kernel/linux.git/net/unix, branch v7.0.10

af_unix: Drop all SCM attributes for SOCKMAP.

2026-05-23T11:09:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 965dc93481d1b80d341bdd16c27b16fe197175ee ] SOCKMAP can hide inflight fd from AF_UNIX GC. When a socket in SOCKMAP receives skb with inflight fd, sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() looks up the mapped socket and enqueue skb to its psock->ingress_skb. Since neither the old nor the new GC can inspect the psock queue, the hidden skb leaks the inflight sockets. Note that this cannot be detected via kmemleak because inflight sockets are linked to a global list. In addition, SOCKMAP redirect breaks the Tarjan-based GC's assumption that unix_edge.successor is always alive, which is no longer true once skb is redirected, resulting in use-after-free below. [0] Moreover, SOCKMAP does not call scm_stat_del() properly, so unix_show_fdinfo() could report an incorrect fd count. sk_msg_recvmsg() does not support any SCM attributes in the first place. Let's drop all SCM attributes before passing skb to the SOCKMAP layer. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_del_edges (net/unix/garbage.c:118 net/unix/garbage.c:181 net/unix/garbage.c:251) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888125362670 by task kworker/56:1/496 CPU: 56 UID: 0 PID: 496 Comm: kworker/56:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-00263-gb9d8b856689d #3 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597) unix_del_edges (net/unix/garbage.c:118 net/unix/garbage.c:181 net/unix/garbage.c:251) unix_destroy_fpl (net/unix/garbage.c:317) unix_destruct_scm (./include/net/scm.h:80 ./include/net/scm.h:86 net/unix/af_unix.c:1976) sk_psock_backlog (./include/linux/skbuff.h:?) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:?) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:?) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:438) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258) Allocated by task 955: kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:58 mm/kasan/common.c:78) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:369) kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:4539) sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2240) sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2301) unix_create1 (net/unix/af_unix.c:1099) unix_create (net/unix/af_unix.c:1169) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1606) __sys_socketpair (net/socket.c:1811) __x64_sys_socketpair (net/socket.c:1863 net/socket.c:1860 net/socket.c:1860) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Freed by task 496: kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:58 mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:6165) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2282 net/core/sock.c:2384) sk_psock_destroy (./include/net/sock.h:?) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:?) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:?) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:438) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258) Fixes: c63829182c37 ("af_unix: Implement ->psock_update_sk_prot()") Fixes: 77462de14a43 ("af_unix: Add read_sock for stream socket types") Reported-by: Xingyu Jin Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260415184830.3988432-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, sockmap: Take state lock for af_unix iter

2026-05-23T11:09:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit 64c2f93fc3254d3bf5de4445fb732ee5c451edb6 ] When a BPF iterator program updates a sockmap, there is a race condition in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() where the `peer` pointer can become stale[1] during a state transition TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_CLOSE. CPU0 bpf CPU1 close -------- ---------- // unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) if (unlikely(!sk_pair)) return -EINVAL; // unix_release_sock() skpair = unix_peer(sk); unix_peer(sk) = NULL; sock_put(skpair) sock_hold(sk_pair) // UaF More practically, this fix guarantees that the iterator program is consistently provided with a unix socket that remains stable during iterator execution. [1]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0x155/0x490 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881178c9a00 by task test_progs/2231 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_report+0x170/0x4f3 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1c0 kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0x155/0x490 sock_map_link+0x71c/0xec0 sock_map_update_common+0xbc/0x600 sock_map_update_elem+0x19a/0x1f0 bpf_prog_bbbf56096cdd4f01_selective_dump_unix+0x20c/0x217 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x21e/0xae0 bpf_iter_unix_seq_show+0x1e0/0x2a0 bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 vfs_read+0x171/0xb20 ksys_read+0xff/0x200 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Allocated by task 2236: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x63/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x1d5/0x680 sk_prot_alloc+0x59/0x210 sk_alloc+0x34/0x470 unix_create1+0x86/0x8a0 unix_stream_connect+0x318/0x15b0 __sys_connect+0xfd/0x130 __x64_sys_connect+0x72/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 2236: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x47/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x11c/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x432/0x6e0 unix_release_sock+0x9b3/0xf60 unix_release+0x8a/0xf0 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 sock_close+0x18/0x20 __fput+0x36e/0xac0 fput_close_sync+0xe5/0x1a0 __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 2c860a43dd77 ("bpf: af_unix: Implement BPF iterator for UNIX domain socket.") Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414-unix-proto-update-null-ptr-deref-v4-5-2af6fe97918e@rbox.co Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update

2026-05-23T11:09:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a ] unix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`). sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that socket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW, there's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on socket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL. CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) ... sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) sock_hold(sk_pair) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0 Call Trace: sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0 sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340 sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240 __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250 __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Initial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1], but that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path was rejected. Then a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was considered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause, i.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing unix_state_lock()[4]. In the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking would be unnecessarily complex[5]. Complexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT are allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix lock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock(): spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken in a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program attempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6]. This way we circled back to the peer check idea[2]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/ [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/ Summary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap update: 1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys() Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf. 2. connect() vs BPF program doing update Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only) BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP Plus one more race to consider: CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) if (unlikely(!sk_pair)) return -EINVAL; CPU1 close ---------- skpair = unix_peer(sk); unix_peer(sk) = NULL; sock_put(skpair) // use after free? sock_hold(sk_pair) 2.1 BPF program invoking helper function bpf_sock_map_update() -> BPF_CALL_4(bpf_sock_map_update(), ...) Helper limited to BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS. Nevertheless, a unix sock might be accessible via bpf_map_lookup_elem(). Which implies sk already having psock, which in turn implies sk already having sk_pair. Since sk_psock_destroy() is queued as RCU work, sk_pair won't go away while BPF executes the update. 2.2 BPF program invoking helper function bpf_map_update_elem() -> sock_map_update_elem() 2.2.1 Unix sock accessible to BPF prog only via sockmap lookup in BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT, BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT, BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP. Pretty much the same as case 2.1. 2.2.2 Unix sock accessible to BPF program directly: BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, narrowed down to BPF_TRACE_ITER. Sockmap iterator (sock_map_seq_ops) is safe: unix sock residing in a sockmap means that the sock already went through the proto update step. Unix sock iterator (bpf_iter_unix_seq_ops), on the other hand, gives access to socks that may still be unconnected. Which means iterator prog can race sockmap/proto update against connect(). BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0x253/0x4d0 Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000080 by task test_progs/3140 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1c0 kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0x253/0x4d0 sock_map_link+0x71c/0xec0 sock_map_update_common+0xbc/0x600 sock_map_update_elem+0x19a/0x1f0 bpf_prog_bbbf56096cdd4f01_selective_dump_unix+0x20c/0x217 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x21e/0xae0 bpf_iter_unix_seq_show+0x1e0/0x2a0 bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 vfs_read+0x171/0xb20 ksys_read+0xff/0x200 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e While the introduced NULL check prevents null-ptr-deref in the BPF program path as well, it is insufficient to guard against a poorly timed close() leading to a use-after-free. This will be addressed in a subsequent patch. Fixes: c63829182c37 ("af_unix: Implement ->psock_update_sk_prot()") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/ Reported-by: Michal Luczaj Reported-by: 钱一铭 Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414-unix-proto-update-null-ptr-deref-v4-4-2af6fe97918e@rbox.co Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix iter deadlock

2026-05-23T11:09:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4d328dd695383224aa750ddee6b4ad40c0f8d205 ] bpf_iter_unix_seq_show() may deadlock when lock_sock_fast() takes the fast path and the iter prog attempts to update a sockmap. Which ends up spinning at sock_map_update_elem()'s bh_lock_sock(): WARNING: possible recursive locking detected test_progs/1393 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: sock_map_update_elem+0xdb/0x1f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: __lock_sock_fast+0x37/0xe0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(slock-AF_UNIX); lock(slock-AF_UNIX); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by test_progs/1393: #0: ffff88814b59c790 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x59/0x10d0 #1: ffff88811ec25fd8 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 #2: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: __lock_sock_fast+0x37/0xe0 #3: ffffffff85a6a7c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_iter_run_prog+0x51d/0xb00 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xce __lock_acquire+0x130f/0x2590 lock_acquire+0x14e/0x2b0 _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x40 sock_map_update_elem+0xdb/0x1f0 bpf_prog_2d0075e5d9b721cd_dump_unix+0x55/0x4f4 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x5b9/0xb00 bpf_iter_unix_seq_show+0x1f7/0x2e0 bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 vfs_read+0x171/0xb20 ksys_read+0xff/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 2c860a43dd77 ("bpf: af_unix: Implement BPF iterator for UNIX domain socket.") Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414-unix-proto-update-null-ptr-deref-v4-2-2af6fe97918e@rbox.co Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

af_unix: Reject SIOCATMARK on non-stream sockets

2026-05-14T13:31:09+00:00

commit d119775f2bad827edc28071c061fdd4a91f889a5 upstream. SIOCATMARK reports whether the receive queue is at the urgent mark for MSG_OOB. In AF_UNIX, MSG_OOB is supported only for SOCK_STREAM sockets. SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET reject MSG_OOB in sendmsg() and recvmsg(), so they should not support SIOCATMARK either. Return -EOPNOTSUPP for non-stream sockets before checking the receive queue. Fixes: 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Reported-by: Xin Liu Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: Jiexun Wang Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260506140825.2987635-1-n05ec@lzu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

af_unix: read UNIX_DIAG_VFS data under unix_state_lock

2026-04-09T02:33:52+00:00

Exact UNIX diag lookups hold a reference to the socket, but not to u->path. Meanwhile, unix_release_sock() clears u->path under unix_state_lock() and drops the path reference after unlocking. Read the inode and device numbers for UNIX_DIAG_VFS while holding unix_state_lock(), then emit the netlink attribute after dropping the lock. This keeps the VFS data stable while the reply is being built. Fixes: 5f7b0569460b ("unix_diag: Unix inode info NLA") Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan Suggested-by: Xin Liu Tested-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Jiexun Wang Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407080015.1744197-1-n05ec@lzu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.

2026-03-12T20:37:18+00:00

Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro. This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK"). After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue. The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC. Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B. The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B. GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -> true <------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -> sk-A's file refcount : 1 -> 2 close(sk-B) -> sk-B's file refcount : 2 -> 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -> true Initially, sk-A's file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds. However, sk-A's file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous evaluation. At this moment, sk-B's file refcount is 2; one by the open fd, and one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close() releases one refcount by the former. Finally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead. One option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(), but we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm. The point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent close() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with the dead SCC detection. When the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount. If GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just give up garbage-collecting the SCC. Therefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with a proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC. Let's use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let it defer the SCC to the next run. This way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can avoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily. Note that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is detected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from abusive MSG_PEEK calls. Fixes: 118f457da9ed ("af_unix: Remove lock dance in unix_peek_fds().") Reported-by: Igor Ushakov Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260311054043.1231316-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_{data_ready,write_space}

2026-02-27T03:23:03+00:00

skmsg (and probably other layers) are changing these pointers while other cpus might read them concurrently. Add corresponding READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations for UDP, TCP and AF_UNIX. Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: syzbot+87f770387a9e5dc6b79b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/699ee9fc.050a0220.1cd54b.0009.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: John Fastabend Cc: Jakub Sitnicki Cc: Willem de Bruijn Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225131547.1085509-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

Convert remaining multi-line kmalloc_obj/flex GFP_KERNEL uses

2026-02-22T16:26:33+00:00

Conversion performed via this Coccinelle script: // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only // Options: --include-headers-for-types --all-includes --include-headers --keep-comments virtual patch @gfp depends on patch && !(file in "tools") && !(file in "samples")@ identifier ALLOC = {kmalloc_obj,kmalloc_objs,kmalloc_flex, kzalloc_obj,kzalloc_objs,kzalloc_flex, kvmalloc_obj,kvmalloc_objs,kvmalloc_flex, kvzalloc_obj,kvzalloc_objs,kvzalloc_flex}; @@ ALLOC(... - , GFP_KERNEL ) $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=gfp.cocci Build and boot tested x86_64 with Fedora 42's GCC and Clang: Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (gcc (GCC) 15.2.1 20260123 (Red Hat 15.2.1-7), GNU ld version 2.44-12.fc42) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01 Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (clang version 20.1.8 (Fedora 20.1.8-4.fc42), LLD 20.1.8) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Convert more 'alloc_obj' cases to default GFP_KERNEL arguments

2026-02-22T04:03:00+00:00

This converts some of the visually simpler cases that have been split over multiple lines. I only did the ones that are easy to verify the resulting diff by having just that final GFP_KERNEL argument on the next line. Somebody should probably do a proper coccinelle script for this, but for me the trivial script actually resulted in an assertion failure in the middle of the script. I probably had made it a bit _too_ trivial. So after fighting that far a while I decided to just do some of the syntactically simpler cases with variations of the previous 'sed' scripts. The more syntactically complex multi-line cases would mostly really want whitespace cleanup anyway. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds