<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/mm/slab.c, branch v6.2-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.2-rc2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.2-rc2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2022-11-21T09:36:09+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'slab/for-6.2/kmalloc_redzone' into slab/for-next</title>
<updated>2022-11-21T09:36:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-11T08:08:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=90e9b23a60d5b4c8317f58e01ed05d3bdf063440'/>
<id>urn:sha1:90e9b23a60d5b4c8317f58e01ed05d3bdf063440</id>
<content type='text'>
kmalloc() redzone improvements by Feng Tang

From cover letter [1]:

kmalloc's API family is critical for mm, and one of its nature is that
it will round up the request size to a fixed one (mostly power of 2).
When user requests memory for '2^n + 1' bytes, actually 2^(n+1) bytes
could be allocated, so there is an extra space than what is originally
requested.

This patchset tries to extend the redzone sanity check to the extra
kmalloced buffer than requested, to better detect un-legitimate access
to it. (depends on SLAB_STORE_USER &amp; SLAB_RED_ZONE)

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221021032405.1825078-1-feng.tang@intel.com/
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'slab/for-6.2/fit_rcu_head' into slab/for-next</title>
<updated>2022-11-21T09:36:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-10T09:42:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=76537db3b95cbf5d0189ce185c16db9f93017021'/>
<id>urn:sha1:76537db3b95cbf5d0189ce185c16db9f93017021</id>
<content type='text'>
A series by myself to reorder fields in struct slab to allow the
embedded rcu_head to grow (for debugging purposes). Requires changes to
isolate_movable_page() to skip slab pages which can otherwise become
false-positive __PageMovable due to its use of low bits in
page-&gt;mapping.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'slab/for-6.2/locking' into slab/for-next</title>
<updated>2022-11-21T09:35:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-10T08:48:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=14d3eb66e16a55d279598c8ed7ae1ca85066ff5b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:14d3eb66e16a55d279598c8ed7ae1ca85066ff5b</id>
<content type='text'>
A patch from Jiri Kosina that makes SLAB's list_lock a raw_spinlock_t.
While there are no plans to make SLAB actually compatible with
PREEMPT_RT or any other future, it makes !PREEMPT_RT lockdep happy.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/migrate: make isolate_movable_page() skip slab pages</title>
<updated>2022-11-21T09:24:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-04T14:57:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8b8817630ae80032e80b2eaf334de756ac1ff6a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b8817630ae80032e80b2eaf334de756ac1ff6a3</id>
<content type='text'>
In the next commit we want to rearrange struct slab fields to allow a larger
rcu_head. Afterwards, the page-&gt;mapping field will overlap with SLUB's "struct
list_head slab_list", where the value of prev pointer can become LIST_POISON2,
which is 0x122 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA.  Unfortunately the bit 1 being set can
confuse PageMovable() to be a false positive and cause a GPF as reported by lkp
[1].

To fix this, make isolate_movable_page() skip pages with the PageSlab flag set.
This is a bit tricky as we need to add memory barriers to SLAB and SLUB's page
allocation and freeing, and their counterparts to isolate_movable_page().

Based on my RFC from [2]. Added a comment update from Matthew's variant in [3]
and, as done there, moved the PageSlab checks to happen before trying to take
the page lock.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/208c1757-5edd-fd42-67d4-1940cc43b50f@intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aec59f53-0e53-1736-5932-25407125d4d4@suse.cz/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/YzsVM8eToHUeTP75@casper.infradead.org/

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;yujie.liu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/slab: move and adjust kernel-doc for kmem_cache_alloc</title>
<updated>2022-11-21T09:19:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-10T08:10:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=838de63b101147fc7d8af828465cf6d1d30232a8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:838de63b101147fc7d8af828465cf6d1d30232a8</id>
<content type='text'>
Alexander reports an issue with the kmem_cache_alloc() comment in
mm/slab.c:

&gt; The current comment mentioned that the flags only matters if the
&gt; cache has no available objects. It's different for the __GFP_ZERO
&gt; flag which will ensure that the returned object is always zeroed
&gt; in any case.

&gt; I have the feeling I run into this question already two times if
&gt; the user need to zero the object or not, but the user does not need
&gt; to zero the object afterwards. However another use of __GFP_ZERO
&gt; and only zero the object if the cache has no available objects would
&gt; also make no sense.

and suggests thus mentioning __GFP_ZERO as the exception. But on closer
inspection, the part about flags being only relevant if cache has no
available objects is misleading. The slab user has no reliable way to
determine if there are available objects, and e.g. the might_sleep()
debug check can be performed even if objects are available, so passing
correct flags given the allocation context always matters.

Thus remove that sentence completely, and while at it, move the comment
to from SLAB-specific mm/slab.c to the common include/linux/slab.h
The comment otherwise refers flags description for kmalloc(), so add
__GFP_ZERO comment there and remove a very misleading GFP_HIGHUSER
(not applicable to slab) description from there. Mention kzalloc() and
kmem_cache_zalloc() shortcuts.

Reported-by: Alexander Aring &lt;aahringo@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221011145413.8025-1-aahringo@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/slub: only zero requested size of buffer for kzalloc when debug enabled</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T15:25:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Feng Tang</name>
<email>feng.tang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-21T03:24:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9ce67395f5a0cdec6ce152d26bfda13b98b25c01'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ce67395f5a0cdec6ce152d26bfda13b98b25c01</id>
<content type='text'>
kzalloc/kmalloc will round up the request size to a fixed size
(mostly power of 2), so the allocated memory could be more than
requested. Currently kzalloc family APIs will zero all the
allocated memory.

To detect out-of-bound usage of the extra allocated memory, only
zero the requested part, so that redzone sanity check could be
added to the extra space later.

For kzalloc users who will call ksize() later and utilize this
extra space, please be aware that the space is not zeroed any
more when debug is enabled. (Thanks to Kees Cook's effort to
sanitize all ksize() user cases [1], this won't be a big issue).

[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220922031013.2150682-1-keescook@chromium.org/#r

Signed-off-by: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/slab: Annotate kmem_cache_node-&gt;list_lock as raw</title>
<updated>2022-10-24T11:17:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Kosina</name>
<email>jkosina@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-21T19:18:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b539ce9f1a31c442098c3f351cb4d03ba27c2720'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b539ce9f1a31c442098c3f351cb4d03ba27c2720</id>
<content type='text'>
The list_lock can be taken in hardirq context when do_drain() is being
called via IPI on all cores, and therefore lockdep complains about it,
because it can't be preempted on PREEMPT_RT.

That's not a real issue, as SLAB can't be built on PREEMPT_RT anyway, but
we still want to get rid of the warning on non-PREEMPT_RT builds.

Annotate it therefore as a raw lock in order to get rid of he lockdep
warning below.

	 =============================
	 [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
	 6.1.0-rc1-00134-ge35184f32151 #4 Not tainted
	 -----------------------------
	 swapper/3/0 is trying to lock:
	 ffff8bc88086dc18 (&amp;parent-&gt;list_lock){..-.}-{3:3}, at: do_drain+0x57/0xb0
	 other info that might help us debug this:
	 context-{2:2}
	 no locks held by swapper/3/0.
	 stack backtrace:
	 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1-00134-ge35184f32151 #4
	 Hardware name: LENOVO 20K5S22R00/20K5S22R00, BIOS R0IET38W (1.16 ) 05/31/2017
	 Call Trace:
	  &lt;IRQ&gt;
	  dump_stack_lvl+0x6b/0x9d
	  __lock_acquire+0x1519/0x1730
	  ? build_sched_domains+0x4bd/0x1590
	  ? __lock_acquire+0xad2/0x1730
	  lock_acquire+0x294/0x340
	  ? do_drain+0x57/0xb0
	  ? sched_clock_tick+0x41/0x60
	  _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40
	  ? do_drain+0x57/0xb0
	  do_drain+0x57/0xb0
	  __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x138/0x220
	  __sysvec_call_function+0x4f/0x210
	  sysvec_call_function+0x4b/0x90
	  &lt;/IRQ&gt;
	  &lt;TASK&gt;
	  asm_sysvec_call_function+0x16/0x20
	 RIP: 0010:mwait_idle+0x5e/0x80
	 Code: 31 d2 65 48 8b 04 25 80 ed 01 00 48 89 d1 0f 01 c8 48 8b 00 a8 08 75 14 66 90 0f 00 2d 0b 78 46 00 31 c0 48 89 c1 fb 0f 01 c9 &lt;eb&gt; 06 fb 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 80 ed 01 00 f0 80 60 02 df
	 RSP: 0000:ffffa90940217ee0 EFLAGS: 00000246
	 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
	 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff9bb9f93a
	 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
	 R10: ffffa90940217ea8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff
	 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8bc88127c500 R15: 0000000000000000
	  ? default_idle_call+0x1a/0xa0
	  default_idle_call+0x4b/0xa0
	  do_idle+0x1f1/0x2c0
	  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x56/0x70
	  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
	  start_secondary+0x122/0x150
	  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xce/0xdb
	  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random</title>
<updated>2022-10-16T22:27:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-16T22:27:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f1947d7c8a61db1cb0ef909a6512ede0b1f2115b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f1947d7c8a61db1cb0ef909a6512ede0b1f2115b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull more random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
 "This time with some large scale treewide cleanups.

