kernel/linux.git/net/ipv6/syncookies.c, branch v7.2-rc2

tcp: rehash onto different local ECMP path on retransmit timeout

2026-06-15T22:57:31+00:00

Currently sk_rethink_txhash() re-rolls the socket's txhash on RTO, PLB, and spurious-retransmission events, but the cached route is reused and the new hash is not propagated into the ECMP path selection logic. Two changes are needed to make rehash select a different local ECMP path: 1. Add __sk_dst_reset() alongside sk_rethink_txhash() in tcp_write_timeout(), tcp_rcv_spurious_retrans(), and tcp_plb_check_rehash() so the cached dst is invalidated and the next transmit triggers a fresh route lookup. 2. Set fl6->mp_hash from sk_txhash (or tcp_rsk(req)->txhash for SYN/ACK retransmits and syncookies) in tcp_v6_connect(), inet6_sk_rebuild_header(), inet6_csk_route_req(), inet6_csk_route_socket(), tcp_v6_send_response(), and cookie_v6_check() so fib6_select_path() picks a path based on the new hash. The mp_hash override only applies to fib_multipath_hash_policy 0 (the default L3 policy). Its hash includes the flow label, but that is 0 by default -- np->flow_label is unset, and auto_flowlabels only computes the on-wire label later, per packet -- so flows to the same peer share one local path. Keying the hash on sk_txhash makes the local path per-connection and lets a rehash re-select it. Policies 1-3 are left unchanged. The mp_hash assignment is factored into a small helper, ip6_ecmp_set_mp_hash(), shared by inet6_csk_route_req(), inet6_csk_route_socket(), tcp_v6_connect(), inet6_sk_rebuild_header(), tcp_v6_send_response(), and cookie_v6_check(). It applies (txhash >> 1) ?: 1 for policy 0 (the >> 1 keeps mp_hash in the 31-bit range; ?: 1 keeps it non-zero, since 0 would fall back to rt6_multipath_hash()). inet6_csk_route_socket() calls it only for sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP so that non-TCP callers (e.g., L2TP via inet6_csk_xmit) fall through to rt6_multipath_hash() and retain their existing flow-key-based ECMP behavior. tcp_v6_send_response() also sets mp_hash from the response txhash so that a control packet (a RST from the full socket, or an ACK from a time-wait socket) selects the same local ECMP nexthop as the connection's txhash rather than falling back to the flow hash. The time-wait socket's tw_txhash is copied from sk_txhash when the connection enters TIME_WAIT, so it reflects any rehash that occurred. Setting mp_hash explicitly is necessary because the default ECMP hash derives from fl6->flowlabel via np->flow_label, which is not updated from sk_txhash (REPFLOW is off by default). ip6_make_flowlabel() cannot help either, as it runs after the route lookup. As a consequence, for policy 0 the local ECMP path of an IPv6 TCP flow follows sk_txhash even when fl6->flowlabel is non-zero, e.g. a reflected (REPFLOW) or explicitly set (IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR) flow label. This is intentional: only local path selection changes, so rehash can recover from a failed path; the on-wire flow label is unchanged. sk_set_txhash() is moved before ip6_dst_lookup_flow() in tcp_v6_connect() so the initial ECMP path is selected by the same txhash that subsequent route rebuilds will use. This avoids unintended path changes when the cached dst is naturally invalidated (e.g., by PMTU discovery or route changes). The rehash sites (tcp_write_timeout(), tcp_plb_check_rehash(), and tcp_rcv_spurious_retrans()) call __sk_rethink_txhash_reset_dst(), which re-rolls the txhash and, when it changed, drops the cached dst so the next transmit re-runs route selection. The dst reset is guarded by sk->sk_family == AF_INET6 since IPv4 ECMP does not currently use sk_txhash for path selection. For IPv4-mapped IPv6 sockets this produces a redundant dst reset on a cold path (RTO/PLB); the subsequent IPv4 route lookup returns the same result. The helper is deliberately separate from sk_rethink_txhash() itself: dst_negative_advice() calls sk_rethink_txhash() before its own dst op, so resetting the dst inside sk_rethink_txhash() would skip that op (e.g. rt6_remove_exception_rt()). For syncookies, cookie_init_sequence() computes the cookie value before route_req() and sets txhash so the SYN-ACK selects the same ECMP path that cookie_v6_check() will use when the full socket is created. cookie_tcp_reqsk_init() derives txhash from the cookie so the full socket's ECMP path matches the SYN-ACK. Both the SYN-ACK assignment in tcp_conn_request() and the full-socket assignment in cookie_tcp_reqsk_init() set txhash from the cookie for IPv4 and IPv6 alike. On IPv6 this drives ECMP path selection; on IPv4, which does not use sk_txhash for ECMP, it only affects TX-queue selection. That selection scales the hash by its high bits (reciprocal_scale()), which are uniform in the keyed secure_tcp_syn_cookie() output -- the MSS index only perturbs the low bits -- so the queue distribution matches net_tx_rndhash(). cookie_init_sequence() is split from the former version that also called tcp_synq_overflow() and incremented SYNCOOKIESSENT; those side effects are now in cookie_record_sent(), called after route_req() succeeds so they are not bumped when route_req() fails. cookie_record_sent() is guarded by CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES to match the guard on tcp_synq_overflow(). route_req() receives 0 as tw_isn for the syncookie path so that tcp_v6_init_req() still saves ireq->pktopts for REPFLOW flowlabel reflection and IPv6 cmsg options. The ecn_ok clear for syncookies without timestamps stays after tcp_ecn_create_request() so it takes precedence. Signed-off-by: Neil Spring Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260615042158.1600746-2-ntspring@meta.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset

2026-03-05T01:44:35+00:00

This reverts 28ee1b746f49 ("secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets") tcp_tw_recycle went away in 2017. Zhouyan Deng reported off-path TCP source port leakage via SYN cookie side-channel that can be fixed in multiple ways. One of them is to bring back TCP ports in TS offset randomization. As a bonus, we perform a single siphash() computation to provide both an ISN and a TS offset. Fixes: 28ee1b746f49 ("secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets") Reported-by: Zhouyan Deng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Acked-by: Florian Westphal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260302205527.1982836-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: accecn: AccECN negotiation

2025-09-18T06:47:51+00:00

Accurate ECN negotiation parts based on the specification: https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-28.txt Accurate ECN is negotiated using ECE, CWR and AE flags in the TCP header. TCP falls back into using RFC3168 ECN if one of the ends supports only RFC3168-style ECN. The AccECN negotiation includes reflecting IP ECN field value seen in SYN and SYNACK back using the same bits as negotiation to allow responding to SYN CE marks and to detect ECN field mangling. CE marks should not occur currently because SYN=1 segments are sent with Non-ECT in IP ECN field (but proposal exists to remove this restriction). Reflecting SYN IP ECN field in SYNACK is relatively simple. Reflecting SYNACK IP ECN field in the final/third ACK of the handshake is more challenging. Linux TCP code is not well prepared for using the final/third ACK a signalling channel which makes things somewhat complicated here. tcp_ecn sysctl can be used to select the highest ECN variant (Accurate ECN, ECN, No ECN) that is attemped to be negotiated and requested for incoming connection and outgoing connection: TCP_ECN_IN_NOECN_OUT_NOECN, TCP_ECN_IN_ECN_OUT_ECN, TCP_ECN_IN_ECN_OUT_NOECN, TCP_ECN_IN_ACCECN_OUT_ACCECN, TCP_ECN_IN_ACCECN_OUT_ECN, and TCP_ECN_IN_ACCECN_OUT_NOECN. After this patch, the size of tcp_request_sock remains unchanged and no new holes are added. Below are the pahole outcomes before and after this patch: [BEFORE THIS PATCH] struct tcp_request_sock { [...] u32 rcv_nxt; /* 352 4 */ u8 syn_tos; /* 356 1 */ /* size: 360, cachelines: 6, members: 16 */ } [AFTER THIS PATCH] struct tcp_request_sock { [...] u32 rcv_nxt; /* 352 4 */ u8 syn_tos; /* 356 1 */ bool accecn_ok; /* 357 1 */ u8 syn_ect_snt:2; /* 358: 0 1 */ u8 syn_ect_rcv:2; /* 358: 2 1 */ u8 accecn_fail_mode:4; /* 358: 4 1 */ /* size: 360, cachelines: 6, members: 20 */ } After this patch, the size of tcp_sock remains unchanged and no new holes are added. Also, 4 bits of the existing 2-byte hole are exploited. Below are the pahole outcomes before and after this patch: [BEFORE THIS PATCH] struct tcp_sock { [...] u8 dup_ack_counter:2; /* 2761: 0 1 */ u8 tlp_retrans:1; /* 2761: 2 1 */ u8 unused:5; /* 2761: 3 1 */ u8 thin_lto:1; /* 2762: 0 1 */ u8 fastopen_connect:1; /* 2762: 1 1 */ u8 fastopen_no_cookie:1; /* 2762: 2 1 */ u8 fastopen_client_fail:2; /* 2762: 3 1 */ u8 frto:1; /* 2762: 5 1 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ [...] u8 keepalive_probes; /* 2765 1 */ /* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */ [...] /* size: 3200, cachelines: 50, members: 164 */ } [AFTER THIS PATCH] struct tcp_sock { [...] u8 dup_ack_counter:2; /* 2761: 0 1 */ u8 tlp_retrans:1; /* 2761: 2 1 */ u8 syn_ect_snt:2; /* 2761: 3 1 */ u8 syn_ect_rcv:2; /* 2761: 5 1 */ u8 thin_lto:1; /* 2761: 7 1 */ u8 fastopen_connect:1; /* 2762: 0 1 */ u8 fastopen_no_cookie:1; /* 2762: 1 1 */ u8 fastopen_client_fail:2; /* 2762: 2 1 */ u8 frto:1; /* 2762: 4 1 */ /* XXX 3 bits hole, try to pack */ [...] u8 keepalive_probes; /* 2765 1 */ u8 accecn_fail_mode:4; /* 2766: 0 1 */ /* XXX 4 bits hole, try to pack */ /* XXX 1 byte hole, try to pack */ [...] /* size: 3200, cachelines: 50, members: 166 */ } Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Co-developed-by: Olivier Tilmans Signed-off-by: Olivier Tilmans Co-developed-by: Chia-Yu Chang Signed-off-by: Chia-Yu Chang Acked-by: Paolo Abeni Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916082434.100722-3-chia-yu.chang@nokia-bell-labs.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni

net: annotate races around sk->sk_uid

2025-06-24T00:04:03+00:00

sk->sk_uid can be read while another thread changes its value in sockfs_setattr(). Add sk_uid(const struct sock *sk) helper to factorize the needed READ_ONCE() annotations, and add corresponding WRITE_ONCE() where needed. Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Lorenzo Colitti Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250620133001.4090592-2-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: use sk_skb_reason_drop to free rx packets

2024-06-19T11:44:22+00:00

Replace kfree_skb_reason with sk_skb_reason_drop and pass the receiving socket to the tracepoint. Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202406011539.jhwBd7DX-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Yan Zhai Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tcp: annotate data-races around tp->window_clamp

2024-04-06T05:32:37+00:00

tp->window_clamp can be read locklessly, add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Jason Xing Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404114231.2195171-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: Clear req->syncookie in reqsk_alloc().

2024-03-20T02:35:59+00:00

syzkaller reported a read of uninit req->syncookie. [0] Originally, req->syncookie was used only in tcp_conn_request() to indicate if we need to encode SYN cookie in SYN+ACK, so the field remains uninitialised in other places. The commit 695751e31a63 ("bpf: tcp: Handle BPF SYN Cookie in cookie_v[46]_check().") added another meaning in ACK path; req->syncookie is set true if SYN cookie is validated by BPF kfunc. After the change, cookie_v[46]_check() always read req->syncookie, but it is not initialised in the normal SYN cookie case as reported by KMSAN. Let's make sure we always initialise req->syncookie in reqsk_alloc(). [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cookie_v4_check+0x22b7/0x29e0 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:477 cookie_v4_check+0x22b7/0x29e0 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:477 tcp_v4_cookie_check net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1855 [inline] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xb17/0x10b0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1914 tcp_v4_rcv+0x4ce4/0x5420 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2322 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2a3/0x13d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x332/0x500 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x4a2/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_rcv+0xcd/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5538 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x319/0x9e0 net/core/dev.c:5652 process_backlog+0x480/0x8b0 net/core/dev.c:5981 __napi_poll+0xe7/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6632 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6701 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89d/0x1820 net/core/dev.c:6813 __do_softirq+0x1c0/0x7d7 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq+0x9a/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:455 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x9f/0xb0 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:820 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2776/0x52c0 net/core/dev.c:4362 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x187a/0x1b70 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output+0x287/0x810 ip_finish_output+0x4b/0x550 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip_output+0x15f/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x1e93/0x2030 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535 ip_queue_xmit+0x60/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:549 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x3c70/0x4890 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1462 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1480 [inline] tcp_write_xmit+0x3ee1/0x8900 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2792 __tcp_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2977 [inline] tcp_send_fin+0xa90/0x12e0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3578 tcp_shutdown+0x198/0x1f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2716 inet_shutdown+0x33f/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:923 __sys_shutdown_sock net/socket.c:2425 [inline] __sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __do_sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2445 [inline] __se_sys_shutdown+0x2a4/0x440 net/socket.c:2443 __x64_sys_shutdown+0x6c/0xa0 net/socket.c:2443 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was stored to memory at: reqsk_alloc include/net/request_sock.h:148 [inline] inet_reqsk_alloc+0x651/0x7a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6978 cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc+0xd4/0x900 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:328 cookie_tcp_check net/ipv4/syncookies.c:388 [inline] cookie_v4_check+0x289f/0x29e0 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:420 tcp_v4_cookie_check net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1855 [inline] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xb17/0x10b0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1914 tcp_v4_rcv+0x4ce4/0x5420 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2322 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2a3/0x13d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x332/0x500 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x4a2/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_rcv+0xcd/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5538 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x319/0x9e0 net/core/dev.c:5652 process_backlog+0x480/0x8b0 net/core/dev.c:5981 __napi_poll+0xe7/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6632 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6701 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89d/0x1820 net/core/dev.c:6813 __do_softirq+0x1c0/0x7d7 kernel/softirq.c:554 Uninit was created at: __alloc_pages+0x9a7/0xe00 mm/page_alloc.c:4592 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2175 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline] new_slab+0x2de/0x1400 mm/slub.c:2391 ___slab_alloc+0x1184/0x33d0 mm/slub.c:3525 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline] __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x6d3/0xbe0 mm/slub.c:3852 reqsk_alloc include/net/request_sock.h:131 [inline] inet_reqsk_alloc+0x66/0x7a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6978 tcp_conn_request+0x484/0x44e0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7135 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x16f/0x1d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1716 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2e5/0x4bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6655 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbfd/0x10b0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1929 tcp_v4_rcv+0x4ce4/0x5420 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2322 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2a3/0x13d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x332/0x500 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip_sublist_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:580 [inline] ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:631 [inline] ip_sublist_rcv+0x15f3/0x17f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:639 ip_list_rcv+0x9ef/0xa40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:674 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5581 [inline] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x15c5/0x1670 net/core/dev.c:5629 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5681 [inline] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x106c/0x16f0 net/core/dev.c:5773 gro_normal_list include/net/gro.h:438 [inline] napi_complete_done+0x425/0x880 net/core/dev.c:6113 virtqueue_napi_complete drivers/net/virtio_net.c:465 [inline] virtnet_poll+0x149d/0x2240 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:2211 __napi_poll+0xe7/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6632 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6701 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89d/0x1820 net/core/dev.c:6813 __do_softirq+0x1c0/0x7d7 kernel/softirq.c:554 CPU: 0 PID: 16792 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-05562-g61387b8dcf1d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Fixes: 695751e31a63 ("bpf: tcp: Handle BPF SYN Cookie in cookie_v[46]_check().") Reported-by: syzkaller Reported-by: Eric Dumazet Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CANn89iKdN9c+C_2JAUbc+VY3DDQjAQukMtiBbormAmAk9CdvQA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315224710.55209-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: use drop reasons in cookie check for ipv6

2024-02-28T10:39:21+00:00

Like what I did to ipv4 mode, refine this part: adding more drop reasons for better tracing. Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: David Ahern Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tcp: directly drop skb in cookie check for ipv6

2024-02-28T10:39:21+00:00

Like previous patch does, only moving skb drop logical code to cookie_v6_check() for later refinement. Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: David Ahern Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

bpf: tcp: Handle BPF SYN Cookie in cookie_v[46]_check().

2024-01-23T22:40:24+00:00

We will support arbitrary SYN Cookie with BPF in the following patch. If BPF prog validates ACK and kfunc allocates a reqsk, it will be carried to cookie_[46]_check() as skb->sk. If skb->sk is not NULL, we call cookie_bpf_check(). Then, we clear skb->sk and skb->destructor, which are needed not to hold refcnt for reqsk and the listener. See the following patch for details. After that, we finish initialisation for the remaining fields with cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(). Note that the server side WScale is set only for non-BPF SYN Cookie. Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240115205514.68364-5-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov