kernel/linux.git/net/xdp, branch v5.10.257

xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING

2024-05-02T14:23:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit 237f3cf13b20db183d3706d997eedc3c49eacd44 ] syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1] Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549 CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08 Allocated by task 7549: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311 __alloc_pages+0x256/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4569 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2175 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline] new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2391 ___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3525 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline] __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3965 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x2db/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:3973 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline] __vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:3197 [inline] __vmalloc_node_range+0x5f9/0x14a0 mm/vmalloc.c:3392 __vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:3457 [inline] vzalloc+0x79/0x90 mm/vmalloc.c:3530 bpf_check+0x260/0x19010 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:21162 bpf_prog_load+0x1667/0x20f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2895 __sys_bpf+0x4ee/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 page last free pid 6650 tgid 6647 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline] free_unref_page_prepare+0x95d/0xa80 mm/page_alloc.c:2346 free_unref_page_list+0x5a3/0x850 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 release_pages+0x2117/0x2400 mm/swap.c:1042 tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline] tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline] tlb_flush_mmu+0x34d/0x4e0 mm/mmu_gather.c:300 tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:392 exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3300 __mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1345 exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569 do_exit+0x99e/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:865 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027 get_signal+0x176e/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2907 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc9/0x360 kernel/entry/common.c:212 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888028c6cc80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff888028c6cd00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 06 fc fc fc >ffff888028c6cd80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc ^ ffff888028c6ce00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff888028c6ce80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc Fixes: 423f38329d26 ("xsk: add umem fill queue support and mmap") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: "Björn Töpel" Cc: Magnus Karlsson Cc: Maciej Fijalkowski Cc: Jonathan Lemon Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404202738.3634547-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xsk: Honor SO_BINDTODEVICE on bind

2023-07-27T06:44:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit f7306acec9aae9893d15e745c8791124d42ab10a ] Initial creation of an AF_XDP socket requires CAP_NET_RAW capability. A privileged process might create the socket and pass it to a non-privileged process for later use. However, that process will be able to bind the socket to any network interface. Even though it will not be able to receive any traffic without modification of the BPF map, the situation is not ideal. Sockets already have a mechanism that can be used to restrict what interface they can be attached to. That is SO_BINDTODEVICE. To change the SO_BINDTODEVICE binding the process will need CAP_NET_RAW. Make xsk_bind() honor the SO_BINDTODEVICE in order to allow safer workflow when non-privileged process is using AF_XDP. The intended workflow is following: 1. First process creates a bare socket with socket(AF_XDP, ...). 2. First process loads the XSK program to the interface. 3. First process adds the socket fd to a BPF map. 4. First process ties socket fd to a particular interface using SO_BINDTODEVICE. 5. First process sends socket fd to a second process. 6. Second process allocates UMEM. 7. Second process binds socket to the interface with bind(...). 8. Second process sends/receives the traffic. All the steps above are possible today if the first process is privileged and the second one has sufficient RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and no capabilities. However, the second process will be able to bind the socket to any interface it wants on step 7 and send traffic from it. With the proposed change, the second process will be able to bind the socket only to a specific interface chosen by the first process at step 4. Fixes: 965a99098443 ("xsk: add support for bind for Rx") Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Acked-by: John Fastabend Acked-by: Jason Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230703175329.3259672-1-i.maximets@ovn.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xsk: Fix unaligned descriptor validation

2023-05-17T09:47:50+00:00

[ Upstream commit d769ccaf957fe7391f357c0a923de71f594b8a2b ] Make sure unaligned descriptors that straddle the end of the UMEM are considered invalid. Currently, descriptor validation is broken for zero-copy mode which only checks descriptors at page granularity. For example, descriptors in zero-copy mode that overrun the end of the UMEM but not a page boundary are (incorrectly) considered valid. The UMEM boundary check needs to happen before the page boundary and contiguity checks in xp_desc_crosses_non_contig_pg(). Do this check in xp_unaligned_validate_desc() instead like xp_check_unaligned() already does. Fixes: 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer allocation API") Signed-off-by: Kal Conley Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405235920.7305-2-kal.conley@dectris.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xsk: Add missing overflow check in xdp_umem_reg

2023-04-05T09:23:32+00:00

[ Upstream commit c7df4813b149362248d6ef7be41a311e27bf75fe ] The number of chunks can overflow u32. Make sure to return -EINVAL on overflow. Also remove a redundant u32 cast assigning umem->npgs. Fixes: bbff2f321a86 ("xsk: new descriptor addressing scheme") Signed-off-by: Kal Conley Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230308174013.1114745-1-kal.conley@dectris.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xsk: Inherit need_wakeup flag for shared sockets

2022-10-15T05:55:51+00:00

commit 60240bc26114543fcbfcd8a28466e67e77b20388 upstream. The flag for need_wakeup is not set for xsks with `XDP_SHARED_UMEM` flag and of different queue ids and/or devices. They should inherit the flag from the first socket buffer pool since no flags can be specified once `XDP_SHARED_UMEM` is specified. Fixes: b5aea28dca134 ("xsk: Add shared umem support between queue ids") Signed-off-by: Jalal Mostafa Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220921135701.10199-1-jalal.a.mostapha@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xsk: Clear page contiguity bit when unmapping pool

2022-07-12T14:32:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 512d1999b8e94a5d43fba3afc73e774849674742 ] When a XSK pool gets mapped, xp_check_dma_contiguity() adds bit 0x1 to pages' DMA addresses that go in ascending order and at 4K stride. The problem is that the bit does not get cleared before doing unmap. As a result, a lot of warnings from iommu_dma_unmap_page() are seen in dmesg, which indicates that lookups by iommu_iova_to_phys() fail. Fixes: 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer allocation API") Signed-off-by: Ivan Malov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220628091848.534803-1-ivan.malov@oktetlabs.ru Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Revert "xsk: Do not sleep in poll() when need_wakeup set"

2021-12-22T08:30:59+00:00

commit 0706a78f31c4217ca144f630063ec9561a21548d upstream. This reverts commit bd0687c18e635b63233dc87f38058cd728802ab4. This patch causes a Tx only workload to go to sleep even when it does not have to, leading to misserable performance in skb mode. It fixed one rare problem but created a much worse one, so this need to be reverted while I try to craft a proper solution to the original problem. Fixes: bd0687c18e63 ("xsk: Do not sleep in poll() when need_wakeup set") Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217145646.26449-1-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xsk: Do not sleep in poll() when need_wakeup set

2021-12-22T08:30:58+00:00

commit bd0687c18e635b63233dc87f38058cd728802ab4 upstream. Do not sleep in poll() when the need_wakeup flag is set. When this flag is set, the application needs to explicitly wake up the driver with a syscall (poll, recvmsg, sendmsg, etc.) to guarantee that Rx and/or Tx processing will be processed promptly. But the current code in poll(), sleeps first then wakes up the driver. This means that no driver processing will occur (baring any interrupts) until the timeout has expired. Fix this by checking the need_wakeup flag first and if set, wake the driver and return to the application. Only if need_wakeup is not set should the process sleep if there is a timeout set in the poll() call. Fixes: 77cd0d7b3f25 ("xsk: add support for need_wakeup flag in AF_XDP rings") Reported-by: Keith Wiles Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211214102607.7677-1-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xsk: Fix broken Tx ring validation

2021-07-14T14:56:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit f654fae47e83e56b454fbbfd0af0a4f232e356d6 ] Fix broken Tx ring validation for AF_XDP. The commit under the Fixes tag, fixed an off-by-one error in the validation but introduced another error. Descriptors are now let through even if they straddle a chunk boundary which they are not allowed to do in aligned mode. Worse is that they are let through even if they straddle the end of the umem itself, tricking the kernel to read data outside the allowed umem region which might or might not be mapped at all. Fix this by reintroducing the old code, but subtract the length by one to fix the off-by-one error that the original patch was addressing. The test chunk != chunk_end makes sure packets do not straddle chunk boundraries. Note that packets of zero length are allowed in the interface, therefore the test if the length is non-zero. Fixes: ac31565c2193 ("xsk: Fix for xp_aligned_validate_desc() when len == chunk_size") Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo Acked-by: Björn Töpel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210618075805.14412-1-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xsk: Fix for xp_aligned_validate_desc() when len == chunk_size

2021-05-19T08:13:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit ac31565c21937eee9117e43c9cd34f557f6f1cb8 ] When desc->len is equal to chunk_size, it is legal. But when the xp_aligned_validate_desc() got chunk_end from desc->addr + desc->len pointing to the next chunk during the check, it caused the check to fail. This problem was first introduced in bbff2f321a86 ("xsk: new descriptor addressing scheme"). Later in 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer allocation API") this piece of code was moved into the new function called xp_aligned_validate_desc(). This function was then moved into xsk_queue.h via 26062b185eee ("xsk: Explicitly inline functions and move definitions"). Fixes: bbff2f321a86 ("xsk: new descriptor addressing scheme") Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210428094424.54435-1-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin