<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net/ipv4, branch v5.10.257</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.257</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.257'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-05-08T10:45:22+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags</title>
<updated>2026-05-08T10:45:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuan-Ting Chen</name>
<email>h3xrabbit@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-04T15:27:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a6cb440f274a22456ef3e86b457344f1678f38f9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6cb440f274a22456ef3e86b457344f1678f38f9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f4c50a4034e62ab75f1d5cdd191dd5f9c77fdff4 upstream.

MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP
marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(),
so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private
copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when
splicing pages into UDP skbs.

That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking
like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW
fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place
over data that is not owned privately by the skb.

Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching
TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is
present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place.
Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path.

This intentionally does not change ESP output. In esp_output_head(),
the path that appends the ESP trailer to existing skb tailroom without
calling skb_cow_data() is not reachable for nonlinear skbs:
skb_tailroom() returns zero when skb-&gt;data_len is nonzero, while ESP
tailen is positive. Thus ESP output will either use the separate
destination-frag path or fall back to skb_cow_data().

Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 7da0dde68486 ("ip, udp: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Fixes: 6d8192bd69bb ("ip6, udp6: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Kuan-Ting Chen &lt;h3xrabbit@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ting Chen &lt;h3xrabbit@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 5.10: set the SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG flag in
 ip_append_page() instead of __ip{,6}_append_data()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;benh@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>esp: fix skb leak with espintcp and async crypto</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabrina Dubroca</name>
<email>sd@queasysnail.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-23T23:05:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=aca3ad0c262f54a5b5c95dda80a48365997d1224'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aca3ad0c262f54a5b5c95dda80a48365997d1224</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0c0eef8ccd2413b0a10eb6bbd3442333b1e64dd2 ]

When the TX queue for espintcp is full, esp_output_tail_tcp will
return an error and not free the skb, because with synchronous crypto,
the common xfrm output code will drop the packet for us.

With async crypto (esp_output_done), we need to drop the skb when
esp_output_tail_tcp returns an error.

Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: Fix the usage of skb-&gt;sk</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steffen Klassert</name>
<email>steffen.klassert@secunet.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-16T10:46:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=09815d6df7bf8b095fd56cd7a83b6e0b758976fc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:09815d6df7bf8b095fd56cd7a83b6e0b758976fc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1620c88887b16940e00dbe57dd38c74eda9bad9e ]

xfrm assumed to always have a full socket at skb-&gt;sk.
This is not always true, so fix it by converting to a
full socket before it is used.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 0c0eef8ccd24 ("esp: fix skb leak with espintcp and async crypto")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>icmp: fix NULL pointer dereference in icmp_tag_validation()</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weiming Shi</name>
<email>bestswngs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-18T13:06:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=571d9d7b650f02d1e38c01128817868bceac9edd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:571d9d7b650f02d1e38c01128817868bceac9edd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 614aefe56af8e13331e50220c936fc0689cf5675 ]

icmp_tag_validation() unconditionally dereferences the result of
rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]) without checking for NULL.
The inet_protos[] array is sparse -- only about 15 of 256 protocol
numbers have registered handlers. When ip_no_pmtu_disc is set to 3
(hardened PMTU mode) and the kernel receives an ICMP Fragmentation
Needed error with a quoted inner IP header containing an unregistered
protocol number, the NULL dereference causes a kernel panic in
softirq context.

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
 RIP: 0010:icmp_unreach (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1085 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1143)
 Call Trace:
  &lt;IRQ&gt;
  icmp_rcv (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1527)
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207)
  ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:242)
  ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262)
  ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:573)
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6164)
  process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6628)
  handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561)
  &lt;/IRQ&gt;

Add a NULL check before accessing icmp_strict_tag_validation. If the
protocol has no registered handler, return false since it cannot
perform strict tag validation.

Fixes: 8ed1dc44d3e9 ("ipv4: introduce hardened ip_no_pmtu_disc mode")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260318130558.1050247-4-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tcp-md5: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-10T20:17:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=821c8751fdeecdeecabeb11704dd33439c9e4bbc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:821c8751fdeecdeecabeb11704dd33439c9e4bbc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46d0d6f50dab706637f4c18a470aac20a21900d3 upstream.

To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant
time.  Use the appropriate helper function for this.

Fixes: cfb6eeb4c860 ("[TCP]: MD5 Signature Option (RFC2385) support.")
Fixes: 658ddaaf6694 ("tcp: md5: RST: getting md5 key from listener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260302203409.13388-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: fib: Annotate access to struct fib_alias.fa_state.</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-27T04:35:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=86da94d9b53b8fe63d15e7b661e0532f034816ee'/>
<id>urn:sha1:86da94d9b53b8fe63d15e7b661e0532f034816ee</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6e84fc395e90465f1418f582a9f7d53c87ab010e ]

syzbot reported that struct fib_alias.fa_state can be
modified locklessly by RCU readers. [0]

Let's use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() properly.

[0]:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in fib_table_lookup / fib_table_lookup

write to 0xffff88811b06a7fa of 1 bytes by task 4167 on cpu 0:
 fib_alias_accessed net/ipv4/fib_lookup.h:32 [inline]
 fib_table_lookup+0x361/0xd60 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1565
 fib_lookup include/net/ip_fib.h:390 [inline]
 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x378/0x1380 net/ipv4/route.c:2814
 ip_route_output_key_hash net/ipv4/route.c:2705 [inline]
 __ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:169 [inline]
 ip_route_output_flow+0x65/0x110 net/ipv4/route.c:2932
 udp_sendmsg+0x13c3/0x15d0 net/ipv4/udp.c:1450
 inet_sendmsg+0xac/0xd0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:859
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53a/0x600 net/socket.c:2592
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x195/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2646
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x185/0x320 net/socket.c:2735
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2759 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x57/0x70 net/socket.c:2759
 x64_sys_call+0x1e28/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xc0/0x2a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

read to 0xffff88811b06a7fa of 1 bytes by task 4168 on cpu 1:
 fib_alias_accessed net/ipv4/fib_lookup.h:31 [inline]
 fib_table_lookup+0x338/0xd60 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1565
 fib_lookup include/net/ip_fib.h:390 [inline]
 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x378/0x1380 net/ipv4/route.c:2814
 ip_route_output_key_hash net/ipv4/route.c:2705 [inline]
 __ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:169 [inline]
 ip_route_output_flow+0x65/0x110 net/ipv4/route.c:2932
 udp_sendmsg+0x13c3/0x15d0 net/ipv4/udp.c:1450
 inet_sendmsg+0xac/0xd0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:859
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53a/0x600 net/socket.c:2592
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x195/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2646
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x185/0x320 net/socket.c:2735
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2759 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x57/0x70 net/socket.c:2759
 x64_sys_call+0x1e28/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xc0/0x2a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

value changed: 0x00 -&gt; 0x01

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4168 Comm: syz.4.206 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025

Reported-by: syzbot+d24f940f770afda885cf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/69783ead.050a0220.c9109.0013.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260127043528.514160-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: tcp_tx_timestamp() must look at the rtx queue</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:19:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-27T12:38:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4d21ab0459a781e2a3f4e25024f6f99a2460f15a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d21ab0459a781e2a3f4e25024f6f99a2460f15a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 838eb9687691d29915797a885b861fd09353386e ]

tcp_tx_timestamp() is only called at the end of tcp_sendmsg_locked()
before the final tcp_push().

By the time it is called, it is possible all the copied data
has been sent already (transmit queue is empty).

If this is the case, use the last skb in the rtx queue.

Fixes: 75c119afe14f ("tcp: implement rb-tree based retransmit queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260127123828.4098577-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:40:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-15T17:24:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c7498f9bc390479ccfad7c7f2332237ff4945b03'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c7498f9bc390479ccfad7c7f2332237ff4945b03</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7a9bc9e3f42391e4c187e099263cf7a1c4b69ff5 ]

fou_udp_recv() has the same problem mentioned in the previous
patch.

If FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO is set to 0, skb is not freed by
fou_udp_recv() nor "resubmit"-ted in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu().

Let's forbid 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.

Fixes: 23461551c0062 ("fou: Support for foo-over-udp RX path")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260115172533.693652-4-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fou: use policy and operation tables generated from the spec</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:40:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-20T17:50:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=719b4f91ed0ebee82e4c6d27805708db2af2c177'/>
<id>urn:sha1:719b4f91ed0ebee82e4c6d27805708db2af2c177</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1d562c32e4392cc091c940918ee1ffd7bfcb9e96 ]

Generate and plug in the spec-based tables.

A little bit of renaming is needed in the FOU code.

Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7a9bc9e3f423 ("fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fou: rename the source for linking</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:40:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-20T17:50:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4ab50a2c092a2562c5fa3f288fe517448845db7f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4ab50a2c092a2562c5fa3f288fe517448845db7f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 08d323234d10eab077cbf0093eeb5991478a261a ]

We'll need to link two objects together to form the fou module.
This means the source can't be called fou, the build system expects
fou.o to be the combined object.

Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7a9bc9e3f423 ("fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
