<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/net/dccp, branch v6.6.132</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.132</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.132'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2025-01-23T16:21:19+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: fix data-races around sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc</title>
<updated>2025-01-23T16:21:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang Liang</name>
<email>wangliang74@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-07T02:34:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3f51f8c9d28954cf380100883a02eed35a8277e9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f51f8c9d28954cf380100883a02eed35a8277e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 073d89808c065ac4c672c0a613a71b27a80691cb upstream.

Syzkaller reported this warning:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #26
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
 Code: 24 12 4c 89 e2 5b 48 c7 c7 98 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 d1 18 17 ff 4c 89 e6 5b 48 c7 c7 d0 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 bf 18 17 ff 0f 0b eb 83 &lt;0f&gt; 0b eb 97 0f 0b eb 87 0f 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bd90 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffff88810b172a90 RCX: 0000000000000007
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000300 RDI: ffff88810b172a00
 RBP: ffff88810b172a00 R08: ffff888104273c00 R09: 0000000000100007
 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88810b172a00
 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888237c31f78
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007ffc63fecac8 CR3: 000000000342e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  ? __warn+0x88/0x130
  ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
  ? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0
  ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
  ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
  ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
  __sk_destruct+0x2a/0x200
  rcu_do_batch+0x1aa/0x530
  ? rcu_do_batch+0x13b/0x530
  rcu_core+0x159/0x2f0
  handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x2b0
  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
  run_ksoftirqd+0x25/0x30
  smpboot_thread_fn+0xdd/0x1d0
  kthread+0xd3/0x100
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Its possible that two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv()/sk_forward_alloc_add()
concurrently when sk-&gt;sk_state == TCP_LISTEN with sk-&gt;sk_lock unlocked,
which triggers a data-race around sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc:
tcp_v6_rcv
    tcp_v6_do_rcv
        skb_clone_and_charge_r
            sk_rmem_schedule
                __sk_mem_schedule
                    sk_forward_alloc_add()
            skb_set_owner_r
                sk_mem_charge
                    sk_forward_alloc_add()
        __kfree_skb
            skb_release_all
                skb_release_head_state
                    sock_rfree
                        sk_mem_uncharge
                            sk_forward_alloc_add()
                            sk_mem_reclaim
                                // set local var reclaimable
                                __sk_mem_reclaim
                                    sk_forward_alloc_add()

In this syzkaller testcase, two threads call
tcp_v6_do_rcv() with skb-&gt;truesize=768, the sk_forward_alloc changes like
this:
 (cpu 1)             | (cpu 2)             | sk_forward_alloc
 ...                 | ...                 | 0
 __sk_mem_schedule() |                     | +4096 = 4096
                     | __sk_mem_schedule() | +4096 = 8192
 sk_mem_charge()     |                     | -768  = 7424
                     | sk_mem_charge()     | -768  = 6656
 ...                 |    ...              |
 sk_mem_uncharge()   |                     | +768  = 7424
 reclaimable=7424    |                     |
                     | sk_mem_uncharge()   | +768  = 8192
                     | reclaimable=8192    |
 __sk_mem_reclaim()  |                     | -4096 = 4096
                     | __sk_mem_reclaim()  | -8192 = -4096 != 0

The skb_clone_and_charge_r() should not be called in tcp_v6_do_rcv() when
sk-&gt;sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, it happens later in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock().
Fix the same issue in dccp_v6_do_rcv().

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Fixes: e994b2f0fb92 ("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang &lt;wangliang74@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241107023405.889239-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan &lt;alvalan9@foxmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: Fix memory leak in dccp_feat_change_recv</title>
<updated>2024-12-14T18:59:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ivan Solodovnikov</name>
<email>solodovnikov.ia@phystech.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-26T14:39:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d3ec686a369fae5034303061f003cd3f94ddfd23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d3ec686a369fae5034303061f003cd3f94ddfd23</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 22be4727a8f898442066bcac34f8a1ad0bc72e14 ]

If dccp_feat_push_confirm() fails after new value for SP feature was accepted
without reconciliation ('entry == NULL' branch), memory allocated for that value
with dccp_feat_clone_sp_val() is never freed.

Here is the kmemleak stack for this:

unreferenced object 0xffff88801d4ab488 (size 8):
  comm "syz-executor310", pid 1127, jiffies 4295085598 (age 41.666s)
  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
    01 b4 4a 1d 80 88 ff ff                          ..J.....
  backtrace:
    [&lt;00000000db7cabfe&gt;] kmemdup+0x23/0x50 mm/util.c:128
    [&lt;0000000019b38405&gt;] kmemdup include/linux/string.h:465 [inline]
    [&lt;0000000019b38405&gt;] dccp_feat_clone_sp_val net/dccp/feat.c:371 [inline]
    [&lt;0000000019b38405&gt;] dccp_feat_clone_sp_val net/dccp/feat.c:367 [inline]
    [&lt;0000000019b38405&gt;] dccp_feat_change_recv net/dccp/feat.c:1145 [inline]
    [&lt;0000000019b38405&gt;] dccp_feat_parse_options+0x1196/0x2180 net/dccp/feat.c:1416
    [&lt;00000000b1f6d94a&gt;] dccp_parse_options+0xa2a/0x1260 net/dccp/options.c:125
    [&lt;0000000030d7b621&gt;] dccp_rcv_state_process+0x197/0x13d0 net/dccp/input.c:650
    [&lt;000000001f74c72e&gt;] dccp_v4_do_rcv+0xf9/0x1a0 net/dccp/ipv4.c:688
    [&lt;00000000a6c24128&gt;] sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1041 [inline]
    [&lt;00000000a6c24128&gt;] __release_sock+0x139/0x3b0 net/core/sock.c:2570
    [&lt;00000000cf1f3a53&gt;] release_sock+0x54/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3111
    [&lt;000000008422fa23&gt;] inet_wait_for_connect net/ipv4/af_inet.c:603 [inline]
    [&lt;000000008422fa23&gt;] __inet_stream_connect+0x5d0/0xf70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:696
    [&lt;0000000015b6f64d&gt;] inet_stream_connect+0x53/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:735
    [&lt;0000000010122488&gt;] __sys_connect_file+0x15c/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1865
    [&lt;00000000b4b70023&gt;] __sys_connect+0x165/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1882
    [&lt;00000000f4cb3815&gt;] __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1892 [inline]
    [&lt;00000000f4cb3815&gt;] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1889 [inline]
    [&lt;00000000f4cb3815&gt;] __x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xb0 net/socket.c:1889
    [&lt;00000000e7b1e839&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
    [&lt;0000000055e91434&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1

Clean up the allocated memory in case of dccp_feat_push_confirm() failure
and bail out with an error reset code.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: e77b8363b2ea ("dccp: Process incoming Change feature-negotiation options")
Signed-off-by: Ivan Solodovnikov &lt;solodovnikov.ia@phystech.edu&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241126143902.190853-1-solodovnikov.ia@phystech.edu
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp/dccp: do not care about families in inet_twsk_purge()</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:33:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-29T15:32:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7348061662c7149b81e38e545d5dd6bd427bec81'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7348061662c7149b81e38e545d5dd6bd427bec81</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1eeb5043573981f3a1278876515851b7f6b1df1b ]

We lost ability to unload ipv6 module a long time ago.

Instead of calling expensive inet_twsk_purge() twice,
we can handle all families in one round.

Also remove an extra line added in my prior patch,
per Kuniyuki Iwashima feedback.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240327192934.6843-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329153203.345203-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 565d121b6998 ("tcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix race for duplicate reqsk on identical SYN</title>
<updated>2024-07-05T07:33:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>luoxuanqiang</name>
<email>luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-21T01:39:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fdae4d139f4778b20a40c60705c53f5f146459b5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fdae4d139f4778b20a40c60705c53f5f146459b5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ff46e3b4421923937b7f6e44ffcd3549a074f321 ]

When bonding is configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode, if two identical
SYN packets are received at the same time and processed on different CPUs,
it can potentially create the same sk (sock) but two different reqsk
(request_sock) in tcp_conn_request().

These two different reqsk will respond with two SYNACK packets, and since
the generation of the seq (ISN) incorporates a timestamp, the final two
SYNACK packets will have different seq values.

The consequence is that when the Client receives and replies with an ACK
to the earlier SYNACK packet, we will reset(RST) it.

========================================================================

This behavior is consistently reproducible in my local setup,
which comprises:

                  | NETA1 ------ NETB1 |
PC_A --- bond --- |                    | --- bond --- PC_B
                  | NETA2 ------ NETB2 |

- PC_A is the Server and has two network cards, NETA1 and NETA2. I have
  bonded these two cards using BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode and configured
  them to be handled by different CPU.

- PC_B is the Client, also equipped with two network cards, NETB1 and
  NETB2, which are also bonded and configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode.

If the client attempts a TCP connection to the server, it might encounter
a failure. Capturing packets from the server side reveals:

10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855116,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855123, &lt;==
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117, &lt;==
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117,

Two SYNACKs with different seq numbers are sent by localhost,
resulting in an anomaly.

========================================================================

The attempted solution is as follows:
Add a return value to inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add() to confirm if the
ehash insertion is successful (Up to now, the reason for unsuccessful
insertion is that a reqsk for the same connection has already been
inserted). If the insertion fails, release the reqsk.

Due to the refcnt, Kuniyuki suggests also adding a return value check
for the DCCP module; if ehash insertion fails, indicating a successful
insertion of the same connection, simply release the reqsk as well.

Simultaneously, In the reqsk_queue_hash_req(), the start of the
req-&gt;rsk_timer is adjusted to be after successful insertion.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: luoxuanqiang &lt;luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621013929.1386815-1-luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp/tcp: Call security_inet_conn_request() after setting IPv6 addresses.</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:59:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-30T20:10:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=82c0c8b9643ed15707412c42a6753085c5a894e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82c0c8b9643ed15707412c42a6753085c5a894e6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 23be1e0e2a83a8543214d2599a31d9a2185a796b ]

Initially, commit 4237c75c0a35 ("[MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child
sockets") introduced security_inet_conn_request() in some functions
where reqsk is allocated.  The hook is added just after the allocation,
so reqsk's IPv6 remote address was not initialised then.

However, SELinux/Smack started to read it in netlbl_req_setattr()
after commit e1adea927080 ("calipso: Allow request sockets to be
relabelled by the lsm.").

Commit 284904aa7946 ("lsm: Relocate the IPv4 security_inet_conn_request()
hooks") fixed that kind of issue only in TCPv4 because IPv6 labeling was
not supported at that time.  Finally, the same issue was introduced again
in IPv6.

Let's apply the same fix on DCCPv6 and TCPv6.

Fixes: e1adea927080 ("calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: Call security_inet_conn_request() after setting IPv4 addresses.</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:59:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-30T20:10:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0a2bcc3bb7d32f6e9ee8f31c7a3f43d1fe00c342'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0a2bcc3bb7d32f6e9ee8f31c7a3f43d1fe00c342</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fa2df45af13091f76b89adb84a28f13818d5d631 ]

Initially, commit 4237c75c0a35 ("[MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child
sockets") introduced security_inet_conn_request() in some functions
where reqsk is allocated.  The hook is added just after the allocation,
so reqsk's IPv4 remote address was not initialised then.

However, SELinux/Smack started to read it in netlbl_req_setattr()
after the cited commits.

This bug was partially fixed by commit 284904aa7946 ("lsm: Relocate
the IPv4 security_inet_conn_request() hooks").

This patch fixes the last bug in DCCPv4.

Fixes: 389fb800ac8b ("netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux")
Fixes: 07feee8f812f ("netlabel: Cleanup the Smack/NetLabel code to fix incoming TCP connections")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: fix dccp_v4_err()/dccp_v6_err() again</title>
<updated>2023-09-18T06:10:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-15T19:00:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6af289746a636f71f4c0535a9801774118486c7a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6af289746a636f71f4c0535a9801774118486c7a</id>
<content type='text'>
dh-&gt;dccph_x is the 9th byte (offset 8) in "struct dccp_hdr",
not in the "byte 7" as Jann claimed.

We need to make sure the ICMP messages are big enough,
using more standard ways (no more assumptions).

syzbot reported:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2667 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2681 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in dccp_v6_err+0x426/0x1aa0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:94
pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2667 [inline]
pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2681 [inline]
dccp_v6_err+0x426/0x1aa0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:94
icmpv6_notify+0x4c7/0x880 net/ipv6/icmp.c:867
icmpv6_rcv+0x19d5/0x30d0
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xda6/0x2a60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:304 [inline]
ip6_input+0x15d/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:492
ip6_mc_input+0xa7e/0xc80 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:586
dst_input include/net/dst.h:468 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x5db/0x870 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:304 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0xda/0x390 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:310
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5523 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5637
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5723 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5782
tun_rx_batched+0x83b/0x920
tun_get_user+0x564c/0x6940 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1985 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x8ef/0x15c0 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x12f/0xb70 mm/slab.h:767
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x577/0xa80 mm/slub.c:3523
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:559
__alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:650
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6313
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795
tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1531 [inline]
tun_get_user+0x23cf/0x6940 drivers/net/tun.c:1846
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1985 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x8ef/0x15c0 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

CPU: 0 PID: 4995 Comm: syz-executor153 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-syzkaller-00014-ga747acc0b752 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023

Fixes: 977ad86c2a1b ("dccp: Fix out of bounds access in DCCP error handler")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net</title>
<updated>2023-08-29T05:44:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
<email>pabeni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-29T05:44:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c873512ef3a39cc1a605b7a5ff2ad0a33d619aa8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c873512ef3a39cc1a605b7a5ff2ad0a33d619aa8</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge in late fixes to prepare for the 6.6 net-next PR.

No conflicts.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: Fix out of bounds access in DCCP error handler</title>
<updated>2023-08-28T09:15:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-25T13:32:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=977ad86c2a1bcaf58f01ab98df5cc145083c489c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:977ad86c2a1bcaf58f01ab98df5cc145083c489c</id>
<content type='text'>
There was a previous attempt to fix an out-of-bounds access in the DCCP
error handlers, but that fix assumed that the error handlers only want
to access the first 8 bytes of the DCCP header. Actually, they also look
at the DCCP sequence number, which is stored beyond 8 bytes, so an
explicit pskb_may_pull() is required.

Fixes: 6706a97fec96 ("dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v4_err()")
Fixes: 1aa9d1a0e7ee ("ipv6: dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v6_err()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net</title>
<updated>2023-08-24T17:51:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-24T17:46:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=57ce6427e00a6a72f74b29630b39548b36980b09'/>
<id>urn:sha1:57ce6427e00a6a72f74b29630b39548b36980b09</id>
<content type='text'>
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

Conflicts:

include/net/inet_sock.h
  f866fbc842de ("ipv4: fix data-races around inet-&gt;inet_id")
  c274af224269 ("inet: introduce inet-&gt;inet_flags")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/679ddff6-db6e-4ff6-b177-574e90d0103d@tessares.net/

Adjacent changes:

drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
  e74216b8def3 ("bonding: fix macvlan over alb bond support")
  f11e5bd159b0 ("bonding: support balance-alb with openvswitch")

drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac.c
  d6499f0b7c7c ("net: bgmac: Return PTR_ERR() for fixed_phy_register()")
  23a14488ea58 ("net: bgmac: Fix return value check for fixed_phy_register()")

drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c
  32bbe64a1386 ("net: bcmgenet: Fix return value check for fixed_phy_register()")
  acf50d1adbf4 ("net: bcmgenet: Return PTR_ERR() for fixed_phy_register()")

net/sctp/socket.c
  f866fbc842de ("ipv4: fix data-races around inet-&gt;inet_id")
  b09bde5c3554 ("inet: move inet-&gt;mc_loop to inet-&gt;inet_frags")

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