  The intent of this pull is to clean up the way callers fetch random
  integers. The current rules for doing this right are:

   - If you want a secure or an insecure random u64, use get_random_u64()

   - If you want a secure or an insecure random u32, use get_random_u32()

     The old function prandom_u32() has been deprecated for a while
     now and is just a wrapper around get_random_u32(). Same for
     get_random_int().

   - If you want a secure or an insecure random u16, use get_random_u16()

   - If you want a secure or an insecure random u8, use get_random_u8()

   - If you want secure or insecure random bytes, use get_random_bytes().

     The old function prandom_bytes() has been deprecated for a while
     now and has long been a wrapper around get_random_bytes()

   - If you want a non-uniform random u32, u16, or u8 bounded by a
     certain open interval maximum, use prandom_u32_max()

     I say "non-uniform", because it doesn't do any rejection sampling
     or divisions. Hence, it stays within the prandom_*() namespace, not
     the get_random_*() namespace.

     I'm currently investigating a "uniform" function for 6.2. We'll see
     what comes of that.

  By applying these rules uniformly, we get several benefits:

   - By using prandom_u32_max() with an upper-bound that the compiler
     can prove at compile-time is ≤65536 or ≤256, internally
     get_random_u16() or get_random_u8() is used, which wastes fewer
     batched random bytes, and hence has higher throughput.

   - By using prandom_u32_max() instead of %, when the upper-bound is
     not a constant, division is still avoided, because
     prandom_u32_max() uses a faster multiplication-based trick instead.

   - By using get_random_u16() or get_random_u8() in cases where the
     return value is intended to indeed be a u16 or a u8, we waste fewer
     batched random bytes, and hence have higher throughput.

  This series was originally done by hand while I was on an airplane
  without Internet. Later, Kees and I worked on retroactively figuring
  out what could be done with Coccinelle and what had to be done
  manually, and then we split things up based on that.

  So while this touches a lot of files, the actual amount of code that's
  hand fiddled is comfortably small"

* tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
  prandom: remove unused functions
  treewide: use get_random_bytes() when possible
  treewide: use get_random_u32() when possible
  treewide: use get_random_{u8,u16}() when possible, part 2
  treewide: use get_random_{u8,u16}() when possible, part 1
  treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 2
  treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 1
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/slab: use kmalloc_node() for off slab freelist_idx_t array allocation</title>
<updated>2022-10-15T19:42:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hyeonggon Yoo</name>
<email>42.hyeyoo@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-15T04:34:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e36ce448a08d43de69e7449eb225805a7a8addf8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e36ce448a08d43de69e7449eb225805a7a8addf8</id>
<content type='text'>
After commit d6a71648dbc0 ("mm/slab: kmalloc: pass requests larger than
order-1 page to page allocator"), SLAB passes large ( &gt; PAGE_SIZE * 2)
requests to buddy like SLUB does.

SLAB has been using kmalloc caches to allocate freelist_idx_t array for
off slab caches. But after the commit, freelist_size can be bigger than
KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE.

Instead of using pointer to kmalloc cache, use kmalloc_node() and only
check if the kmalloc cache is off slab during calculate_slab_order().
If freelist_size &gt; KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE, no looping condition happens
as it allocates freelist_idx_t array directly from buddy.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221014205818.GA1428667@roeck-us.net/
Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Fixes: d6a71648dbc0 ("mm/slab: kmalloc: pass requests larger than order-1 page to page allocator")
Signed-off-by: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: use get_random_u32() when possible</title>
<updated>2022-10-11T23:42:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-05T15:43:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a251c17aa558d8e3128a528af5cf8b9d7caae4fd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a251c17aa558d8e3128a528af5cf8b9d7caae4fd</id>
<content type='text'>
The prandom_u32() function has been a deprecated inline wrapper around
get_random_u32() for several releases now, and compiles down to the
exact same code. Replace the deprecated wrapper with a direct call to
the real function. The same also applies to get_random_int(), which is
just a wrapper around get_random_u32(). This was done as a basic find
and replace.

Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt; # for ext4
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@toke.dk&gt; # for sch_cake
Acked-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt; # for nfsd
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg &lt;mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com&gt; # for thunderbolt
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt; # for xfs
Acked-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # for parisc
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt; # for s390
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
