<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/lib/nlattr.c, branch v5.10.257</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.257</id>
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<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:15+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>netlink: add nla be16/32 types to minlen array</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-21T17:27:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=000a68159c0326b46c42ec712ab98793e7e625a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:000a68159c0326b46c42ec712ab98793e7e625a7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9a0d18853c280f6a0ee99f91619f2442a17a323a upstream.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nla_validate_range_unsigned lib/nlattr.c:222 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nla_validate_int_range lib/nlattr.c:336 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:575 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nla_validate_parse+0x2e20/0x45c0 lib/nlattr.c:631
 nla_validate_range_unsigned lib/nlattr.c:222 [inline]
 nla_validate_int_range lib/nlattr.c:336 [inline]
 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:575 [inline]
...

The message in question matches this policy:

 [NFTA_TARGET_REV]       = NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_BE32, 255),

but because NLA_BE32 size in minlen array is 0, the validation
code will read past the malformed (too small) attribute.

Note: Other attributes, e.g. BITFIELD32, SINT, UINT.. are also missing:
those likely should be added too.

Reported-by: syzbot+3f497b07aa3baf2fb4d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: xingwei lee &lt;xrivendell7@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABOYnLzFYHSnvTyS6zGa-udNX55+izqkOt2sB9WDqUcEGW6n8w@mail.gmail.com/raw
Fixes: ecaf75ffd5f5 ("netlink: introduce bigendian integer types")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240221172740.5092-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: allow be16 and be32 types in all uint policy checks</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-18T07:52:29+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d134c7e26056ef429300f31bbff5f9d7a40313c7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5fac9b7c16c50c6c7699517f582b56e3743f453a ]

__NLA_IS_BEINT_TYPE(tp) isn't useful.  NLA_BE16/32 are identical to
NLA_U16/32, the only difference is that it tells the netlink validation
functions that byteorder conversion might be needed before comparing
the value to the policy min/max ones.

After this change all policy macros that can be used with UINT types,
such as NLA_POLICY_MASK() can also be used with NLA_BE16/32.

This will be used to validate nf_tables flag attributes which
are in bigendian byte order.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 8f15b5071b45 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: introduce bigendian integer types</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-31T12:34:07+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:24ea1c8abaae6541ad95912422a9af4fb858428d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ecaf75ffd5f5db320d8b1da0198eef5a5ce64a3f ]

Jakub reported that the addition of the "network_byte_order"
member in struct nla_policy increases size of 32bit platforms.

Instead of scraping the bit from elsewhere Johannes suggested
to add explicit NLA_BE types instead, so do this here.

NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE() macro is removed again, there is no need
for it: NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_BE.., ..) will do the right thing.

NLA_BE64 can be added later.

Fixes: 08724ef69907 ("netlink: introduce NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE")
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221031123407.9158-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 8f15b5071b45 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: introduce NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:31:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-05T10:09:36+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:648616416aae4747b76517c5b136b42d8eb95348</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 08724ef69907214ce622344fe4945412e38368f0 ]

netlink allows to specify allowed ranges for integer types.
Unfortunately, nfnetlink passes integers in big endian, so the existing
NLA_POLICY_MAX() cannot be used.

At the moment, nfnetlink users, such as nf_tables, need to resort to
programmatic checking via helpers such as nft_parse_u32_check().

This is both cumbersome and error prone.  This adds NLA_POLICY_MAX_BE
which adds range check support for BE16, BE32 and BE64 integers.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 8f15b5071b45 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: prevent potential spectre v1 gadgets</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:23:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-19T11:01:50+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:539ca5dcbc91134bbe2c45677811c31d8b030d2d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f0950402e8c76e7dcb08563f1b4e8000fbc62455 ]

Most netlink attributes are parsed and validated from
__nla_validate_parse() or validate_nla()

    u16 type = nla_type(nla);

    if (type == 0 || type &gt; maxtype) {
        /* error or continue */
    }

@type is then used as an array index and can be used
as a Spectre v1 gadget.

array_index_nospec() can be used to prevent leaking
content of kernel memory to malicious users.

This should take care of vast majority of netlink uses,
but an audit is needed to take care of others where
validation is not yet centralized in core netlink functions.

Fixes: bfa83a9e03cf ("[NETLINK]: Type-safe netlink messages/attributes interface")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119110150.2678537-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix nla_strcmp to handle more then one trailing null character</title>
<updated>2021-05-19T08:13:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej Żenczykowski</name>
<email>maze@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-05T16:58:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d6c635a8cc6a0ed93444a43124ff752475ed0680'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6c635a8cc6a0ed93444a43124ff752475ed0680</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2c16db6c92b0ee4aa61e88366df82169e83c3f7e ]

Android userspace has been using TCA_KIND with a char[IFNAMESIZ]
many-null-terminated buffer containing the string 'bpf'.

This works on 4.19 and ceases to work on 5.10.

I'm not entirely sure what fixes tag to use, but I think the issue
was likely introduced in the below mentioned 5.4 commit.

Reported-by: Nucca Chen &lt;nuccachen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Fixes: 62794fc4fbf5 ("net_sched: add max len check for TCA_KIND")
Change-Id: I66dc281f165a2858fc29a44869a270a2d698a82b
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: export policy in extended ACK</title>
<updated>2020-10-10T03:22:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-08T10:45:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=44f3625bc61653ea3bde9960298faf2f5518fda5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:44f3625bc61653ea3bde9960298faf2f5518fda5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new attribute NLMSGERR_ATTR_POLICY to the extended ACK
to advertise the policy, e.g. if an attribute was out of range,
you'll know the range that's permissible.

Add new NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR_POL() and NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR_POL()
macros to set this, since realistically it's only useful to do
this when the bad attribute (offset) is also returned.

Use it in lib/nlattr.c which practically does all the policy
validation.

v2:
 - add and use netlink_policy_dump_attr_size_estimate()
v3:
 - remove redundant break
v4:
 - really remove redundant break ... sorry

Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: add mask validation</title>
<updated>2020-10-06T13:25:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-05T22:07:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bdbb4e29df8b790db50cb73ce25d23543329f05f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bdbb4e29df8b790db50cb73ce25d23543329f05f</id>
<content type='text'>
We don't have good validation policy for existing unsigned int attrs
which serve as flags (for new ones we could use NLA_BITFIELD32).
With increased use of policy dumping having the validation be
expressed as part of the policy is important. Add validation
policy in form of a mask of supported/valid bits.

Support u64 in the uAPI to be future-proof, but really for now
the embedded mask member can only hold 32 bits, so anything with
bit 32+ set will always fail validation.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: remove duplicated nla_need_padding_for_64bit() check</title>
<updated>2020-08-25T13:06:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miaohe Lin</name>
<email>linmiaohe@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-25T03:25:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4718a471f1a7fc5cc943377c09300bb35138daf9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4718a471f1a7fc5cc943377c09300bb35138daf9</id>
<content type='text'>
The need for padding 64bit is implicitly checked by nla_align_64bit(), so
remove this explicit one.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin &lt;linmiaohe@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: make NLA_BINARY validation more flexible</title>
<updated>2020-08-18T19:28:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-18T08:17:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8aa26c575fb343ebde810b30dad0cba7d8121efb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8aa26c575fb343ebde810b30dad0cba7d8121efb</id>
<content type='text'>
Add range validation for NLA_BINARY, allowing validation of any
combination of combination minimum or maximum lengths, using the
existing NLA_POLICY_RANGE()/NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE() macros, just
like for integers where the value is checked.

Also make NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(), NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN_WARN()
and NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN() special cases of this, removing the old
types NLA_EXACT_LEN and NLA_MIN_LEN.

This allows us to save some code where both minimum and maximum
lengths are requires, currently the policy only allows maximum
(NLA_BINARY), minimum (NLA_MIN_LEN) or exact (NLA_EXACT_LEN), so
a range of lengths cannot be accepted and must be checked by the
code that consumes the attributes later.

Also, this allows advertising the correct ranges in the policy
export to userspace. Here, NLA_MIN_LEN and NLA_EXACT_LEN already
were special cases of NLA_BINARY with min and min/max length
respectively.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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