<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net/ipv4/netfilter, branch v5.10.257</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.257</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.257'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:59+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_reject: don't leak dst refcount for loopback packets</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-20T12:37:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7b8b503c06274ef3c6c1a107743f1ec0d0a53ef8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7b8b503c06274ef3c6c1a107743f1ec0d0a53ef8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91a79b792204313153e1bdbbe5acbfc28903b3a5 ]

recent patches to add a WARN() when replacing skb dst entry found an
old bug:

WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 skb_dst_check_unset include/linux/skbuff.h:1164 [inline]
WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 skb_dst_set include/linux/skbuff.h:1210 [inline]
WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 nf_reject_fill_skb_dst+0x2a4/0x330 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c:234
[..]
Call Trace:
 nf_send_unreach+0x17b/0x6e0 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c:325
 nft_reject_inet_eval+0x4bc/0x690 net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c:27
 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:237 [inline]
 ..

This is because blamed commit forgot about loopback packets.
Such packets already have a dst_entry attached, even at PRE_ROUTING stage.

Instead of checking hook just check if the skb already has a route
attached to it.

Fixes: f53b9b0bdc59 ("netfilter: introduce support for reject at prerouting stage")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250820123707.10671-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_reject_inet: allow to use reject from inet ingress</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-31T10:24:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=97540d9e879f62894350d7e10e538e02e21df08d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97540d9e879f62894350d7e10e538e02e21df08d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 117ca1f8920cf4087bf82f44bd2a51b49d6aae63 ]

Enhance validation to support for reject from inet ingress chains.

Note that, reject from inet ingress and netdev ingress differ.

Reject packets from inet ingress are sent through ip_local_out() since
inet reject emulates the IP layer receive path. So the reject packet
follows to classic IP output and postrouting paths.

The reject action from netdev ingress assumes the packet not yet entered
the IP layer, so the reject packet is sent through dev_queue_xmit().
Therefore, reject packets from netdev ingress do not follow the classic
IP output and postrouting paths.

Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 91a79b792204 ("netfilter: nf_reject: don't leak dst refcount for loopback packets")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: fib: check correct rtable in vrf setups</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:08:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-09T07:19:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3502b1a297204d140f483916ecb3b9809e86c1ae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3502b1a297204d140f483916ecb3b9809e86c1ae</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 05ef7055debc804e8083737402127975e7244fc4 ]

We need to init l3mdev unconditionally, else main routing table is searched
and incorrect result is returned unless strict (iif keyword) matching is
requested.

Next patch adds a selftest for this.

Fixes: 2a8a7c0eaa87 ("netfilter: nft_fib: Fix for rpath check with VRF devices")
Closes: https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1761
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: rpfilter/fib: Set -&gt;flowic_uid correctly for user namespaces.</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:08:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guillaume Nault</name>
<email>gnault@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-13T14:37:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=037145e2a21465c4a1fcae546991f8036ea821b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:037145e2a21465c4a1fcae546991f8036ea821b1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1fcc064b305a1aadeff0d4bff961094d27660acd ]

Currently netfilter's rpfilter and fib modules implicitely initialise
-&gt;flowic_uid with 0. This is normally the root UID. However, this isn't
the case in user namespaces, where user ID 0 is mapped to a different
kernel UID. By initialising -&gt;flowic_uid with sock_net_uid(), we get
the root UID of the user namespace, thus keeping the same behaviour
whether or not we're running in a user namepspace.

Note, this is similar to commit 8bcfd0925ef1 ("ipv4: add missing
initialization for flowi4_uid"), which fixed the rp_filter sysctl.

Fixes: 622ec2c9d524 ("net: core: add UID to flows, rules, and routes")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 05ef7055debc ("netfilter: fib: check correct rtable in vrf setups")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: rpfilter/fib: Populate flowic_l3mdev field</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:08:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Phil Sutter</name>
<email>phil@nwl.cc</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-05T16:07:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d98558fe26996baf2107169ecfea9e40973add3f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d98558fe26996baf2107169ecfea9e40973add3f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit acc641ab95b66b813c1ce856c377a2bbe71e7f52 ]

Use the introduced field for correct operation with VRF devices instead
of conditionally overwriting flowic_oif. This is a partial revert of
commit b575b24b8eee3 ("netfilter: Fix rpfilter dropping vrf packets by
mistake"), implementing a simpler solution.

Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter &lt;phil@nwl.cc&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 05ef7055debc ("netfilter: fib: check correct rtable in vrf setups")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: prevent nf_skb_duplicated corruption</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:08:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-26T18:56:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=531754952f5dfc4b141523088147071d6e6112c4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:531754952f5dfc4b141523088147071d6e6112c4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 92ceba94de6fb4cee2bf40b485979c342f44a492 ]

syzbot found that nf_dup_ipv4() or nf_dup_ipv6() could write
per-cpu variable nf_skb_duplicated in an unsafe way [1].

Disabling preemption as hinted by the splat is not enough,
we have to disable soft interrupts as well.

[1]
BUG: using __this_cpu_write() in preemptible [00000000] code: syz.4.282/6316
 caller is nf_dup_ipv4+0x651/0x8f0 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv4.c:87
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6316 Comm: syz.4.282 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-00104-g7052622fccb1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
  check_preemption_disabled+0x10e/0x120 lib/smp_processor_id.c:49
  nf_dup_ipv4+0x651/0x8f0 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv4.c:87
  nft_dup_ipv4_eval+0x1db/0x300 net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_dup_ipv4.c:30
  expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
  nft_do_chain+0x4ad/0x1da0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
  nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x202/0x320 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
  nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
  nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626
  nf_hook+0x2c4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:269
  NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:302 [inline]
  ip_output+0x185/0x230 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433
  ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline]
  ip_send_skb+0x74/0x100 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1495
  udp_send_skb+0xacf/0x1650 net/ipv4/udp.c:981
  udp_sendmsg+0x1c21/0x2a60 net/ipv4/udp.c:1269
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
  ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f4ce4f7def9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f4ce5d4a038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ce5135f80 RCX: 00007f4ce4f7def9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020005d40 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f4ce4ff0b76 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f4ce5135f80 R15: 00007ffd4cbc6d68
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: d877f07112f1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add nft_dup expression")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: tproxy: bail out if IP has been disabled on the device</title>
<updated>2024-06-16T11:32:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-13T10:27:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=07eeedafc59c45fe5de43958128542be3784764c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:07eeedafc59c45fe5de43958128542be3784764c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 21a673bddc8fd4873c370caf9ae70ffc6d47e8d3 ]

syzbot reports:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
[..]
RIP: 0010:nf_tproxy_laddr4+0xb7/0x340 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_tproxy_ipv4.c:62
Call Trace:
 nft_tproxy_eval_v4 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:56 [inline]
 nft_tproxy_eval+0xa9a/0x1a00 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:168

__in_dev_get_rcu() can return NULL, so check for this.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b94a6818504ea90d7661@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: cc6eb4338569 ("tproxy: use the interface primary IP address as a default value for --on-ip")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: complete validation of user input</title>
<updated>2024-05-02T14:23:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-09T12:07:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cf4bc359b76144a3dd55d7c09464ef4c5f2b2b05'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cf4bc359b76144a3dd55d7c09464ef4c5f2b2b05</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 65acf6e0501ac8880a4f73980d01b5d27648b956 ]

In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers
use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed
by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls.

In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation
before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following
check:

if ((u64)optlen &lt; (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
        return -EINVAL;

Fixes: 0c83842df40f ("netfilter: validate user input for expected length")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409120741.3538135-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: validate user input for expected length</title>
<updated>2024-04-13T10:59:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-04T12:20:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0f038242b77ddfc505bf4163d4904c1abd2e74d6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0f038242b77ddfc505bf4163d4904c1abd2e74d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c83842df40f86e529db6842231154772c20edcc upstream.

I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed
by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc
in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt")

setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account
before copying data.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238

CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
  print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
  kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
  kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
  __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
  copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
  copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
  do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
  do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
  nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
  do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
  __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 7238:
  kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
  kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
  poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
  __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
  kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
  __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline]
  __kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082
  kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline]
  __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
  do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
  __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
 allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73
flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff)
page_type: 0xffffefff(slab)
raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828
  set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
  post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490
  prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline]
  get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454
  __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712
  __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline]
  alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline]
  alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249
  allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412
  new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline]
  ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615
  __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705
  __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline]
  __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
  kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089
  kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62
  device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558
  dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232
  do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864
  __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline]
  rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559
  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
  netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace:
  reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
  free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline]
  free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617
  discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline]
  __put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980
  put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055
  __slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254
  qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
  qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
  kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322
  kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline]
  __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
  __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076
  kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline]
  kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634
  bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline]
  rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367
  rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299
  worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380
  kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
  ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
 ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
&gt;ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
                               ^
 ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc
 ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404122051.2303764-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: add and use nft_sk helper</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T19:53:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-28T10:30:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=39546418b84d4abdbba9cc0db2458e577ff9758c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:39546418b84d4abdbba9cc0db2458e577ff9758c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 85554eb981e5a8b0b8947611193aef1737081ef2 ]

This allows to change storage placement later on without changing readers.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 28427f368f0e ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Fix non-linear header modification")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
