kernel/linux.git/io_uring/io_uring.c, branch v6.19.11

io_uring: ensure ctx->rings is stable for task work flags manipulation

2026-03-19T15:15:32+00:00

Commit 96189080265e6bb5dde3a4afbaf947af493e3f82 upstream. If DEFER_TASKRUN | SETUP_TASKRUN is used and task work is added while the ring is being resized, it's possible for the OR'ing of IORING_SQ_TASKRUN to happen in the small window of swapping into the new rings and the old rings being freed. Prevent this by adding a 2nd ->rings pointer, ->rings_rcu, which is protected by RCU. The task work flags manipulation is inside RCU already, and if the resize ring freeing is done post an RCU synchronize, then there's no need to add locking to the fast path of task work additions. Note: this is only done for DEFER_TASKRUN, as that's the only setup mode that supports ring resizing. If this ever changes, then they too need to use the io_ctx_mark_taskrun() helper. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20260309062759.482210-1-naup96721@gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 79cfe9e59c2a ("io_uring/register: add IORING_REGISTER_RESIZE_RINGS") Reported-by: Hao-Yu Yang Suggested-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

io_uring: fix physical SQE bounds check for SQE_MIXED 128-byte ops

2026-03-19T15:14:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6f02c6b196036dbb6defb4647d8707d29b7fe95b ] When IORING_SETUP_SQE_MIXED is used without IORING_SETUP_NO_SQARRAY, the boundary check for 128-byte SQE operations in io_init_req() validated the logical SQ head position rather than the physical SQE index. The existing check: !(ctx->cached_sq_head & (ctx->sq_entries - 1)) ensures the logical position isn't at the end of the ring, which is correct for NO_SQARRAY rings where physical == logical. However, when sq_array is present, an unprivileged user can remap any logical position to an arbitrary physical index via sq_array. Setting sq_array[N] = sq_entries - 1 places a 128-byte operation at the last physical SQE slot, causing the 128-byte memcpy in io_uring_cmd_sqe_copy() to read 64 bytes past the end of the SQE array. Replace the cached_sq_head alignment check with a direct validation of the physical SQE index, which correctly handles both sq_array and NO_SQARRAY cases. Fixes: 1cba30bf9fdd ("io_uring: add support for IORING_SETUP_SQE_MIXED") Signed-off-by: Tom Ryan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310052003.72871-1-ryan36005@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

io_uring: delay sqarray static branch disablement

2026-02-26T23:01:27+00:00

[ Upstream commit 56112578c71213a10c995a56835bddb5e9ab1ed0 ] io_key_has_sqarray static branch can be easily switched on/off by the user every time patching the kernel. That can be very disruptive as it might require heavy synchronisation across all CPUs. Use deferred static keys, which can rate-limit it by deferring, batching and potentially effectively eliminating dec+inc pairs. Fixes: 9b296c625ac1d ("io_uring: static_key for !IORING_SETUP_NO_SQARRAY") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

io_uring: use release-acquire ordering for IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED

2026-02-26T23:00:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7a8737e1132ff07ca225aa7a4008f87319b5b1ca ] io_uring_enter(), __io_msg_ring_data(), and io_msg_send_fd() read ctx->flags and ctx->submitter_task without holding the ctx's uring_lock. This means they may race with the assignment to ctx->submitter_task and the clearing of IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED from ctx->flags in io_register_enable_rings(). Ensure the correct ordering of the ctx->flags and ctx->submitter_task memory accesses by storing to ctx->flags using release ordering and loading it using acquire ordering. Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos Fixes: 4add705e4eeb ("io_uring: remove io_register_submitter") Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

