<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/lib, branch v5.15.97</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.97</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.97'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2023-02-25T11:06:46+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>lib/Kconfig.debug: Allow BTF + DWARF5 with pahole 1.21+</title>
<updated>2023-02-25T11:06:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nathan Chancellor</name>
<email>nathan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-01T20:56:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0c168d7f36d5c63c9568f5cf2a3910822499a742'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c168d7f36d5c63c9568f5cf2a3910822499a742</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42d9b379e3e1790eafb87c799c9edfd0b37a37c7 upstream.

Commit 98cd6f521f10 ("Kconfig: allow explicit opt in to DWARF v5")
prevented CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF5 from being selected when
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is enabled because pahole had issues with clang's
DWARF5 info. This was resolved by [1], which is in pahole v1.21.

Allow DEBUG_INFO_DWARF5 to be selected with DEBUG_INFO_BTF when using
pahole v1.21 or newer.

[1]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/devel/pahole/pahole.git/commit/?id=7d8e829f636f47aba2e1b6eda57e74d8e31f733c

Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220201205624.652313-6-nathan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthias Maennich &lt;maennich@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/Kconfig.debug: Use CONFIG_PAHOLE_VERSION</title>
<updated>2023-02-25T11:06:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nathan Chancellor</name>
<email>nathan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-01T20:56:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6ba3de5a8a0265469ca42f37ad7c48b611c55894'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6ba3de5a8a0265469ca42f37ad7c48b611c55894</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6323c81350b73a4569cf52df85f80273faa64071 upstream.

Now that CONFIG_PAHOLE_VERSION exists, use it in the definition of
CONFIG_PAHOLE_HAS_SPLIT_BTF and CONFIG_PAHOLE_HAS_BTF_TAG to reduce the
amount of duplication across the tree.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220201205624.652313-5-nathan@kernel.org
[maennich: omitted patching non-existing config PAHOLE_HAS_BTF_TAG]
Signed-off-by: Matthias Maennich &lt;maennich@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()</title>
<updated>2023-02-25T11:06:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T20:30:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=41d8b591d70a7517293b23958a18452baf22588f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:41d8b591d70a7517293b23958a18452baf22588f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47 upstream.

The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated.  The result is that
you can end speculatively:

	if (access_ok(from, size))
		// Right here

even for bad from/size combinations.  On first glance, it would be ideal
to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results
can never be mis-speculated.

But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via
"copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends).  Those are
generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from
userspace other than the pointer.  They are also very quick and common
system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.

"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and
is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches.  Take
something like this:

	if (!copy_from_user(&amp;kernelvar, uptr, size))
		do_something_with(kernelvar);

If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel
addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other)
side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.

Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent
mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.

Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec().
This makes the macro usable in generic code.

Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the
BPF code can also go away.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer &lt;jordyzomer@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;   # BPF bits
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: prevent potential spectre v1 gadgets</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:27:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-19T11:01:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=41b74e95f297ac360ca7ed6bf200100717cb6c45'/>
<id>urn:sha1:41b74e95f297ac360ca7ed6bf200100717cb6c45</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f0950402e8c76e7dcb08563f1b4e8000fbc62455 ]

Most netlink attributes are parsed and validated from
__nla_validate_parse() or validate_nla()

    u16 type = nla_type(nla);

    if (type == 0 || type &gt; maxtype) {
        /* error or continue */
    }

@type is then used as an array index and can be used
as a Spectre v1 gadget.

array_index_nospec() can be used to prevent leaking
content of kernel memory to malicious users.

This should take care of vast majority of netlink uses,
but an audit is needed to take care of others where
validation is not yet centralized in core netlink functions.

Fixes: bfa83a9e03cf ("[NETLINK]: Type-safe netlink messages/attributes interface")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119110150.2678537-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:27:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T18:51:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7b98914a6c26a69ee4140451f29d93dd94ee66e0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7b98914a6c26a69ee4140451f29d93dd94ee66e0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79cc1ba7badf9e7a12af99695a557e9ce27ee967 upstream.

Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
a single location.

Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann &lt;dietmar.eggemann@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Valentin Schneider &lt;vschneid@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ubsan: no need to unset panic_on_warn in ubsan_epilogue()</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:27:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tiezhu Yang</name>
<email>yangtiezhu@loongson.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T18:50:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b5c967dc682209d820e4f71a6f48467a648bfac3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5c967dc682209d820e4f71a6f48467a648bfac3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d83ce027a54068fabb70d2c252e1ce2da86784a4 upstream.

panic_on_warn is unset inside panic(), so no need to unset it before
calling panic() in ubsan_epilogue().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1644324666-15947-5-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Xuefeng Li &lt;lixuefeng@loongson.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lockref: stop doing cpu_relax in the cmpxchg loop</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:27:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Guzik</name>
<email>mjguzik@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-13T18:44:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a4e70bcf2e8734ae901dfa0c6449a6759508755e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4e70bcf2e8734ae901dfa0c6449a6759508755e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f5fe24ef17b5fbe6db49534163e77499fb10ae8c ]

On the x86-64 architecture even a failing cmpxchg grants exclusive
access to the cacheline, making it preferable to retry the failed op
immediately instead of stalling with the pause instruction.

To illustrate the impact, below are benchmark results obtained by
running various will-it-scale tests on top of the 6.2-rc3 kernel and
Cascade Lake (2 sockets * 24 cores * 2 threads) CPU.

All results in ops/s.  Note there is some variance in re-runs, but the
code is consistently faster when contention is present.

  open3 ("Same file open/close"):
  proc          stock       no-pause
     1         805603         814942       (+%1)
     2        1054980        1054781       (-0%)
     8        1544802        1822858      (+18%)
    24        1191064        2199665      (+84%)
    48         851582        1469860      (+72%)
    96         609481        1427170     (+134%)

  fstat2 ("Same file fstat"):
  proc          stock       no-pause
     1        3013872        3047636       (+1%)
     2        4284687        4400421       (+2%)
     8        3257721        5530156      (+69%)
    24        2239819        5466127     (+144%)
    48        1701072        5256609     (+209%)
    96        1269157        6649326     (+423%)

Additionally, a kernel with a private patch to help access() scalability:
access2 ("Same file access"):

  proc          stock        patched      patched
                                         +nopause
    24        2378041        2005501      5370335  (-15% / +125%)

That is, fixing the problems in access itself *reduces* scalability
after the cacheline ping-pong only happens in lockref with the pause
instruction.

Note that fstat and access benchmarks are not currently integrated into
will-it-scale, but interested parties can find them in pull requests to
said project.

Code at hand has a rather tortured history.  First modification showed
up in commit d472d9d98b46 ("lockref: Relax in cmpxchg loop"), written
with Itanium in mind.  Later it got patched up to use an arch-dependent
macro to stop doing it on s390 where it caused a significant regression.
Said macro had undergone revisions and was ultimately eliminated later,
going back to cpu_relax.

While I intended to only remove cpu_relax for x86-64, I got the
following comment from Linus:

    I would actually prefer just removing it entirely and see if
    somebody else hollers. You have the numbers to prove it hurts on
    real hardware, and I don't think we have any numbers to the
    contrary.

    So I think it's better to trust the numbers and remove it as a
    failure, than say "let's just remove it on x86-64 and leave
    everybody else with the potentially broken code"

Additionally, Will Deacon (maintainer of the arm64 port, one of the
architectures previously benchmarked):

    So, from the arm64 side of the fence, I'm perfectly happy just
    removing the cpu_relax() calls from lockref.

As such, come back full circle in history and whack it altogether.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGudoHHx0Nqg6DE70zAVA75eV-HXfWyhVMWZ-aSeOofkA_=WdA@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt; # ia64
Acked-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt; # powerpc
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt; # arm64
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>overflow: Implement size_t saturating arithmetic helpers</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:14:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-18T22:17:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=30f20ceb87f78a14645acd7996397af7fee6e518'/>
<id>urn:sha1:30f20ceb87f78a14645acd7996397af7fee6e518</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e1be43d9b5d0d1310dbd90185a8e5c7145dde40f ]

In order to perform more open-coded replacements of common allocation
size arithmetic, the kernel needs saturating (SIZE_MAX) helpers for
multiplication, addition, and subtraction. For example, it is common in
allocators, especially on realloc, to add to an existing size:

    p = krealloc(map-&gt;patch,
                 sizeof(struct reg_sequence) * (map-&gt;patch_regs + num_regs),
                 GFP_KERNEL);

There is no existing saturating replacement for this calculation, and
just leaving the addition open coded inside array_size() could
potentially overflow as well. For example, an overflow in an expression
for a size_t argument might wrap to zero:

    array_size(anything, something_at_size_max + 1) == 0

Introduce size_mul(), size_add(), and size_sub() helpers that
implicitly promote arguments to size_t and saturated calculations for
use in allocations. With these helpers it is also possible to redefine
array_size(), array3_size(), flex_array_size(), and struct_size() in
terms of the new helpers.

As with the check_*_overflow() helpers, the new helpers use __must_check,
though what is really desired is a way to make sure that assignment is
only to a size_t lvalue. Without this, it's still possible to introduce
overflow/underflow via type conversion (i.e. from size_t to int).
Enforcing this will currently need to be left to static analysis or
future use of -Wconversion.

Additionally update the overflow unit tests to force runtime evaluation
for the pathological cases.

Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@ziepe.ca&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Len Baker &lt;len.baker@gmx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: e001e6086939 ("fs/ntfs3: Harden against integer overflows")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>test_firmware: fix memory leak in test_firmware_init()</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:14:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhengchao Shao</name>
<email>shaozhengchao@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-19T03:57:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=357379d504c0c8b0834e206ad8c49e4b3c98ed4d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:357379d504c0c8b0834e206ad8c49e4b3c98ed4d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7610615e8cdb3f6f5bbd9d8e7a5d8a63e3cabf2e ]

When misc_register() failed in test_firmware_init(), the memory pointed
by test_fw_config-&gt;name is not released. The memory leak information is
as follows:
unreferenced object 0xffff88810a34cb00 (size 32):
  comm "insmod", pid 7952, jiffies 4294948236 (age 49.060s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    74 65 73 74 2d 66 69 72 6d 77 61 72 65 2e 62 69  test-firmware.bi
    6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  n...............
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff81b21fcb&gt;] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x4b/0xc0
    [&lt;ffffffff81affb96&gt;] kstrndup+0x46/0xc0
    [&lt;ffffffffa0403a49&gt;] __test_firmware_config_init+0x29/0x380 [test_firmware]
    [&lt;ffffffffa040f068&gt;] 0xffffffffa040f068
    [&lt;ffffffff81002c41&gt;] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x780
    [&lt;ffffffff816a72c3&gt;] do_init_module+0x1c3/0x630
    [&lt;ffffffff816adb9e&gt;] load_module+0x623e/0x76a0
    [&lt;ffffffff816af471&gt;] __do_sys_finit_module+0x181/0x240
    [&lt;ffffffff89978f99&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
    [&lt;ffffffff89a0008b&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: c92316bf8e94 ("test_firmware: add batched firmware tests")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao &lt;shaozhengchao@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221119035721.18268-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/notifier-error-inject: fix error when writing -errno to debugfs file</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:14:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Akinobu Mita</name>
<email>akinobu.mita@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-19T17:24:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7e8e8cc13625241550f5e523bc1bb81511faecb3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e8e8cc13625241550f5e523bc1bb81511faecb3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f883c3edd2c432a2931ec8773c70a570115a50fe ]

The simple attribute files do not accept a negative value since the commit
488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in
simple_attr_write()").

This restores the previous behaviour by using newly introduced
DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED instead of DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220919172418.45257-3-akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()")
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita &lt;akinobu.mita@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi &lt;zhaogongyi@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Oscar Salvador &lt;osalvador@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Yicong Yang &lt;yangyicong@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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