<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/mm/shmem.c, branch v6.1.174</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.174</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.174'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:26:12+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>mm: update memfd seal write check to include F_SEAL_WRITE</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:26:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Stoakes</name>
<email>lstoakes@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T01:52:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ba86db5b7784e6e6b21952b3028b34b3eb150074'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ba86db5b7784e6e6b21952b3028b34b3eb150074</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 28464bbb2ddc199433383994bcb9600c8034afa1 ]

The seal_check_future_write() function is called by shmem_mmap() or
hugetlbfs_file_mmap() to disallow any future writable mappings of an memfd
sealed this way.

The F_SEAL_WRITE flag is not checked here, as that is handled via the
mapping-&gt;i_mmap_writable mechanism and so any attempt at a mapping would
fail before this could be run.

However we intend to change this, meaning this check can be performed for
F_SEAL_WRITE mappings also.

The logic here is equally applicable to both flags, so update this
function to accommodate both and rename it accordingly.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/913628168ce6cce77df7d13a63970bae06a526e0.1697116581.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lstoakes@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;muchun.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres &lt;isaacmanjarres@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: refactor arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() and arm64 MTE handling</title>
<updated>2024-11-22T14:37:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Stoakes</name>
<email>lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-18T16:17:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8fad7b004be8dc46eb801172ea62b0a2000fcf82'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8fad7b004be8dc46eb801172ea62b0a2000fcf82</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5baf8b037debf4ec60108ccfeccb8636d1dbad81 ]

Currently MTE is permitted in two circumstances (desiring to use MTE
having been specified by the VM_MTE flag) - where MAP_ANONYMOUS is
specified, as checked by arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() and actualised by
setting the VM_MTE_ALLOWED flag, or if the file backing the mapping is
shmem, in which case we set VM_MTE_ALLOWED in shmem_mmap() when the mmap
hook is activated in mmap_region().

The function that checks that, if VM_MTE is set, VM_MTE_ALLOWED is also
set is the arm64 implementation of arch_validate_flags().

Unfortunately, we intend to refactor mmap_region() to perform this check
earlier, meaning that in the case of a shmem backing we will not have
invoked shmem_mmap() yet, causing the mapping to fail spuriously.

It is inappropriate to set this architecture-specific flag in general mm
code anyway, so a sensible resolution of this issue is to instead move the
check somewhere else.

We resolve this by setting VM_MTE_ALLOWED much earlier in do_mmap(), via
the arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() call.

This is an appropriate place to do this as we already check for the
MAP_ANONYMOUS case here, and the shmem file case is simply a variant of
the same idea - we permit RAM-backed memory.

This requires a modification to the arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() signature to
pass in a pointer to the struct file associated with the mapping, however
this is not too egregious as this is only used by two architectures anyway
- arm64 and parisc.

So this patch performs this adjustment and removes the unnecessary
assignment of VM_MTE_ALLOWED in shmem_mmap().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix whitespace, per Catalin]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ec251b20ba1964fb64cf1607d2ad80c47f3873df.1730224667.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Fixes: deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo -&gt;mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Andreas Larsson &lt;andreas@gaisler.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Liam R. Howlett &lt;Liam.Howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: revert "mm: shmem: fix data-race in shmem_getattr()"</title>
<updated>2024-11-22T14:37:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Morton</name>
<email>akpm@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-16T00:57:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5874c1150e77296565ad6e495ef41fbf87570d14'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5874c1150e77296565ad6e495ef41fbf87570d14</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d1aa0c04294e29883d65eac6c2f72fe95cc7c049 upstream.

Revert d949d1d14fa2 ("mm: shmem: fix data-race in shmem_getattr()") as
suggested by Chuck [1].  It is causing deadlocks when accessing tmpfs over
NFS.

As Hugh commented, "added just to silence a syzbot sanitizer splat: added
where there has never been any practical problem".

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZzdxKF39VEmXSSyN@tissot.1015granger.net [1]
Fixes: d949d1d14fa2 ("mm: shmem: fix data-race in shmem_getattr()")
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jeongjun Park &lt;aha310510@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yu Zhao &lt;yuzhao@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: shmem: fix data-race in shmem_getattr()</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:26:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeongjun Park</name>
<email>aha310510@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-09T12:35:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=82cae1e30bd940253593c2d4f16d88343d1358f4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82cae1e30bd940253593c2d4f16d88343d1358f4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d949d1d14fa281ace388b1de978e8f2cd52875cf upstream.

I got the following KCSAN report during syzbot testing:

==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in generic_fillattr / inode_set_ctime_current

write to 0xffff888102eb3260 of 4 bytes by task 6565 on cpu 1:
 inode_set_ctime_to_ts include/linux/fs.h:1638 [inline]
 inode_set_ctime_current+0x169/0x1d0 fs/inode.c:2626
 shmem_mknod+0x117/0x180 mm/shmem.c:3443
 shmem_create+0x34/0x40 mm/shmem.c:3497
 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3578 [inline]
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3647 [inline]
 path_openat+0xdbc/0x1f00 fs/namei.c:3883
 do_filp_open+0xf7/0x200 fs/namei.c:3913
 do_sys_openat2+0xab/0x120 fs/open.c:1416
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1431 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1447 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1442 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0xf3/0x120 fs/open.c:1442
 x64_sys_call+0x1025/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:258
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

read to 0xffff888102eb3260 of 4 bytes by task 3498 on cpu 0:
 inode_get_ctime_nsec include/linux/fs.h:1623 [inline]
 inode_get_ctime include/linux/fs.h:1629 [inline]
 generic_fillattr+0x1dd/0x2f0 fs/stat.c:62
 shmem_getattr+0x17b/0x200 mm/shmem.c:1157
 vfs_getattr_nosec fs/stat.c:166 [inline]
 vfs_getattr+0x19b/0x1e0 fs/stat.c:207
 vfs_statx_path fs/stat.c:251 [inline]
 vfs_statx+0x134/0x2f0 fs/stat.c:315
 vfs_fstatat+0xec/0x110 fs/stat.c:341
 __do_sys_newfstatat fs/stat.c:505 [inline]
 __se_sys_newfstatat+0x58/0x260 fs/stat.c:499
 __x64_sys_newfstatat+0x55/0x70 fs/stat.c:499
 x64_sys_call+0x141f/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:263
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

value changed: 0x2755ae53 -&gt; 0x27ee44d3

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3498 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00326-gd1f2d51b711a-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
==================================================================

When calling generic_fillattr(), if you don't hold read lock, data-race
will occur in inode member variables, which can cause unexpected
behavior.

Since there is no special protection when shmem_getattr() calls
generic_fillattr(), data-race occurs by functions such as shmem_unlink()
or shmem_mknod(). This can cause unexpected results, so commenting it out
is not enough.

Therefore, when calling generic_fillattr() from shmem_getattr(), it is
appropriate to protect the inode using inode_lock_shared() and
inode_unlock_shared() to prevent data-race.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240909123558.70229-1-aha310510@gmail.com
Fixes: 44a30220bc0a ("shmem: recalculate file inode when fstat")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park &lt;aha310510@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroup.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yu Zhao &lt;yuzhao@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/shmem: fix race in shmem_undo_range w/THP</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T16:00:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Stevens</name>
<email>stevensd@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-18T08:40:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=da9b7c651c6517c2de1099136ed87c0c24f864dd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:da9b7c651c6517c2de1099136ed87c0c24f864dd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 55ac8bbe358bdd2f3c044c12f249fd22d48fe015 upstream.

Split folios during the second loop of shmem_undo_range.  It's not
sufficient to only split folios when dealing with partial pages, since
it's possible for a THP to be faulted in after that point.  Calling
truncate_inode_folio in that situation can result in throwing away data
outside of the range being targeted.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy up comment layout]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418084031.3439795-1-stevensd@google.com
Fixes: b9a8a4195c7d ("truncate,shmem: Handle truncates that split large folios")
Signed-off-by: David Stevens &lt;stevensd@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Suleiman Souhlal &lt;suleiman@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tmpfs: verify {g,u}id mount options correctly</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-01T16:17:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c13e6edbad1af8680896e980e55934dfc9b8248b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c13e6edbad1af8680896e980e55934dfc9b8248b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0200679fc7953177941e41c2a4241d0b6c2c5de8 ]

A while ago we received the following report:

"The other outstanding issue I noticed comes from the fact that
fsconfig syscalls may occur in a different userns than that which
called fsopen. That means that resolving the uid/gid via
current_user_ns() can save a kuid that isn't mapped in the associated
namespace when the filesystem is finally mounted. This means that it
is possible for an unprivileged user to create files owned by any
group in a tmpfs mount (since we can set the SUID bit on the tmpfs
directory), or a tmpfs that is owned by any user, including the root
group/user."

The contract for {g,u}id mount options and {g,u}id values in general set
from userspace has always been that they are translated according to the
caller's idmapping. In so far, tmpfs has been doing the correct thing.
But since tmpfs is mountable in unprivileged contexts it is also
necessary to verify that the resulting {k,g}uid is representable in the
namespace of the superblock to avoid such bugs as above.

The new mount api's cross-namespace delegation abilities are already
widely used. After having talked to a bunch of userspace this is the
most faithful solution with minimal regression risks. I know of one
users - systemd - that makes use of the new mount api in this way and
they don't set unresolable {g,u}ids. So the regression risk is minimal.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALxfFW4BXhEwxR0Q5LSkg-8Vb4r2MONKCcUCVioehXQKr35eHg@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: f32356261d44 ("vfs: Convert ramfs, shmem, tmpfs, devtmpfs, rootfs to use the new mount API")
Reviewed-by: "Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)" &lt;sforshee@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Seth Jenkins &lt;sethjenkins@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20230801-vfs-fs_context-uidgid-v1-1-daf46a050bbf@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>shmem: fix smaps BUG sleeping while atomic</title>
<updated>2023-08-30T14:11:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-23T05:14:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d13f3a63d236d311fceece5f34133636fd334bde'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d13f3a63d236d311fceece5f34133636fd334bde</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e5548f85b4527c4c803b7eae7887c10bf8f90c97 upstream.

smaps_pte_hole_lookup() is calling shmem_partial_swap_usage() with page
table lock held: but shmem_partial_swap_usage() does cond_resched_rcu() if
need_resched(): "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context".

Since shmem_partial_swap_usage() is designed to count across a range, but
smaps_pte_hole_lookup() only calls it for a single page slot, just break
out of the loop on the last or only page, before checking need_resched().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6fe3b3ec-abdf-332f-5c23-6a3b3a3b11a9@google.com
Fixes: 230100321518 ("mm/smaps: simplify shmem handling of pte holes")
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.16+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>shmem: use ramfs_kill_sb() for kill_sb method of ramfs-based tmpfs</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:22:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-07T16:15:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1f34bf8b442c6d720e7fa6f15e8702427e48aea9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1f34bf8b442c6d720e7fa6f15e8702427e48aea9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 36ce9d76b0a93bae799e27e4f5ac35478c676592 upstream.

As the ramfs-based tmpfs uses ramfs_init_fs_context() for the
init_fs_context method, which allocates fc-&gt;s_fs_info, use ramfs_kill_sb()
to free it and avoid a memory leak.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230607161523.2876433-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Fixes: c3b1b1cbf002 ("ramfs: add support for "mode=" mount option")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/shmem: restore SHMEM_HUGE_DENY precedence over MADV_COLLAPSE</title>
<updated>2023-01-24T06:24:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zach O'Keefe</name>
<email>zokeefe@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-24T08:20:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1cb76f56694965541d07c78b988f3edc837bf561'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1cb76f56694965541d07c78b988f3edc837bf561</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3de0c269adc6c2fac0bb1fb11965f0de699dc32b upstream.

SHMEM_HUGE_DENY is for emergency use by the admin, to disable allocation
of shmem huge pages if, for example, a dangerous bug is found in their
usage: see "deny" in Documentation/mm/transhuge.rst.  An app using
madvise(,,MADV_COLLAPSE) should not be allowed to override it: restore its
precedence over shmem_huge_force.

Restore SHMEM_HUGE_DENY precedence over MADV_COLLAPSE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221224082035.3197140-2-zokeefe@google.com
Fixes: 7c6c6cc4d3a2 ("mm/shmem: add flag to enforce shmem THP in hugepage_vma_check()")
Signed-off-by: Zach O'Keefe &lt;zokeefe@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Yang Shi &lt;shy828301@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tmpfs: fix data loss from failed fallocate</title>
<updated>2022-12-10T02:41:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-05T00:51:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=44bcabd70cf1425b4243e02251c02b01638a8287'/>
<id>urn:sha1:44bcabd70cf1425b4243e02251c02b01638a8287</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix tmpfs data loss when the fallocate system call is interrupted by a
signal, or fails for some other reason.  The partial folio handling in
shmem_undo_range() forgot to consider this unfalloc case, and was liable
to erase or truncate out data which had already been committed earlier.

It turns out that none of the partial folio handling there is appropriate
for the unfalloc case, which just wants to proceed to removal of whole
folios: which find_get_entries() provides, even when partially covered.

Original patch by Rui Wang.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/33b85d82.7764.1842e9ab207.Coremail.chenguoqic@163.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a5dac112-cf4b-7af-a33-f386e347fd38@google.com
Fixes: b9a8a4195c7d ("truncate,shmem: Handle truncates that split large folios")
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Guoqi Chen &lt;chenguoqic@163.com&gt;
  Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221101032248.819360-1-kernel@hev.cc/
Cc: Rui Wang &lt;kernel@hev.cc&gt;
Cc: Huacai Chen &lt;chenhuacai@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Vishal Moola (Oracle) &lt;vishal.moola@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.17+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
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