<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/lib, branch v6.12.80</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.12.80</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.12.80'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:08:57+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: check xbc_init_node() return in override path</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:08:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-18T23:43:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=21156d04549d5da2830165fe2ce6a8d8ba53981b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:21156d04549d5da2830165fe2ce6a8d8ba53981b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bb288d7d869e86d382f35a0e26242c5ccb05ca82 ]

The ':=' override path in xbc_parse_kv() calls xbc_init_node() to
re-initialize an existing value node but does not check the return
value. If xbc_init_node() fails (data offset out of range), parsing
silently continues with stale node data.

Add the missing error check to match the xbc_add_node() call path
which already checks for failure.

In practice, a bootconfig using ':=' to override a value near the
32KB data limit could silently retain the old value, meaning a
security-relevant boot parameter override (e.g., a trace filter or
debug setting) would not take effect as intended.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318155847.78065-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: e5efaeb8a8f5 ("bootconfig: Support mixing a value and subkeys under a key")
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: check bounds before writing in __xbc_open_brace()</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:08:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-12T19:11:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ab10bf16456188665073565a24ef90b8b786a046'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab10bf16456188665073565a24ef90b8b786a046</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 560f763baa0f2c9a44da4294c06af071405ac46f upstream.

The bounds check for brace_index happens after the array write.
While the current call pattern prevents an actual out-of-bounds
access (the previous call would have returned an error), the
write-before-check pattern is fragile and would become a real
out-of-bounds write if the error return were ever not propagated.

Move the bounds check before the array write so the function is
self-contained and safe regardless of caller behavior.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-3-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: fix snprintf truncation check in xbc_node_compose_key_after()</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:08:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-12T19:11:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=197c3716937bac78570d1cf0c10b9fbe97524d09'/>
<id>urn:sha1:197c3716937bac78570d1cf0c10b9fbe97524d09</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1120a36bb1e9b9e22de75ecb4ef0b998f73a97f1 upstream.

snprintf() returns the number of characters that would have been
written excluding the NUL terminator.  Output is truncated when the
return value is &gt;= the buffer size, not just &gt; the buffer size.

When ret == size, the current code takes the non-truncated path,
advancing buf by ret and reducing size to 0.  This is wrong because
the output was actually truncated (the last character was replaced by
NUL).  Fix by using &gt;= so the truncation path is taken correctly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-4-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: 76db5a27a827 ("bootconfig: Add Extra Boot Config support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: fix off-by-one in xbc_verify_tree() unclosed brace error</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:08:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-12T19:11:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6a1b45a06880a125e7c880c65b4569c194281923'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6a1b45a06880a125e7c880c65b4569c194281923</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39ebc8d7f561e1b64eca87353ef9b18e2825e591 upstream.

__xbc_open_brace() pushes entries with post-increment
(open_brace[brace_index++]), so brace_index always points one past
the last valid entry.  xbc_verify_tree() reads open_brace[brace_index]
to report which brace is unclosed, but this is one past the last
pushed entry and contains stale/zero data, causing the error message
to reference the wrong node.

Use open_brace[brace_index - 1] to correctly identify the unclosed
brace.  brace_index is known to be &gt; 0 here since we are inside the
if (brace_index) guard.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM kernel config option</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:21:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-23T19:18:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=464808911fb9ddcea141801808c65326266a8f20'/>
<id>urn:sha1:464808911fb9ddcea141801808c65326266a8f20</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7dff99b354601dd01829e1511711846e04340a69 ]

This config option goes way back - it used to be an internal debug
option to random.c (at that point called DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT), then was
renamed and exposed as a config option as CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM,
and then further renamed to the current CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.

It was all done with the best of intentions: the more limited
rate-limited reports were reporting some cases, but if you wanted to see
all the gory details, you'd enable this "ALL" option.

However, it turns out - perhaps not surprisingly - that when people
don't care about and fix the first rate-limited cases, they most
certainly don't care about any others either, and so warning about all
of them isn't actually helping anything.

And the non-ratelimited reporting causes problems, where well-meaning
people enable debug options, but the excessive flood of messages that
nobody cares about will hide actual real information when things go
wrong.

I just got a kernel bug report (which had nothing to do with randomness)
where two thirds of the the truncated dmesg was just variations of

   random: get_random_u32 called from __get_random_u32_below+0x10/0x70 with crng_init=0

and in the process early boot messages had been lost (in addition to
making the messages that _hadn't_ been lost harder to read).

The proper way to find these things for the hypothetical developer that
cares - if such a person exists - is almost certainly with boot time
tracing.  That gives you the option to get call graphs etc too, which is
likely a requirement for fixing any problems anyway.

See Documentation/trace/boottime-trace.rst for that option.

And if we for some reason do want to re-introduce actual printing of
these things, it will need to have some uniqueness filtering rather than
this "just print it all" model.

Fixes: cc1e127bfa95 ("random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness")
Acked-by: Jason Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>objpool: fix the overestimation of object pooling metadata size</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>zhouwenhao</name>
<email>zhouwenhao7600@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-02T13:28:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f712f72563245a7429e66884c804ffcb8626d624'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f712f72563245a7429e66884c804ffcb8626d624</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5ed4b6b37c647d168ae31035b3f61b705997e043 ]

objpool uses struct objpool_head to store metadata information, and its
cpu_slots member points to an array of pointers that store the addresses
of the percpu ring arrays.  However, the memory size allocated during the
initialization of cpu_slots is nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(struct objpool_slot).
On a 64-bit machine, the size of struct objpool_slot is 16 bytes, which is
twice the size of the actual pointer required, and the extra memory is
never be used, resulting in a waste of memory.  Therefore, the memory size
required for cpu_slots needs to be corrected.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260202132846.68257-1-zhouwenhao7600@gmail.com
Fixes: b4edb8d2d464 ("lib: objpool added: ring-array based lockless MPMC")
Signed-off-by: zhouwenhao &lt;zhouwenhao7600@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Matt Wu &lt;wuqiang.matt@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: wuqiang.matt &lt;wuqiang.matt@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>procfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock</title>
<updated>2026-02-11T12:40:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andrii@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-07T19:16:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b9b97e6aeb534315f9646b2090d1a5024c6a4e82'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b9b97e6aeb534315f9646b2090d1a5024c6a4e82</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b5cbacd7f86f4f62b8813688c8e73be94e8e1951 ]

Fix PROCMAP_QUERY to fetch optional build ID only after dropping mmap_lock
or per-VMA lock, whichever was used to lock VMA under question, to avoid
deadlock reported by syzbot:

 -&gt; #1 (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
        __might_fault+0xed/0x170
        _copy_to_iter+0x118/0x1720
        copy_page_to_iter+0x12d/0x1e0
        filemap_read+0x720/0x10a0
        blkdev_read_iter+0x2b5/0x4e0
        vfs_read+0x7f4/0xae0
        ksys_read+0x12a/0x250
        do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -&gt; #0 (&amp;sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1509/0x26d0
        lock_acquire+0x185/0x340
        down_read+0x98/0x490
        blkdev_read_iter+0x2a7/0x4e0
        __kernel_read+0x39a/0xa90
        freader_fetch+0x1d5/0xa80
        __build_id_parse.isra.0+0xea/0x6a0
        do_procmap_query+0xd75/0x1050
        procfs_procmap_ioctl+0x7a/0xb0
        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210
        do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 other info that might help us debug this:

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   rlock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock);
                                lock(&amp;sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_key#8);
                                lock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock);
   rlock(&amp;sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_key#8);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

This seems to be exacerbated (as we haven't seen these syzbot reports
before that) by the recent:

	777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")

To make this safe, we need to grab file refcount while VMA is still locked, but
other than that everything is pretty straightforward. Internal build_id_parse()
API assumes VMA is passed, but it only needs the underlying file reference, so
just add another variant build_id_parse_file() that expects file passed
directly.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up kerneldoc]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260129215340.3742283-1-andrii@kernel.org
Fixes: ed5d583a88a9 ("fs/procfs: implement efficient VMA querying API for /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/maps")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: &lt;syzbot+4e70c8e0a2017b432f7a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeel.butt@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hao Luo &lt;haoluo@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Cc: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ mm is local var instead of function param ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>flex_proportions: make fprop_new_period() hardirq safe</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:55:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-21T11:27:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=78ede9ebd679dadf480dce6f7b798e3603f88348'/>
<id>urn:sha1:78ede9ebd679dadf480dce6f7b798e3603f88348</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dd9e2f5b38f1fdd49b1ab6d3a85f81c14369eacc upstream.

Bernd has reported a lockdep splat from flexible proportions code that is
essentially complaining about the following race:

&lt;timer fires&gt;
run_timer_softirq - we are in softirq context
  call_timer_fn
    writeout_period
      fprop_new_period
        write_seqcount_begin(&amp;p-&gt;sequence);

        &lt;hardirq is raised&gt;
        ...
        blk_mq_end_request()
	  blk_update_request()
	    ext4_end_bio()
	      folio_end_writeback()
		__wb_writeout_add()
		  __fprop_add_percpu_max()
		    if (unlikely(max_frac &lt; FPROP_FRAC_BASE)) {
		      fprop_fraction_percpu()
			seq = read_seqcount_begin(&amp;p-&gt;sequence);
			  - sees odd sequence so loops indefinitely

Note that a deadlock like this is only possible if the bdi has configured
maximum fraction of writeout throughput which is very rare in general but
frequent for example for FUSE bdis.  To fix this problem we have to make
sure write section of the sequence counter is irqsafe.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260121112729.24463-2-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: a91befde3503 ("lib/flex_proportions.c: remove local_irq_ops in fprop_new_period()")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Bernd Schubert &lt;bernd@bsbernd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/9b845a47-9aee-43dd-99bc-1a82bea00442@bsbernd.com/
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Joanne Koong &lt;joannelkoong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context</title>
<updated>2026-01-23T10:18:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shakeel Butt</name>
<email>shakeel.butt@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-22T20:58:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b11dfb7708f212b96c7973a474014c071aa02e05'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b11dfb7708f212b96c7973a474014c071aa02e05</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 777a8560fd29738350c5094d4166fe5499452409 upstream.

Prevent a "BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in
filemap_read_folio".

For the sleepable context, convert freader to use __kernel_read() instead
of direct page cache access via read_cache_folio().  This simplifies the
faultable code path by using the standard kernel file reading interface
which handles all the complexity of reading file data.

At the moment we are not changing the code for non-sleepable context which
uses filemap_get_folio() and only succeeds if the target folios are
already in memory and up-to-date.  The reason is to keep the patch simple
and easier to backport to stable kernels.

Syzbot repro does not crash the kernel anymore and the selftests run
successfully.

In the follow up we will make __kernel_read() with IOCB_NOWAIT work for
non-sleepable contexts.  In addition, I would like to replace the
secretmem check with a more generic approach and will add fstest for the
buildid code.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251222205859.3968077-1-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Fixes: ad41251c290d ("lib/buildid: implement sleepable build_id_parse() API")
Reported-by: syzbot+09b7d050e4806540153d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=09b7d050e4806540153d
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeel.butt@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jinchao Wang &lt;wangjinchao600@gmail.com&gt;
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aUteBPWPYzVWIZFH@ndev
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkman &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/crypto: aes: Fix missing MMU protection for AES S-box</title>
<updated>2026-01-17T15:31:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-07T05:20:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=196e8fd7424b684b2af16ff12dd60adc09b29167'/>
<id>urn:sha1:196e8fd7424b684b2af16ff12dd60adc09b29167</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 74d74bb78aeccc9edc10db216d6be121cf7ec176 upstream.

__cacheline_aligned puts the data in the ".data..cacheline_aligned"
section, which isn't marked read-only i.e. it doesn't receive MMU
protection.  Replace it with ____cacheline_aligned which does the right
thing and just aligns the data while keeping it in ".rodata".

Fixes: b5e0b032b6c3 ("crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Qingfang Deng &lt;dqfext@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260105074712.498-1-dqfext@gmail.com/
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260107052023.174620-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
