kernel/linux.git/net/can/raw.c, branch v6.6.134

can: raw: add missing refcount for memory leak fix

2023-08-23T00:18:50+00:00

Commit ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") introduced a new reference to the CAN netdevice that has assigned CAN filters. But this new ro->dev reference did not maintain its own refcount which lead to another KASAN use-after-free splat found by Eric Dumazet. This patch ensures a proper refcount for the CAN nedevice. Fixes: ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Ziyang Xuan Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821144547.6658-3-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_mark

2023-07-29T17:13:41+00:00

sk->sk_mark is often read while another thread could change the value. Fixes: 4a19ec5800fc ("[NET]: Introducing socket mark socket option.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

can: raw: fix lockdep issue in raw_release()

2023-07-20T11:46:29+00:00

syzbot complained about a lockdep issue [1] Since raw_bind() and raw_setsockopt() first get RTNL before locking the socket, we must adopt the same order in raw_release() [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.0/14110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e3df368 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: raw_bind+0xa7/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:434 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 raw_release+0x1c6/0x9b0 net/can/raw.c:391 __sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:654 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1386 __fput+0x3fd/0xac0 fs/file_table.c:384 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/14110: stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 14110 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/03/2023 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd89007cb29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd890d2a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd89019bf80 RCX: 00007fd89007cb29 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd8900c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd89019bf80 R15: 00007ffebf8124f8 Fixes: ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Ziyang Xuan Cc: Oliver Hartkopp Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230720114438.172434-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde

can: raw: fix receiver memory leak

2023-07-17T07:23:31+00:00

Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde

sock: Remove ->sendpage*() in favour of sendmsg(MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)

2023-06-24T22:50:13+00:00

Remove ->sendpage() and ->sendpage_locked(). sendmsg() with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES should be used instead. This allows multiple pages and multipage folios to be passed through. Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde # for net/can cc: Jens Axboe cc: Matthew Wilcox cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: mptcp@lists.linux.dev cc: rds-devel@oss.oracle.com cc: tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230623225513.2732256-16-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

can: raw: use temp variable instead of rolling back config

2023-02-08T20:53:24+00:00

Introduce a temporary variable to check for an invalid configuration attempt from user space. Before this patch the value was copied to the real config variable and rolled back in the case of an error. Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230203090807.97100-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde

can: raw: fix CAN FD frame transmissions over CAN XL devices

2023-02-02T09:33:26+00:00

A CAN XL device is always capable to process CAN FD frames. The former check when sending CAN FD frames relied on the existence of a CAN FD device and did not check for a CAN XL device that would be correct too. With this patch the CAN FD feature is enabled automatically when CAN XL is switched on - and CAN FD cannot be switch off while CAN XL is enabled. This precondition also leads to a clean up and reduction of checks in the hot path in raw_rcv() and raw_sendmsg(). Some conditions are reordered to handle simple checks first. changes since v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230131091012.50553-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net - fixed typo: devive -> device changes since v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230131091824.51026-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net/ - reorder checks in if statements to handle simple checks first Fixes: 626332696d75 ("can: raw: add CAN XL support") Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230131105613.55228-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde

can: raw: add support for SO_MARK

2022-12-12T10:43:16+00:00

Add support for SO_MARK to the CAN_RAW protocol. This makes it possible to add traffic control filters based on the fwmark. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221210113653.170346-1-mkl@pengutronix.de Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde

can: raw: add CAN XL support

2022-09-15T07:08:09+00:00

Enable CAN_RAW sockets to read and write CAN XL frames analogue to the CAN FD extension (new CAN_RAW_XL_FRAMES sockopt). A CAN XL network interface is capable to handle Classical CAN, CAN FD and CAN XL frames. When CAN_RAW_XL_FRAMES is enabled, the CAN_RAW socket checks whether the addressed CAN network interface is capable to handle the provided CAN frame. In opposite to the fixed number of bytes for - CAN frames (CAN_MTU = sizeof(struct can_frame)) - CAN FD frames (CANFD_MTU = sizeof(struct can_frame)) the number of bytes when reading/writing CAN XL frames depends on the number of data bytes. For efficiency reasons the length of the struct canxl_frame is truncated to the needed size for read/write operations. This leads to a calculated size of CANXL_HDR_SIZE + canxl_frame::len which is enforced on write() operations and guaranteed on read() operations. NB: Valid length values are 1 .. 2048 (CANXL_MIN_DLEN .. CANXL_MAX_DLEN). Acked-by: Vincent Mailhol Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220912170725.120748-8-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde

can: raw: use guard clause to optimize nesting in raw_rcv()

2022-09-06T06:35:07+00:00

We can use guard clause to optimize nesting codes like if (condition) { ... } else { return; } in raw_rcv(); Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0170ad1f07dbe838965df4274fce950980fa9d1f.1661584485.git.william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde