kernel/linux.git/net/bluetooth, branch v6.1.176

Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access

2026-06-19T11:37:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit e83f5e24da741fa9405aeeff00b08c5ee7c37b88 ] bt_sock_poll() walks the accept queue without synchronization, while child teardown can unlink the same socket and drop its last reference. The unsynchronized accept queue walk has existed since the initial Bluetooth import. Protect accept_q with a dedicated lock for queue updates and polling. Also rework bt_accept_dequeue() to take temporary child references under the queue lock before dropping it and locking the child socket. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jann Horn Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Reported-by: Xin Liu Signed-off-by: Jiexun Wang Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Jiexun Wang Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: Init sk_peer_* on bt_sock_alloc

2026-06-19T11:37:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 464c702fb9374ff8f3f816f24fb7ac719dd20e1e ] This makes sure peer information is always available via sock when using bt_sock_alloc. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Stable-dep-of: e83f5e24da74 ("Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig

2026-06-19T11:37:13+00:00

commit dd214733544427587a95f66dbf3adff072568990 upstream. net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms. Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands. Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched. The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded. Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process. We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read. The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is available for a Fixes tag. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260518002800.1361430-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260520135034.1060859-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521000555.3712030-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: hci_sync: reject oversized Broadcast Announcement prepend

2026-06-19T11:37:13+00:00

commit 5c65b96b549ea2dcfde497436bf9e048deb87758 upstream. Existing advertising instances can already hold the maximum extended advertising payload. When hci_adv_bcast_annoucement() prepends the Broadcast Announcement service data to that payload, the combined data may no longer fit in the temporary buffer used to rebuild the advertising data. Reject that case before copying the existing payload and report the failure through the device log. This keeps the existing advertising data intact and avoids overrunning the temporary buffer. Fixes: 5725bc608252 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix broadcast/PA when using an existing instance") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang Reported-by: Xin Liu Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4 Signed-off-by: Yuqi Xu Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix backward compatibility with userspace

2026-06-19T11:37:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 149324fc762c2a7acef9c26790566f81f475e51f ] bluetoothd has a bug with makes it send extra bytes as part of MGMT_OP_ADD_EXT_ADV_DATA which are now being checked to be the exact the expected length, relax this so only when the expected length is greater than the data length to cause an error since that would result in accessing invalid memory, otherwise just ignore the extra bytes. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20260602204749.210857-1-luiz.dentz@gmail.com/T/#u Fixes: d3f7d17960ed ("Bluetooth: MGMT: validate Add Extended Advertising Data length") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Bluetooth: fix memory leak in error path of hci_alloc_dev()

2026-06-19T11:37:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 37b3009bf5976e8ab77c8b9a9bc3bbd7ff49e37f ] Early failures in Bluetooth HCI UART configuration leak SRCU percpu memory. When device initialization fails before hci_register_dev() completes, the HCI_UNREGISTER flag is never set. As a result, when the device reference count reaches zero, bt_host_release() evaluates this flag as false and falls back to a direct kfree(hdev). Because hci_release_dev() is bypassed, the SRCU struct initialized early in hci_alloc_dev() is never cleaned up, resulting in a leak of percpu memory. Fix the leak by explicitly calling cleanup_srcu_struct() in the fallback (unregistered) branch of bt_host_release() before freeing the device. Reported-by: syzbot+535ecc844591e50588a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=535ecc844591e50588a5 Tested-by: syzbot+535ecc844591e50588a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1d6123102e9f ("Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix use-after-free in vhci_flush()") Signed-off-by: Bharath Reddy Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Bluetooth: bnep: reject short frames before parsing

