kernel/linux.git/lib/Kconfig.debug, branch v5.10.257

lockdep: Fix upper limit for LOCKDEP_*_BITS configs

2025-03-13T11:47:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit e638072e61726cae363d48812815197a2a0e097f ] Lockdep has a set of configs used to determine the size of the static arrays that it uses. However, the upper limit that was initially setup for these configs is too high (30 bit shift). This equates to several GiB of static memory for individual symbols. Using such high values leads to linker errors: $ make defconfig $ ./scripts/config -e PROVE_LOCKING --set-val LOCKDEP_BITS 30 $ make olddefconfig all [...] ld: kernel image bigger than KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE ld: section .bss VMA wraps around address space Adjust the upper limits to the maximum values that avoid these issues. The need for anything more, likely points to a problem elsewhere. Note that LOCKDEP_CHAINS_BITS was intentionally left out as its upper limit had a different symptom and has already been fixed [1]. Reported-by: J. R. Okajima Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/30795.1620913191@jrobl/ [1] Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Boqun Feng Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Will Deacon Acked-by: Waiman Long Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241024183631.643450-2-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

lib/Kconfig.debug: do not enable DEBUG_PREEMPT by default

2023-10-25T09:54:18+00:00

commit cc6003916ed46d7a67d91ee32de0f9138047d55f upstream. In workloads where this_cpu operations are frequently performed, enabling DEBUG_PREEMPT may result in significant increase in runtime overhead due to frequent invocation of __this_cpu_preempt_check() function. This can be demonstrated through benchmarks such as hackbench where this configuration results in a 10% reduction in performance, primarily due to the added overhead within memcg charging path. Therefore, do not to enable DEBUG_PREEMPT by default and make users aware of its potential impact on performance in some workloads. hackbench-process-sockets debug_preempt no_debug_preempt Amean 1 0.4743 ( 0.00%) 0.4295 * 9.45%* Amean 4 1.4191 ( 0.00%) 1.2650 * 10.86%* Amean 7 2.2677 ( 0.00%) 2.0094 * 11.39%* Amean 12 3.6821 ( 0.00%) 3.2115 * 12.78%* Amean 21 6.6752 ( 0.00%) 5.7956 * 13.18%* Amean 30 9.6646 ( 0.00%) 8.5197 * 11.85%* Amean 48 15.3363 ( 0.00%) 13.5559 * 11.61%* Amean 79 24.8603 ( 0.00%) 22.0597 * 11.27%* Amean 96 30.1240 ( 0.00%) 26.8073 * 11.01%* Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230121033942.350387-1-42.hyeyoo@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin Acked-by: Mel Gorman Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: Ben Segall Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Dennis Zhou Cc: Dietmar Eggemann Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Juri Lelli Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Muchun Song Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Valentin Schneider Cc: Vincent Guittot Cc: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Luiz Capitulino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: switch to storing KCOV handle directly in sk_buff

2023-01-14T09:16:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit fa69ee5aa48b5b52e8028c2eb486906e9998d081 ] It turns out that usage of skb extensions can cause memory leaks. Ido Schimmel reported: "[...] there are instances that blindly overwrite 'skb->extensions' by invoking skb_copy_header() after __alloc_skb()." Therefore, give up on using skb extensions for KCOV handle, and instead directly store kcov_handle in sk_buff. Fixes: 6370cc3bbd8a ("net: add kcov handle to skb extensions") Fixes: 85ce50d337d1 ("net: kcov: don't select SKB_EXTENSIONS when there is no NET") Fixes: 97f53a08cba1 ("net: linux/skbuff.h: combine SKB_EXTENSIONS + KCOV handling") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20201121160941.GA485907@shredder.lan/ Reported-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: Marco Elver Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201125224840.2014773-1-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Stable-dep-of: db0b124f02ba ("igc: Enhance Qbv scheduling by using first flag bit") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Kconfig.debug: provide a little extra FRAME_WARN leeway when KASAN is enabled

2022-12-08T10:23:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 152fe65f300e1819d59b80477d3e0999b4d5d7d2 ] When enabled, KASAN enlarges function's stack-frames. Pushing quite a few over the current threshold. This can mainly be seen on 32-bit architectures where the present limit (when !GCC) is a lowly 1024-Bytes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221125120750.3537134-3-lee@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Alex Deucher Cc: "Christian König" Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: David Airlie Cc: Harry Wentland Cc: Leo Li Cc: Maarten Lankhorst Cc: Maxime Ripard Cc: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Nick Desaulniers Cc: "Pan, Xinhui" Cc: Rodrigo Siqueira Cc: Thomas Zimmermann Cc: Tom Rix Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Increase FRAME_WARN to 2048 bytes on parisc

2022-12-08T10:23:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8d192bec534bd5b778135769a12e5f04580771f7 ] PA-RISC uses a much bigger frame size for functions than other architectures. So increase it to 2048 for 32- and 64-bit kernels. This fixes e.g. a warning in lib/xxhash.c. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Stable-dep-of: 152fe65f300e ("Kconfig.debug: provide a little extra FRAME_WARN leeway when KASAN is enabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xtensa: increase size of gcc stack frame check

2022-12-08T10:23:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 867050247e295cf20fce046a92a7e6491fcfe066 ] xtensa frame size is larger than the frame size for almost all other architectures. This results in more than 50 "the frame size of is larger than 1024 bytes" errors when trying to build xtensa:allmodconfig. Increase frame size for xtensa to 1536 bytes to avoid compile errors due to frame size limits. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210912025235.3514761-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Reviewed-by: Max Filippov Cc: Chris Zankel Cc: David Laight Cc: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Stable-dep-of: 152fe65f300e ("Kconfig.debug: provide a little extra FRAME_WARN leeway when KASAN is enabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Increase size of gcc stack frame check

2022-12-08T10:23:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 55b70eed81cba1331773d4aaf5cba2bb07475cd8 ] parisc uses much bigger frames than other architectures, so increase the stack frame check value to avoid compiler warnings. Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Abd-Alrhman Masalkhi Cc: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Stable-dep-of: 152fe65f300e ("Kconfig.debug: provide a little extra FRAME_WARN leeway when KASAN is enabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

error-injection: Add prompt for function error injection

2022-12-08T10:23:57+00:00

commit a4412fdd49dc011bcc2c0d81ac4cab7457092650 upstream. The config to be able to inject error codes into any function annotated with ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() is enabled when FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION is enabled. But unfortunately, this is always enabled on x86 when KPROBES is enabled, and there's no way to turn it off. As kprobes is useful for observability of the kernel, it is useful to have it enabled in production environments. But error injection should be avoided. Add a prompt to the config to allow it to be disabled even when kprobes is enabled, and get rid of the "def_bool y". This is a kernel debug feature (it's in Kconfig.debug), and should have never been something enabled by default. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 540adea3809f6 ("error-injection: Separate error-injection from kprobe") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lockdep: Allow tuning tracing capacity constants.

2022-08-21T13:15:27+00:00

commit 5dc33592e95534dc8455ce3e9baaaf3dae0fff82 upstream. Since syzkaller continues various test cases until the kernel crashes, syzkaller tends to examine more locking dependencies than normal systems. As a result, syzbot is reporting that the fuzz testing was terminated due to hitting upper limits lockdep can track [1] [2] [3]. Since analysis via /proc/lockdep* did not show any obvious culprit [4] [5], we have no choice but allow tuning tracing capacity constants. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=3d97ba93fb3566000c1c59691ea427370d33ea1b [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=381cb436fe60dc03d7fd2a092b46d7f09542a72a [3] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a588183ac34c1437fc0785e8f220e88282e5a29f [4] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4b8f7a57-fa20-47bd-48a0-ae35d860f233@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [5] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c351187-253b-2d49-acaf-4563c63ae7d2@i-love.sakura.ne.jp References: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1595640639-9310-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness

2022-05-30T07:33:44+00:00

commit cc1e127bfa95b5fb2f9307e7168bf8b2b45b4c5e upstream. The CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM debug option controls whether the kernel warns about all unseeded randomness or just the first instance. There's some complicated rate limiting and comparison to the previous caller, such that even with CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM enabled, developers still don't see all the messages or even an accurate count of how many were missed. This is the result of basically parallel mechanisms aimed at accomplishing more or less the same thing, added at different points in random.c history, which sort of compete with the first-instance-only limiting we have now. It turns out, however, that nobody cares about the first unseeded randomness instance of in-kernel users. The same first user has been there for ages now, and nobody is doing anything about it. It isn't even clear that anybody _can_ do anything about it. Most places that can do something about it have switched over to using get_random_bytes_wait() or wait_for_random_bytes(), which is the right thing to do, but there is still much code that needs randomness sometimes during init, and as a geeneral rule, if you're not using one of the _wait functions or the readiness notifier callback, you're bound to be doing it wrong just based on that fact alone. So warning about this same first user that can't easily change is simply not an effective mechanism for anything at all. Users can't do anything about it, as the Kconfig text points out -- the problem isn't in userspace code -- and kernel developers don't or more often can't react to it. Instead, show the warning for all instances when CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is set, so that developers can debug things need be, or if it isn't set, don't show a warning at all. At the same time, CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM now implies setting random.ratelimit_disable=1 on by default, since if you care about one you probably care about the other too. And we can clean up usage around the related urandom_warning ratelimiter as well (whose behavior isn't changing), so that it properly counts missed messages after the 10 message threshold is reached. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman