slusarek &lt;nslusarek@gmx.net&gt;
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/af_unix: fix a data-race in unix_dgram_sendmsg / unix_release_sock</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-16T14:47:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=81b00066b29199149532b96abe1fd9b8d214d2d6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:81b00066b29199149532b96abe1fd9b8d214d2d6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a494bd642d9120648b06bb7d28ce6d05f55a7819 ]

While unix_may_send(sk, osk) is called while osk is locked, it appears
unix_release_sock() can overwrite unix_peer() after this lock has been
released, making KCSAN unhappy.

Changing unix_release_sock() to access/change unix_peer()
before lock is released should fix this issue.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_dgram_sendmsg / unix_release_sock

write to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20852 on cpu 1:
 unix_release_sock+0x4ed/0x6e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:558
 unix_release+0x2f/0x50 net/unix/af_unix.c:859
 __sock_release net/socket.c:599 [inline]
 sock_close+0x6c/0x150 net/socket.c:1258
 __fput+0x25b/0x4e0 fs/file_table.c:280
 ____fput+0x11/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313
 task_work_run+0xae/0x130 kernel/task_work.c:164
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x156/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:209
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:302
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:57
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20888 on cpu 0:
 unix_may_send net/unix/af_unix.c:189 [inline]
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x923/0x1610 net/unix/af_unix.c:1712
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0xffff888167905400 -&gt; 0x0000000000000000

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 20888 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: synproxy: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Mikityanskiy</name>
<email>maximmi@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T16:40:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e1eb98cfeafdd85537e7e3cefe93ca9bfbcc3ea8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e1eb98cfeafdd85537e7e3cefe93ca9bfbcc3ea8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5fc177ab759418c9537433e63301096e733fb915 ]

The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read
one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets
into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is
neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds
the length of 1.

This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").

v2 changes:

Added an early return when length &lt; 0 to avoid calling
skb_header_pointer with negative length.

Cc: Young Xiao &lt;92siuyang@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 48b1de4c110a ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy &lt;maximmi@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rtnetlink: Fix regression in bridge VLAN configuration</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T11:17:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d6e1d9597c22c4e97f54f1269fd53f7207266a1b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6e1d9597c22c4e97f54f1269fd53f7207266a1b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d2e381c4963663bca6f30c3b996fa4dbafe8fcb5 ]

Cited commit started returning errors when notification info is not
filled by the bridge driver, resulting in the following regression:

 # ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1
 # bridge vlan add dev br1 vid 555 self pvid untagged
 RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument

As long as the bridge driver does not fill notification info for the
bridge device itself, an empty notification should not be considered as
an error. This is explained in commit 59ccaaaa49b5 ("bridge: dont send
notification when skb-&gt;len == 0 in rtnl_bridge_notify").

Fix by removing the error and add a comment to avoid future bugs.

Fixes: a8db57c1d285 ("rtnetlink: Fix missing error code in rtnl_bridge_notify()")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: rds: fix memory leak in rds_recvmsg</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Skripkin</name>
<email>paskripkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-08T08:06:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8c3ec88b03e9e4ca117dcdc4204fd3edcd02084f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8c3ec88b03e9e4ca117dcdc4204fd3edcd02084f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49bfcbfd989a8f1f23e705759a6bb099de2cff9f ]

Syzbot reported memory leak in rds. The problem
was in unputted refcount in case of error.

int rds_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
		int msg_flags)
{
...

	if (!rds_next_incoming(rs, &amp;inc)) {
		...
	}

After this "if" inc refcount incremented and

	if (rds_cmsg_recv(inc, msg, rs)) {
		ret = -EFAULT;
		goto out;
	}
...
out:
	return ret;
}

in case of rds_cmsg_recv() fail the refcount won't be
decremented. And it's easy to see from ftrace log, that
rds_inc_addref() don't have rds_inc_put() pair in
rds_recvmsg() after rds_cmsg_recv()

 1)               |  rds_recvmsg() {
 1)   3.721 us    |    rds_inc_addref();
 1)   3.853 us    |    rds_message_inc_copy_to_user();
 1) + 10.395 us   |    rds_cmsg_recv();
 1) + 34.260 us   |  }

Fixes: bdbe6fbc6a2f ("RDS: recv.c")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5134cdf021c4ed5aaa5f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Håkon Bugge &lt;haakon.bugge@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar &lt;santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