2026-06-19T11:37:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6770d3a8acdf9151769180cc3710346c4cfbe6f0 ] A BNEP peer can send a short BNEP SDU. bnep_rx_frame() reads the packet type byte immediately and, for control packets, reads the control opcode and setup UUID-size byte before proving that those bytes are present. bnep_rx_control() also dereferences the control opcode without rejecting an empty control payload. Use skb_pull_data() for the fixed fields in bnep_rx_frame() so a NULL return gates each dereference. Split the control handler so the frame path can pass an opcode that has already been pulled, and keep the byte-buffer wrapper for extension control payloads. For BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ, name the UUID-size byte before pulling the setup payload. struct bnep_setup_conn_req carries destination and source service UUIDs after that byte, each uuid_size bytes, so the parser now documents that tuple explicitly instead of leaving the pull length as an opaque multiplication. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in bnep_rx_frame.isra.0+0x130c/0x1790 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f7908 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 1-byte region [ffff88800c0f7908, ffff88800c0f7909) Read of size 1 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0x140 (?:?) print_address_description+0x57/0x3a0 (?:?) bnep_rx_frame+0x130c/0x1790 (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c:306) print_report+0xb9/0x2b0 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x1ba/0x3a0 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) kasan_addr_to_slab+0x21/0x60 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) process_one_work+0xfce/0x17e0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3200) worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 (?:?) __kthread_parkme+0x184/0x230 (?:?) kthread+0x35e/0x470 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) ret_from_fork+0x586/0x870 (?:?) __switch_to+0x74f/0xdc0 (?:?) ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 (?:?) Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Bluetooth: bnep: fix incorrect length parsing in bnep_rx_frame() extension handling

2026-06-19T11:37:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 72b8deccff17a7644e0367e1aaf1a36cfb014324 ] In bnep_rx_frame(), the BNEP_FILTER_NET_TYPE_SET and BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_SET extension header parsing has two bugs: 1) The 2-byte length field is read with *(u16 *)(skb->data + 1), which performs a native-endian read. The BNEP protocol specifies this field in big-endian (network byte order), and the same file correctly uses get_unaligned_be16() for the identical fields in bnep_ctrl_set_netfilter() and bnep_ctrl_set_mcfilter(). 2) The length is multiplied by 2, but unlike BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ where the length byte counts UUID pairs (requiring * 2 for two UUIDs per entry), the filter extension length field already represents the total data size in bytes. This is confirmed by bnep_ctrl_set_netfilter() which reads the same field as a byte count and divides by 4 to get the number of filter entries. The bogus * 2 means skb_pull advances twice as far as it should, either dropping valid data from the next header or causing the pull to fail entirely when the doubled length exceeds the remaining skb. Fix by splitting the pull into two steps: first use skb_pull_data() to safely pull and validate the 3-byte fixed header (ctrl type + length), then pull the variable-length data using the properly decoded length. Fixes: bf8b9a9cb77b ("Bluetooth: bnep: Add support to extended headers of control frames") Signed-off-by: Dudu Lu Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Bluetooth: RFCOMM: validate skb length in MCC handlers

2026-06-19T11:37:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 23882b828c3c8c51d0c946446a396b10abb3b16b ] The RFCOMM MCC handlers cast skb->data to protocol-specific structs without validating skb->len first. A malicious remote device can send truncated MCC frames and trigger out-of-bounds reads in these handlers. Fix this by using skb_pull_data() to validate and access the required data before dereferencing it. rfcomm_recv_rpn() requires special handling since ETSI TS 07.10 allows 1-byte RPN requests. Handle this by validating only the DLCI byte first, and validating the full struct only when len > 1. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Suggested-by: Muhammad Bilal Signed-off-by: SeungJu Cheon Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks

2026-06-19T11:37:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit de23fb62259aa01d294f77238ae3b835eb674413 ] tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer. A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data. KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING request reached that path: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid() Read of size 1 Call trace: tlv_data_is_valid() add_advertising() hci_mgmt_cmd() hci_sock_sendmsg() Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the parser looks at data[i + 1]. Fixes: 2bb36870e8cb ("Bluetooth: Unify advertising instance flags check") Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin