<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/lib, branch v5.4.206</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.4.206</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.4.206'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2022-07-12T14:30:49+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ida: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging</title>
<updated>2022-07-12T14:30:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-10T20:55:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5af3f2a697d5001d4735629de1f05789c4de59ae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5af3f2a697d5001d4735629de1f05789c4de59ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fc82bbf4dede758007763867d0282353c06d1121 upstream.

This is another old BUG_ON() that just shouldn't exist (see also commit
a382f8fee42c: "signal handling: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging").

In fact, as Matthew Wilcox points out, this condition shouldn't really
even result in a warning, since a negative id allocation result is just
a normal allocation failure:

  "I wonder if we should even warn here -- sure, the caller is trying to
   free something that wasn't allocated, but we don't warn for
   kfree(NULL)"

and goes on to point out how that current error check is only causing
people to unnecessarily do their own index range checking before freeing
it.

This was noted by Itay Iellin, because the bluetooth HCI socket cookie
code does *not* do that range checking, and ends up just freeing the
error case too, triggering the BUG_ON().

The HCI code requires CAP_NET_RAW, and seems to just result in an ugly
splat, but there really is no reason to BUG_ON() here, and we have
generally striven for allocation models where it's always ok to just do

    free(alloc());

even if the allocation were to fail for some random reason (usually
obviously that "random" reason being some resource limit).

Fixes: 88eca0207cf1 ("ida: simplified functions for id allocation")
Reported-by: Itay Iellin &lt;ieitayie@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:11:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-09T14:13:18+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3266fba20661c2139f17ce81892f576cc98307e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cc1e127bfa95b5fb2f9307e7168bf8b2b45b4c5e upstream.

The CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM debug option controls whether the
kernel warns about all unseeded randomness or just the first instance.
There's some complicated rate limiting and comparison to the previous
caller, such that even with CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM enabled,
developers still don't see all the messages or even an accurate count of
how many were missed. This is the result of basically parallel
mechanisms aimed at accomplishing more or less the same thing, added at
different points in random.c history, which sort of compete with the
first-instance-only limiting we have now.

It turns out, however, that nobody cares about the first unseeded
randomness instance of in-kernel users. The same first user has been
there for ages now, and nobody is doing anything about it. It isn't even
clear that anybody _can_ do anything about it. Most places that can do
something about it have switched over to using get_random_bytes_wait()
or wait_for_random_bytes(), which is the right thing to do, but there is
still much code that needs randomness sometimes during init, and as a
geeneral rule, if you're not using one of the _wait functions or the
readiness notifier callback, you're bound to be doing it wrong just
based on that fact alone.

So warning about this same first user that can't easily change is simply
not an effective mechanism for anything at all. Users can't do anything
about it, as the Kconfig text points out -- the problem isn't in
userspace code -- and kernel developers don't or more often can't react
to it.

Instead, show the warning for all instances when CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
is set, so that developers can debug things need be, or if it isn't set,
don't show a warning at all.

At the same time, CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM now implies setting
random.ratelimit_disable=1 on by default, since if you care about one
you probably care about the other too. And we can clean up usage around
the related urandom_warning ratelimiter as well (whose behavior isn't
changing), so that it properly counts missed messages after the 10
message threshold is reached.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:11:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-07T12:03:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=55d64df3ad5b8f6c8262b2992e27b447caadc1e0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:55d64df3ad5b8f6c8262b2992e27b447caadc1e0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e73aaae2fa9024832e1f42e30c787c7baf61d014 upstream.

The SipHash family of permutations is currently used in three places:

- siphash.c itself, used in the ordinary way it was intended.
- random32.c, in a construction from an anonymous contributor.
- random.c, as part of its fast_mix function.

Each one of these places reinvents the wheel with the same C code, same
rotation constants, and same symmetry-breaking constants.

This commit tidies things up a bit by placing macros for the
permutations and constants into siphash.h, where each of the three .c
users can access them. It also leaves a note dissuading more users of
them from emerging.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:11:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-01T19:03:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=631503001ccf6ff08e816a2edecba0f9f939fab7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:631503001ccf6ff08e816a2edecba0f9f939fab7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5acd35487dc911541672b3ffc322851769c32a56 upstream.

We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only
has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard
atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also
unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional
builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification
handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but
given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this
anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the
simplification we receive here.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
[Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: remove unused tracepoints</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:11:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-10T15:40:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=776927dfd4ac619c478241290a5b030fa90631e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:776927dfd4ac619c478241290a5b030fa90631e6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 14c174633f349cb41ea90c2c0aaddac157012f74 upstream.

These explicit tracepoints aren't really used and show sign of aging.
It's work to keep these up to date, and before I attempted to keep them
up to date, they weren't up to date, which indicates that they're not
really used. These days there are better ways of introspecting anyway.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:11:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-11T17:58:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=996fba14fa353f07b44f16ea2590827a4d102fd4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:996fba14fa353f07b44f16ea2590827a4d102fd4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9a1536b093bb5bf60689021275fd24d513bb8db0 upstream.

With SHA-1 no longer being used for anything performance oriented, and
also soon to be phased out entirely, we can make up for the space added
by unrolled BLAKE2s by simply re-rolling SHA-1. Since SHA-1 is so much
more complex, re-rolling it more or less takes care of the code size
added by BLAKE2s. And eventually, hopefully we'll see SHA-1 removed
entirely from most small kernel builds.

Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:11:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-11T13:37:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c4f48374407b2b5cc57f15e58c6a8ec9dc714cbd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4f48374407b2b5cc57f15e58c6a8ec9dc714cbd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d8d83d8ab0a453e17e68b3a3bed1f940c34b8646 upstream.

Basically nobody should use blake2s in an HMAC construction; it already
has a keyed variant. But unfortunately for historical reasons, Noise,
used by WireGuard, uses HKDF quite strictly, which means we have to use
this. Because this really shouldn't be used by others, this commit moves
it into wireguard's noise.c locally, so that kernels that aren't using
WireGuard don't get this superfluous code baked in. On m68k systems,
this shaves off ~314 bytes.

Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
[Jason: for stable, skip the wireguard changes, since this kernel
 doesn't have wireguard.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:11:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-08T12:22:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=97126d2f65b38342aaeedf991c183fe72e7c9993'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97126d2f65b38342aaeedf991c183fe72e7c9993</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66d7fb94e4ffe5acc589e0b2b4710aecc1f07a28 upstream.

The C implementation was originally based on Samuel Neves' public
domain reference implementation but has since been heavily modified
for the kernel. We're able to do compile-time optimizations by moving
some scaffolding around the final function into the header file.

Information: https://blake2.net/

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves &lt;sneves@dei.uc.pt&gt;
Co-developed-by: Samuel Neves &lt;sneves@dei.uc.pt&gt;
[ardb: - move from lib/zinc to lib/crypto
       - remove simd handling
       - rewrote selftest for better coverage
       - use fixed digest length for blake2s_hmac() and rename to
         blake2s256_hmac() ]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[Jason: for stable, skip kconfig and wire up directly, and skip the arch
 hooks; optimized implementations need not be backported.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nodemask: Fix return values to be unsigned</title>
<updated>2022-06-14T16:12:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T20:52:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a3f9b0afd8b4fcec563e97cedae84636e1a468d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a3f9b0afd8b4fcec563e97cedae84636e1a468d8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0dfe54071d7c828a02917b595456bfde1afdddc9 ]

The nodemask routines had mixed return values that provided potentially
signed return values that could never happen. This was leading to the
compiler getting confusing about the range of possible return values
(it was thinking things could be negative where they could not be). Fix
all the nodemask routines that should be returning unsigned
(or bool) values. Silences:

 mm/swapfile.c: In function ‘setup_swap_info’:
 mm/swapfile.c:2291:47: error: array subscript -1 is below array bounds of ‘struct plist_node[]’ [-Werror=array-bounds]
  2291 |                                 p-&gt;avail_lists[i].prio = 1;
       |                                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
 In file included from mm/swapfile.c:16:
 ./include/linux/swap.h:292:27: note: while referencing ‘avail_lists’
   292 |         struct plist_node avail_lists[]; /*
       |                           ^~~~~~~~~~~

Reported-by: Christophe de Dinechin &lt;dinechin@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220414150855.2407137-3-dinechin@redhat.com/
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>assoc_array: Fix BUG_ON during garbage collect</title>
<updated>2022-06-06T06:33:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Brennan</name>
<email>stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-19T08:50:30+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:039fa25d95cec8254dfb5a8b7d1d2c185de0ee7f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d1dc87763f406d4e67caf16dbe438a5647692395 upstream.

A rare BUG_ON triggered in assoc_array_gc:

    [3430308.818153] kernel BUG at lib/assoc_array.c:1609!

Which corresponded to the statement currently at line 1593 upstream:

    BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));

Using the data from the core dump, I was able to generate a userspace
reproducer[1] and determine the cause of the bug.

[1]: https://github.com/brenns10/kernel_stuff/tree/master/assoc_array_gc

After running the iterator on the entire branch, an internal tree node
looked like the following:

    NODE (nr_leaves_on_branch: 3)
      SLOT [0] NODE (2 leaves)
      SLOT [1] NODE (1 leaf)
      SLOT [2..f] NODE (empty)

In the userspace reproducer, the pr_devel output when compressing this
node was:

    -- compress node 0x5607cc089380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    after: 3

At slot 0, an internal node with 2 leaves could not be folded into the
node, because there was only one available slot (slot 0). Thus, the
internal node was retained. At slot 1, the node had one leaf, and was
able to be folded in successfully. The remaining nodes had no leaves,
and so were removed. By the end of the compression stage, there were 14
free slots, and only 3 leaf nodes. The tree was ascended and then its
parent node was compressed. When this node was seen, it could not be
folded, due to the internal node it contained.

The invariant for compression in this function is: whenever
nr_leaves_on_branch &lt; ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT, the node should contain all
leaf nodes. The compression step currently cannot guarantee this, given
the corner case shown above.

To fix this issue, retry compression whenever we have retained a node,
and yet nr_leaves_on_branch &lt; ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT. This second
compression will then allow the node in slot 1 to be folded in,
satisfying the invariant. Below is the output of the reproducer once the
fix is applied:

    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying
    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=14, leaves=1
    [0] fold node 2/15 [nx 0]
    after: 3

Changes
=======
DH:
 - Use false instead of 0.
 - Reorder the inserted lines in a couple of places to put retained before
   next_slot.

ver #2)
 - Fix typo in pr_devel, correct comparison to "&lt;="

Fixes: 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan &lt;stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511225517.407935-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512215045.489140-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v2
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