io_uring: move local task_work in exit cancel loop

2026-01-14T17:18:19+00:00

With IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN, task work is queued to ctx->work_llist (local work) rather than the fallback list. During io_ring_exit_work(), io_move_task_work_from_local() was called once before the cancel loop, moving work from work_llist to fallback_llist. However, task work can be added to work_llist during the cancel loop itself. There are two cases: 1) io_kill_timeouts() is called from io_uring_try_cancel_requests() to cancel pending timeouts, and it adds task work via io_req_queue_tw_complete() for each cancelled timeout: 2) URING_CMD requests like ublk can be completed via io_uring_cmd_complete_in_task() from ublk_queue_rq() during canceling, given ublk request queue is only quiesced when canceling the 1st uring_cmd. Since io_allowed_defer_tw_run() returns false in io_ring_exit_work() (kworker != submitter_task), io_run_local_work() is never invoked, and the work_llist entries are never processed. This causes io_uring_try_cancel_requests() to loop indefinitely, resulting in 100% CPU usage in kworker threads. Fix this by moving io_move_task_work_from_local() inside the cancel loop, ensuring any work on work_llist is moved to fallback before each cancel attempt. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c0e0d6ba25f1 ("io_uring: add IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN") Signed-off-by: Ming Lei Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

io_uring/tctx: add separate lock for list of tctx's in ctx

2026-01-01T15:16:40+00:00

ctx->tcxt_list holds the tasks using this ring, and it's currently protected by the normal ctx->uring_lock. However, this can cause a circular locking issue, as reported by syzbot, where cancelations off exec end up needing to remove an entry from this list: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.9999/12287 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88805851c0a8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 proc_pid_attr_write+0x547/0x630 fs/proc/base.c:2837 vfs_write+0x27e/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read_internal include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:53 [inline] percpu_down_read_freezable include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:83 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs/super.h:19 [inline] sb_start_write+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs/super.h:125 mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:499 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4529 [inline] path_openat+0xadd/0x3dd0 fs/namei.c:4784 do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4814 io_openat2+0x3e0/0x5c0 io_uring/openclose.c:143 __io_issue_sqe+0x181/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1792 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0x1060 io_uring/io_uring.c:1815 io_queue_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2042 [inline] io_submit_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2320 [inline] io_submit_sqes+0xbf4/0x2140 io_uring/io_uring.c:2434 __do_sys_io_uring_enter io_uring/io_uring.c:3280 [inline] __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x2e0/0x2b60 io_uring/io_uring.c:3219 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctx->uring_lock --> sb_writers#3 --> &sig->cred_guard_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(sb_writers#3); lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(&ctx->uring_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz.0.9999/12287: #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12287 Comm: syz.0.9999 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff3a8b8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff3a9a97038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 RCX: 00007ff3a8b8f749 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000400 RBP: 00007ff3a8c13f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff3a8de6038 R14: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 R15: 00007ff3a8f0fa28 Add a separate lock just for the tctx_list, tctx_lock. This can nest under ->uring_lock, where necessary, and be used separately for list manipulation. For the cancelation off exec side, this removes the need to grab ->uring_lock, hence fixing the circular locking dependency. Reported-by: syzbot+b0e3b77ffaa8a4067ce5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

io_uring: use GFP_NOWAIT for overflow CQEs on legacy rings

2025-12-31T01:49:31+00:00

Allocate the overflowing CQE with GFP_NOWAIT instead of GFP_ATOMIC. This changes causes allocations to fail earlier in out-of-memory situations, rather than being deferred. Using GFP_ATOMIC allows a process to exceed memory limits. Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220794 Signed-off-by: Alexandre Negrel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20251229201933.515797-1-alexandre@negrel.dev/ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

io_uring: fix min_wait wakeups for SQPOLL

2025-12-09T23:54:12+00:00

Using min_wait, two timeouts are given: 1) The min_wait timeout, within which up to 'wait_nr' events are waited for. 2) The overall long timeout, which is entered if no events are generated in the min_wait window. If the min_wait has expired, any event being posted must wake the task. For SQPOLL, that isn't the case, as it won't trigger the io_has_work() condition, as it will have already processed the task_work that happened when an event was posted. This causes any event to trigger post the min_wait to not always cause the waiting application to wakeup, and instead it will wait until the overall timeout has expired. This can be shown in a test case that has a 1 second min_wait, with a 5 second overall wait, even if an event triggers after 1.5 seconds: axboe@m2max-kvm /d/iouring-mre (master)> zig-out/bin/iouring info: MIN_TIMEOUT supported: true, features: 0x3ffff info: Testing: min_wait=1000ms, timeout=5s, wait_nr=4 info: 1 cqes in 5000.2ms where the expected result should be: axboe@m2max-kvm /d/iouring-mre (master)> zig-out/bin/iouring info: MIN_TIMEOUT supported: true, features: 0x3ffff info: Testing: min_wait=1000ms, timeout=5s, wait_nr=4 info: 1 cqes in 1500.3ms When the min_wait timeout triggers, reset the number of completions needed to wake the task. This should ensure that any future events will wake the task, regardless of how many events it originally wanted to wait for. Reported-by: Tip ten Brink Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1100c4a2656d ("io_uring: add support for batch wait timeout") Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/1477 Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

Merge tag 'for-6.19/io_uring-20251201' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux

2025-12-04T02:58:57+00:00

Pull io_uring updates from Jens Axboe: - Unify how task_work cancelations are detected, placing it in the task_work running state rather than needing to check the task state - Series cleaning up and moving the cancelation code to where it belongs, in cancel.c - Cleanup of waitid and futex argument handling - Add support for mixed sized SQEs. 6.18 added support for mixed sized CQEs, improving flexibility and efficiency of workloads that need big CQEs. This adds similar support for SQEs, where the occasional need for a 128b SQE doesn't necessitate having all SQEs be 128b in size - Introduce zcrx and SQ/CQ layout queries. The former returns what zcrx features are available. And both return the ring size information to help with allocation size calculation for user provided rings like IORING_SETUP_NO_MMAP and IORING_MEM_REGION_TYPE_USER - Zcrx updates for 6.19. It includes a bunch of small patches, IORING_REGISTER_ZCRX_CTRL and RQ flushing and David's work on sharing zcrx b/w multiple io_uring instances - Series cleaning up ring initializations, notable deduplicating ring size and offset calculations. It also moves most of the checking before doing any allocations, making the code simpler - Add support for getsockname and getpeername, which is mostly a trivial hookup after a bit of refactoring on the networking side - Various fixes and cleanups * tag 'for-6.19/io_uring-20251201' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux: (68 commits) io_uring: Introduce getsockname io_uring cmd socket: Split out a getsockname helper for io_uring socket: Unify getsockname and getpeername implementation io_uring/query: drop unused io_handle_query_entry() ctx arg io_uring/kbuf: remove obsolete buf_nr_pages and update comments io_uring/register: use correct location for io_rings_layout io_uring/zcrx: share an ifq between rings io_uring/zcrx: add io_fill_zcrx_offsets() io_uring/zcrx: export zcrx via a file io_uring/zcrx: move io_zcrx_scrub() and dependencies up io_uring/zcrx: count zcrx users io_uring/zcrx: add sync refill queue flushing io_uring/zcrx: introduce IORING_REGISTER_ZCRX_CTRL io_uring/zcrx: elide passing msg flags io_uring/zcrx: use folio_nr_pages() instead of shift operation io_uring/zcrx: convert to use netmem_desc io_uring/query: introduce rings info query io_uring/query: introduce zcrx query io_uring: move cq/sq user offset init around io_uring: pre-calculate scq layout ...

io_uring: fix mixed cqe overflow handling

2025-11-25T14:03:45+00:00

I started to see zcrx data corruptions. That turned out to be due to CQ tail pointing to a stale entry which happened to be from a zcrx request. I.e. the tail is incremented without the CQE memory being changed. The culprit is __io_cqring_overflow_flush() passing "cqe32=true" to io_get_cqe_overflow() for non-mixed CQE32 setups, which only expects it to be set for mixed 32B CQEs and not for SETUP_CQE32. The fix is slightly hacky, long term it's better to unify mixed and CQE32 handling. Fixes: e26dca67fde19 ("io_uring: add support for IORING_SETUP_CQE_MIXED") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe