<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include, branch v4.19.156</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.156</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.156'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-11-10T11:36:02+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: dsa: read mac address from DT for slave device</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T11:36:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiaofei Shen</name>
<email>xiaofeis@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-29T05:34:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8069a08d35b72e16486a6a81eb06f964b2e1432b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8069a08d35b72e16486a6a81eb06f964b2e1432b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a2c7023f7075ca9b80f944d3f20f60e6574538e2 upstream.

Before creating a slave netdevice, get the mac address from DTS and
apply in case it is valid.

Signed-off-by: Xiaofei Shen &lt;xiaofeis@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Pali Rohár &lt;pali@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: always have io_remap_pfn_range() set pgprot_decrypted()</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T11:35:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgg@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-02T01:08:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=361d82eb7c301e7473459cb7f1e0d7733cf5e7ec'/>
<id>urn:sha1:361d82eb7c301e7473459cb7f1e0d7733cf5e7ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8f6ae5d077a9bdaf5cbf2ac960a5d1a04b47482 upstream.

The purpose of io_remap_pfn_range() is to map IO memory, such as a
memory mapped IO exposed through a PCI BAR.  IO devices do not
understand encryption, so this memory must always be decrypted.
Automatically call pgprot_decrypted() as part of the generic
implementation.

This fixes a bug where enabling AMD SME causes subsystems, such as RDMA,
using io_remap_pfn_range() to expose BAR pages to user space to fail.
The CPU will encrypt access to those BAR pages instead of passing
unencrypted IO directly to the device.

Places not mapping IO should use remap_pfn_range().

Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Dave Young" &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Larry Woodman &lt;lwoodman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0-v1-025d64bdf6c4+e-amd_sme_fix_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hil/parisc: Disable HIL driver when it gets stuck</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-19T14:57:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=286d11dbf7005e3f348e95f64261ceb285d23fa0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:286d11dbf7005e3f348e95f64261ceb285d23fa0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 879bc2d27904354b98ca295b6168718e045c4aa2 upstream.

When starting a HP machine with HIL driver but without an HIL keyboard
or HIL mouse attached, it may happen that data written to the HIL loop
gets stuck (e.g. because the transaction queue is full).  Usually one
will then have to reboot the machine because all you see is and endless
output of:
 Transaction add failed: transaction already queued?

In the higher layers hp_sdc_enqueue_transaction() is called to queued up
a HIL packet. This function returns an error code, and this patch adds
the necessary checks for this return code and disables the HIL driver if
further packets can't be sent.

Tested on a HP 730 and a HP 715/64 machine.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFSv4.2: support EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_FENCE_OPS 4.2 EXCHANGE_ID flag</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Olga Kornievskaia</name>
<email>kolga@netapp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-16T13:25:45+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3c040b924988be85e99819dd48c1f3130ae683cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8c39076c276be0b31982e44654e2c2357473258a upstream.

RFC 7862 introduced a new flag that either client or server is
allowed to set: EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_FENCE_OPS.

Client needs to update its bitmask to allow for this flag value.

v2: changed minor version argument to unsigned int

Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia &lt;kolga@netapp.com&gt;
CC: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usb: typec: tcpm: During PR_SWAP, source caps should be sent only after tSwapSourceStart</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Badhri Jagan Sridharan</name>
<email>badhri@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-17T18:38:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=00943757170b126923ade6e705cbf532327e4989'/>
<id>urn:sha1:00943757170b126923ade6e705cbf532327e4989</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6bbe2a90a0bb4af8dd99c3565e907fe9b5e7fd88 ]

The patch addresses the compliance test failures while running
TD.PD.CP.E3, TD.PD.CP.E4, TD.PD.CP.E5 of the "Deterministic PD
Compliance MOI" test plan published in https://www.usb.org/usbc.
For a product to be Type-C compliant, it's expected that these tests
are run on usb.org certified Type-C compliance tester as mentioned in
https://www.usb.org/usbc.

The purpose of the tests TD.PD.CP.E3, TD.PD.CP.E4, TD.PD.CP.E5 is to
verify the PR_SWAP response of the device. While doing so, the test
asserts that Source Capabilities message is NOT received from the test
device within tSwapSourceStart min (20 ms) from the time the last bit
of GoodCRC corresponding to the RS_RDY message sent by the UUT was
sent. If it does then the test fails.

This is in line with the requirements from the USB Power Delivery
Specification Revision 3.0, Version 1.2:
"6.6.8.1 SwapSourceStartTimer
The SwapSourceStartTimer Shall be used by the new Source, after a
Power Role Swap or Fast Role Swap, to ensure that it does not send
Source_Capabilities Message before the new Sink is ready to receive
the
Source_Capabilities Message. The new Source Shall Not send the
Source_Capabilities Message earlier than tSwapSourceStart after the
last bit of the EOP of GoodCRC Message sent in response to the PS_RDY
Message sent by the new Source indicating that its power supply is
ready."

The patch makes sure that TCPM does not send the Source_Capabilities
Message within tSwapSourceStart(20ms) by transitioning into
SRC_STARTUP only after  tSwapSourceStart(20ms).

Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan &lt;badhri@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus &lt;heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817183828.1895015-1-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>media: videodev2.h: RGB BT2020 and HSV are always full range</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hans Verkuil</name>
<email>hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-20T10:47:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=df661bb764a2d54d7353c39521a4879de5bb2ebf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:df661bb764a2d54d7353c39521a4879de5bb2ebf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b305dfe2e93434b12d438434461b709641f62af4 ]

The default RGB quantization range for BT.2020 is full range (just as for
all the other RGB pixel encodings), not limited range.

Update the V4L2_MAP_QUANTIZATION_DEFAULT macro and documentation
accordingly.

Also mention that HSV is always full range and cannot be limited range.

When RGB BT2020 was introduced in V4L2 it was not clear whether it should
be limited or full range, but full range is the right (and consistent)
choice.

Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil &lt;hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:47:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=dea09436da034930fbd63420b3c6a010b98e8fab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dea09436da034930fbd63420b3c6a010b98e8fab</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 54c9de89895e0a36047fcc4ae754ea5b8655fb9d upstream.

In order to avoid tight event channel related IRQ loops add a new
framework of "late EOI" handling: the IRQ the event channel is bound
to will be masked until the event has been handled and the related
driver is capable to handle another event. The driver is responsible
for unmasking the event channel via the new function xen_irq_lateeoi().

This is similar to binding an event channel to a threaded IRQ, but
without having to structure the driver accordingly.

In order to support a future special handling in case a rogue guest
is sending lots of unsolicited events, add a flag to xen_irq_lateeoi()
which can be set by the caller to indicate the event was a spurious
one.

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: fix race where -&gt;lookup() marks plaintext dentry as ciphertext</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-31T22:05:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b699b0067c0ba01ca7068470d42d76e34eaafe84'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b699b0067c0ba01ca7068470d42d76e34eaafe84</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b01531db6cec2aa330dbc91bfbfaaef4a0d387a4 upstream.

-&gt;lookup() in an encrypted directory begins as follows:

1. fscrypt_prepare_lookup():
    a. Try to load the directory's encryption key.
    b. If the key is unavailable, mark the dentry as a ciphertext name
       via d_flags.
2. fscrypt_setup_filename():
    a. Try to load the directory's encryption key.
    b. If the key is available, encrypt the name (treated as a plaintext
       name) to get the on-disk name.  Otherwise decode the name
       (treated as a ciphertext name) to get the on-disk name.

But if the key is concurrently added, it may be found at (2a) but not at
(1a).  In this case, the dentry will be wrongly marked as a ciphertext
name even though it was actually treated as plaintext.

This will cause the dentry to be wrongly invalidated on the next lookup,
potentially causing problems.  For example, if the racy -&gt;lookup() was
part of sys_mount(), then the new mount will be detached when anything
tries to access it.  This is despite the mountpoint having a plaintext
path, which should remain valid now that the key was added.

Of course, this is only possible if there's a userspace race.  Still,
the additional kernel-side race is confusing and unexpected.

Close the kernel-side race by changing fscrypt_prepare_lookup() to also
set the on-disk filename (step 2b), consistent with the d_flags update.

Fixes: 28b4c263961c ("ext4 crypto: revalidate dentry after adding or removing the key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: fix race allowing rename() and link() of ciphertext dentries</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-31T22:05:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=000d849574fa636f1764919be459827df0114185'/>
<id>urn:sha1:000d849574fa636f1764919be459827df0114185</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 968dd6d0c6d6b6a989c6ddb9e2584a031b83e7b5 upstream.

Close some race conditions where fscrypt allowed rename() and link() on
ciphertext dentries that had been looked up just prior to the key being
concurrently added.  It's better to return -ENOKEY in this case.

This avoids doing the nonsensical thing of encrypting the names a second
time when searching for the actual on-disk dir entries.  It also
guarantees that DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME dentries are never rename()d, so
the dcache won't have support all possible combinations of moving
DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME around during __d_move().

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: clean up and improve dentry revalidation</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-31T22:05:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1ae161d27b01ebe062cc4bf228a1e5debc473310'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ae161d27b01ebe062cc4bf228a1e5debc473310</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6cc248684d3d23bbd073ae2fa73d3416c0558909 upstream.

Make various improvements to fscrypt dentry revalidation:

- Don't try to handle the case where the per-directory key is removed,
  as this can't happen without the inode (and dentries) being evicted.

- Flag ciphertext dentries rather than plaintext dentries, since it's
  ciphertext dentries that need the special handling.

- Avoid doing unnecessary work for non-ciphertext dentries.

- When revalidating ciphertext dentries, try to set up the directory's
  i_crypt_info to make sure the key is really still absent, rather than
  invalidating all negative dentries as the previous code did.  An old
  comment suggested we can't do this for locking reasons, but AFAICT
  this comment was outdated and it actually works fine.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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