<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net/mac802154/llsec.c, branch v7.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v7.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v7.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-02-22T01:09:51+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument</title>
<updated>2026-02-22T01:09:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-22T00:37:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bf4afc53b77aeaa48b5409da5c8da6bb4eff7f43'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bf4afc53b77aeaa48b5409da5c8da6bb4eff7f43</id>
<content type='text'>
This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using

    git grep -l '\&lt;k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
        xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'

to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.

Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.

For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types</title>
<updated>2026-02-21T09:02:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-21T07:49:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac802154: fix llsec key resources release in mac802154_llsec_key_del</title>
<updated>2024-03-06T20:01:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fedor Pchelkin</name>
<email>pchelkin@ispras.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-28T16:38:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e8a1e58345cf40b7b272e08ac7b32328b2543e40'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e8a1e58345cf40b7b272e08ac7b32328b2543e40</id>
<content type='text'>
mac802154_llsec_key_del() can free resources of a key directly without
following the RCU rules for waiting before the end of a grace period. This
may lead to use-after-free in case llsec_lookup_key() is traversing the
list of keys in parallel with a key deletion:

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 16000 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 4 PID: 16000 Comm: wpan-ping Not tainted 6.7.0 #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 llsec_lookup_key.isra.0+0x890/0x9e0
 mac802154_llsec_encrypt+0x30c/0x9c0
 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0x24/0x1e0
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13e/0x690
 sch_direct_xmit+0x2ae/0xbc0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x11dd/0x3c20
 dgram_sendmsg+0x90b/0xd60
 __sys_sendto+0x466/0x4c0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

Also, ieee802154_llsec_key_entry structures are not freed by
mac802154_llsec_key_del():

unreferenced object 0xffff8880613b6980 (size 64):
  comm "iwpan", pid 2176, jiffies 4294761134 (age 60.475s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    78 0d 8f 18 80 88 ff ff 22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de  x.......".......
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 cd ab 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff81dcfa62&gt;] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0
    [&lt;ffffffff81c43865&gt;] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0xc0
    [&lt;ffffffff88968b09&gt;] mac802154_llsec_key_add+0xac9/0xcf0
    [&lt;ffffffff8896e41a&gt;] ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x5a/0x80
    [&lt;ffffffff8892adc6&gt;] nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x426/0x5b0
    [&lt;ffffffff86ff293e&gt;] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1fe/0x2f0
    [&lt;ffffffff86ff46d1&gt;] genl_rcv_msg+0x531/0x7d0
    [&lt;ffffffff86fee7a9&gt;] netlink_rcv_skb+0x169/0x440
    [&lt;ffffffff86ff1d88&gt;] genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
    [&lt;ffffffff86fec15c&gt;] netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x820
    [&lt;ffffffff86fecd8b&gt;] netlink_sendmsg+0x93b/0xe60
    [&lt;ffffffff86b91b35&gt;] ____sys_sendmsg+0xac5/0xca0
    [&lt;ffffffff86b9c3dd&gt;] ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1c0
    [&lt;ffffffff86b9c65a&gt;] __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0
    [&lt;ffffffff88eadbf5&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0
    [&lt;ffffffff890000ea&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

Handle the proper resource release in the RCU callback function
mac802154_llsec_key_del_rcu().

Note that if llsec_lookup_key() finds a key, it gets a refcount via
llsec_key_get() and locally copies key id from key_entry (which is a
list element). So it's safe to call llsec_key_put() and free the list
entry after the RCU grace period elapses.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 5d637d5aabd8 ("mac802154: add llsec structures and mutators")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Alexander Aring &lt;aahringo@redhat.com&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240228163840.6667-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt &lt;stefan@datenfreihafen.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac802154: Handle basic beaconing</title>
<updated>2023-01-28T12:55:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miquel Raynal</name>
<email>miquel.raynal@bootlin.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-25T10:29:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3accf4762734a69ebd03cba989249c78ac7dfc7e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3accf4762734a69ebd03cba989249c78ac7dfc7e</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement the core hooks in order to provide the softMAC layer support
for sending beacons. Coordinators may be requested to send beacons in a
beacon enabled PAN in order for the other devices around to self
discover the available PANs automatically.

Changing the channels is prohibited while a beacon operation is
ongoing.

The implementation uses a workqueue triggered at a certain interval
depending on the symbol duration for the current channel and the
interval order provided.

Sending beacons in response to a BEACON_REQ frame (ie. answering active
scans) is not yet supported.

This initial patchset has no security support (llsec).

Co-developed-by: David Girault &lt;david.girault@qorvo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Girault &lt;david.girault@qorvo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexander Aring &lt;aahringo@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125102923.135465-3-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt &lt;stefan@datenfreihafen.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: mac802154: Fix general protection fault</title>
<updated>2021-04-06T20:42:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Skripkin</name>
<email>paskripkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-04T15:21:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1165affd484889d4986cf3b724318935a0b120d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1165affd484889d4986cf3b724318935a0b120d8</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot found general protection fault in crypto_destroy_tfm()[1].
It was caused by wrong clean up loop in llsec_key_alloc().
If one of the tfm array members is in IS_ERR() range it will
cause general protection fault in clean up function [1].

Call Trace:
 crypto_free_aead include/crypto/aead.h:191 [inline] [1]
 llsec_key_alloc net/mac802154/llsec.c:156 [inline]
 mac802154_llsec_key_add+0x9e0/0xcc0 net/mac802154/llsec.c:249
 ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x56/0x80 net/mac802154/cfg.c:338
 rdev_add_llsec_key net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:260 [inline]
 nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x3d3/0x560 net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:1584
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+9ec037722d2603a9f52e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Alexander Aring &lt;aahringo@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304152125.1052825-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt &lt;stefan@datenfreihafen.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()</title>
<updated>2020-08-07T18:33:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-07T06:18:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88'/>
<id>urn:sha1:453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88</id>
<content type='text'>
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 174</title>
<updated>2019-05-30T18:26:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-27T06:55:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1802d0beecafe581ad584634ba92f8a471d8a63a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1802d0beecafe581ad584634ba92f8a471d8a63a</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation this program is
  distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
  warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
  fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
  for more details

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 655 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana &lt;rfontana@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070034.575739538@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac802154: Remove VLA usage of skcipher</title>
<updated>2018-09-28T04:46:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-19T02:10:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3103f4a71be3ac22abe926f827653f28a04ce83e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3103f4a71be3ac22abe926f827653f28a04ce83e</id>
<content type='text'>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: Alexander Aring &lt;alex.aring@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stefan Schmidt &lt;stefan@datenfreihafen.org&gt;
Cc: linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac802154: Fix MAC header and payload encrypted</title>
<updated>2017-09-20T11:37:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Diogenes Pereira</name>
<email>dvnp@cesar.org.br</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-05T12:18:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3e4962667efb0f6c09fa3111e6ee53838118b227'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e4962667efb0f6c09fa3111e6ee53838118b227</id>
<content type='text'>
According to  802.15.4-2003/2006/2015 specifications the MAC frame is
composed of MHR, MAC payload and MFR and just the outgoing MAC payload
must be encrypted.

If communication is secure,sender build Auxiliary Security Header(ASH),
insert it next to the standard MHR header with security enabled bit ON,
and secure frames before transmitting them. According to the information
carried within the ASH, recipient retrieves the right cryptographic key
and correctly un-secure MAC frames.

The error scenario occurs on Linux using IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC(4)
security level when llsec_do_encrypt_unauth() function builds theses MAC
frames incorrectly. On recipients these MAC frames are discarded,logging
"got invalid frame" messages.

Signed-off-by: Diogenes Pereira &lt;dvnp@cesar.org.br&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt &lt;stefan@osg.samsung.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac802154: replace hardcoded value with macro</title>
<updated>2017-09-20T11:37:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Diogenes Pereira</name>
<email>dvnp@cesar.org.br</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-09T16:19:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=91f4aa977947f046dc144fa9e3b06f0ffb53be79'/>
<id>urn:sha1:91f4aa977947f046dc144fa9e3b06f0ffb53be79</id>
<content type='text'>
Use IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_NONE macro defined at ieee802154.h file.

Signed-off-by: Diogenes Pereira &lt;dvnp@cesar.org.br&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt &lt;stefan@osg.samsung.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
