kernel/linux.git/lib, branch v5.15.209

kunit: config: KUNIT_DEBUGFS should depend on DEBUG_FS

2026-06-01T15:35:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8f80b5b227ef9ea422080487715c841856339aed ] CONFIG_KUNIT_DEBUGFS is totally useless without debugfs, so it should depend on CONFIG_DEBUG_FS. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260425034155.53913-2-david@davidgow.net Fixes: e2219db280e3 ("kunit: add debugfs /sys/kernel/debug/kunit//results display") Signed-off-by: David Gow Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kunit: config: Enable KUNIT_DEBUGFS by default

2026-06-01T15:35:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 17e4c68ff35090d8cb743e3c82c09f92fda1ebda ] The KUNIT_DEBUGFS option is currently enabled based on the value of KUNIT_ALL_TESTS, but it really doesn't have anything to do with the set of enabled tests, so just enable it by default anyway. In particular, this shouldn't be only visible if KUNIT_ALL_TESTS is set, which is quite confusing. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260425034155.53913-1-david@davidgow.net Fixes: beaed42c427d ("kunit: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS") Signed-off-by: David Gow Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

2026-06-01T15:35:14+00:00

commit 8cdf30813ea8ce881cecc08664144416dbdb3e16 upstream. The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the prefix_tbl[] size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and subsequent pattern copies can overflow it. Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow helpers before calculating the combined allocation size. This fixes a potential heap overflow. The pattern length calculation can wrap during a size_t addition, leading to an undersized allocation. Because the textsearch library is reachable from userspace via Netfilter's xt_string module, this is a security risk that should be backported to LTS kernels. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260308202028.2889285-2-objecting@objecting.org Signed-off-by: Josh Law Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: add nla be16/32 types to minlen array

2026-04-18T08:33:37+00:00

commit 9a0d18853c280f6a0ee99f91619f2442a17a323a upstream. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nla_validate_range_unsigned lib/nlattr.c:222 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nla_validate_int_range lib/nlattr.c:336 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:575 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nla_validate_parse+0x2e20/0x45c0 lib/nlattr.c:631 nla_validate_range_unsigned lib/nlattr.c:222 [inline] nla_validate_int_range lib/nlattr.c:336 [inline] validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:575 [inline] ... The message in question matches this policy: [NFTA_TARGET_REV] = NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_BE32, 255), but because NLA_BE32 size in minlen array is 0, the validation code will read past the malformed (too small) attribute. Note: Other attributes, e.g. BITFIELD32, SINT, UINT.. are also missing: those likely should be added too. Reported-by: syzbot+3f497b07aa3baf2fb4d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: xingwei lee Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABOYnLzFYHSnvTyS6zGa-udNX55+izqkOt2sB9WDqUcEGW6n8w@mail.gmail.com/raw Fixes: ecaf75ffd5f5 ("netlink: introduce bigendian integer types") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240221172740.5092-1-fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lib/crypto: chacha: Zeroize permuted_state before it leaves scope

2026-04-18T08:33:35+00:00

commit e5046823f8fa3677341b541a25af2fcb99a5b1e0 upstream. Since the ChaCha permutation is invertible, the local variable 'permuted_state' is sufficient to compute the original 'state', and thus the key, even after the permutation has been done. While the kernel is quite inconsistent about zeroizing secrets on the stack (and some prominent userspace crypto libraries don't bother at all since it's not guaranteed to work anyway), the kernel does try to do it as a best practice, especially in cases involving the RNG. Thus, explicitly zeroize 'permuted_state' before it goes out of scope. Fixes: c08d0e647305 ("crypto: chacha20 - Add a generic ChaCha20 stream cipher implementation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260326032920.39408-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: allow be16 and be32 types in all uint policy checks

2026-04-18T08:33:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5fac9b7c16c50c6c7699517f582b56e3743f453a ] __NLA_IS_BEINT_TYPE(tp) isn't useful. NLA_BE16/32 are identical to NLA_U16/32, the only difference is that it tells the netlink validation functions that byteorder conversion might be needed before comparing the value to the policy min/max ones. After this change all policy macros that can be used with UINT types, such as NLA_POLICY_MASK() can also be used with NLA_BE16/32. This will be used to validate nf_tables flag attributes which are in bigendian byte order. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Stable-dep-of: 8f15b5071b45 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netlink: introduce bigendian integer types

2026-04-18T08:33:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit ecaf75ffd5f5db320d8b1da0198eef5a5ce64a3f ] Jakub reported that the addition of the "network_byte_order" member in struct nla_policy increases size of 32bit platforms. Instead of scraping the bit from elsewhere Johannes suggested to add explicit NLA_BE types instead, so do this here. NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE() macro is removed again, there is no need for it: NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_BE.., ..) will do the right thing. NLA_BE64 can be added later. Fixes: 08724ef69907 ("netlink: introduce NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE") Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski Suggested-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221031123407.9158-1-fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Stable-dep-of: 8f15b5071b45 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netlink: introduce NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE

2026-04-18T08:33:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit 08724ef69907214ce622344fe4945412e38368f0 ] netlink allows to specify allowed ranges for integer types. Unfortunately, nfnetlink passes integers in big endian, so the existing NLA_POLICY_MAX() cannot be used. At the moment, nfnetlink users, such as nf_tables, need to resort to programmatic checking via helpers such as nft_parse_u32_check(). This is both cumbersome and error prone. This adds NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE which adds range check support for BE16, BE32 and BE64 integers. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Stable-dep-of: 8f15b5071b45 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

lib/bootconfig: check xbc_init_node() return in override path

2026-04-18T08:33:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit bb288d7d869e86d382f35a0e26242c5ccb05ca82 ] The ':=' override path in xbc_parse_kv() calls xbc_init_node() to re-initialize an existing value node but does not check the return value. If xbc_init_node() fails (data offset out of range), parsing silently continues with stale node data. Add the missing error check to match the xbc_add_node() call path which already checks for failure. In practice, a bootconfig using ':=' to override a value near the 32KB data limit could silently retain the old value, meaning a security-relevant boot parameter override (e.g., a trace filter or debug setting) would not take effect as intended. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318155847.78065-2-objecting@objecting.org/ Fixes: e5efaeb8a8f5 ("bootconfig: Support mixing a value and subkeys under a key") Signed-off-by: Josh Law Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

lib/bootconfig: check bounds before writing in __xbc_open_brace()

2026-04-18T08:33:16+00:00

commit 560f763baa0f2c9a44da4294c06af071405ac46f upstream. The bounds check for brace_index happens after the array write. While the current call pattern prevents an actual out-of-bounds access (the previous call would have returned an error), the write-before-check pattern is fragile and would become a real out-of-bounds write if the error return were ever not propagated. Move the bounds check before the array write so the function is self-contained and safe regardless of caller behavior. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-3-objecting@objecting.org/ Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Josh Law Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman