kernel/linux.git/include, branch v4.14.161

rfkill: allocate static minor

2019-12-31T11:37:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8670b2b8b029a6650d133486be9d2ace146fd29a ] udev has a feature of creating /dev/ device-nodes if it finds a devnode: modalias. This allows for auto-loading of modules that provide the node. This requires to use a statically allocated minor number for misc character devices. However, rfkill uses dynamic minor numbers and prevents auto-loading of the module. So allocate the next static misc minor number and use it for rfkill. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191024174042.19851-1-marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

block: Fix writeback throttling W=1 compiler warnings

2019-12-31T11:37:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1d200e9d6f635ae894993a7d0f1b9e0b6e522e3b ] Fix the following compiler warnings: In file included from ./include/linux/bitmap.h:9, from ./include/linux/cpumask.h:12, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/cpumask.h:5, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h:11, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:21, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h:5, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:53, from ./include/linux/thread_info.h:38, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:7, from ./include/linux/preempt.h:78, from ./include/linux/spinlock.h:51, from ./include/linux/mmzone.h:8, from ./include/linux/gfp.h:6, from ./include/linux/mm.h:10, from ./include/linux/bvec.h:13, from ./include/linux/blk_types.h:10, from block/blk-wbt.c:23: In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'perf_trace_wbt_stat' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:15:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'perf_trace_wbt_lat' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:58:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'perf_trace_wbt_step' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:87:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'perf_trace_wbt_timer' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:126:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'trace_event_raw_event_wbt_stat' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:15:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'trace_event_raw_event_wbt_lat' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:58:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'trace_event_raw_event_wbt_timer' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:126:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'trace_event_raw_event_wbt_step' at ./include/trace/events/wbt.h:87:1: ./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Ming Lei Cc: Hannes Reinecke Cc: Johannes Thumshirn Fixes: e34cbd307477 ("blk-wbt: add general throttling mechanism"; v4.10). Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

media: cec-funcs.h: add status_req checks

2019-12-31T11:36:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9b211f9c5a0b67afc435b86f75d78273b97db1c5 ] The CEC_MSG_GIVE_DECK_STATUS and CEC_MSG_GIVE_TUNER_DEVICE_STATUS commands both have a status_req argument: ON, OFF, ONCE. If ON or ONCE, then the follower will reply with a STATUS message. Either once or whenever the status changes (status_req == ON). If status_req == OFF, then it will stop sending continuous status updates, but the follower will *not* send a STATUS message in that case. This means that if status_req == OFF, then msg->reply should be 0 as well since no reply is expected in that case. Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm: mst: Fix query_payload ack reply struct

2019-12-31T11:36:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit 268de6530aa18fe5773062367fd119f0045f6e88 ] Spec says[1] Allocated_PBN is 16 bits [1]- DisplayPort 1.2 Spec, Section 2.11.9.8, Table 2-98 Fixes: ad7f8a1f9ced ("drm/helper: add Displayport multi-stream helper (v0.6)") Cc: Lyude Paul Cc: Todd Previte Cc: Dave Airlie Cc: Maarten Lankhorst Cc: Maxime Ripard Cc: Sean Paul Cc: David Airlie Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul Signed-off-by: Sean Paul Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190829165223.129662-1-sean@poorly.run Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: dst: Force 4-byte alignment of dst_metrics

2019-12-31T11:36:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 258a980d1ec23e2c786e9536a7dd260bea74bae6 ] When storing a pointer to a dst_metrics structure in dst_entry._metrics, two flags are added in the least significant bits of the pointer value. Hence this assumes all pointers to dst_metrics structures have at least 4-byte alignment. However, on m68k, the minimum alignment of 32-bit values is 2 bytes, not 4 bytes. Hence in some kernel builds, dst_default_metrics may be only 2-byte aligned, leading to obscure boot warnings like: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x44/0x9a refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 5.5.0-rc2-atari-01448-g114a1a1038af891d-dirty #261 Stack from 10835e6c: 10835e6c 0038134f 00023fa6 00394b0f 0000001c 00000009 00321560 00023fea 00394b0f 0000001c 001a70f8 00000009 00000000 10835eb4 00000001 00000000 04208040 0000000a 00394b4a 10835ed4 00043aa8 001a70f8 00394b0f 0000001c 00000009 00394b4a 0026aba8 003215a4 00000003 00000000 0026d5a8 00000001 003215a4 003a4361 003238d6 000001f0 00000000 003215a4 10aa3b00 00025e84 003ddb00 10834000 002416a8 10aa3b00 00000000 00000080 000aa038 0004854a Call Trace: [<00023fa6>] __warn+0xb2/0xb4 [<00023fea>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x42/0x64 [<001a70f8>] refcount_warn_saturate+0x44/0x9a [<00043aa8>] printk+0x0/0x18 [<001a70f8>] refcount_warn_saturate+0x44/0x9a [<0026aba8>] refcount_sub_and_test.constprop.73+0x38/0x3e [<0026d5a8>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x5e/0x7e [<00025e84>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x0/0x8e [<002416a8>] dst_destroy+0x40/0xae Fix this by forcing 4-byte alignment of all dst_metrics structures. Fixes: e5fd387ad5b30ca3 ("ipv6: do not overwrite inetpeer metrics prematurely") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mod_devicetable: fix PHY module format

2019-12-31T11:36:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit d2ed49cf6c13e379c5819aa5ac20e1f9674ebc89 ] When a PHY is probed, if the top bit is set, we end up requesting a module with the string "mdio:-10101110000000100101000101010001" - the top bit is printed to a signed -1 value. This leads to the module not being loaded. Fix the module format string and the macro generating the values for it to ensure that we only print unsigned types and the top bit is always 0/1. We correctly end up with "mdio:10101110000000100101000101010001". Fixes: 8626d3b43280 ("phylib: Support phy module autoloading") Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: Russell King Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

inet: protect against too small mtu values.

2019-12-21T09:47:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 501a90c945103e8627406763dac418f20f3837b2 ] syzbot was once again able to crash a host by setting a very small mtu on loopback device. Let's make inetdev_valid_mtu() available in include/net/ip.h, and use it in ip_setup_cork(), so that we protect both ip_append_page() and __ip_append_data() Also add a READ_ONCE() when the device mtu is read. Pairs this lockless read with one WRITE_ONCE() in __dev_set_mtu(), even if other code paths might write over this field. Add a big comment in include/linux/netdevice.h about dev->mtu needing READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations. Hopefully we will add the missing ones in followup patches. [1] refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9464 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 9464 Comm: syz-executor850 Not tainted 5.4.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x2e3/0x75c kernel/panic.c:221 __warn.cold+0x2f/0x3e kernel/panic.c:582 report_bug+0x289/0x300 lib/bug.c:195 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:169 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:267 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:286 invalid_op+0x23/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1027 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22 Code: 06 31 ff 89 de e8 c8 f5 e6 fd 84 db 0f 85 6f ff ff ff e8 7b f4 e6 fd 48 c7 c7 e0 71 4f 88 c6 05 56 a6 a4 06 01 e8 c7 a8 b7 fd <0f> 0b e9 50 ff ff ff e8 5c f4 e6 fd 0f b6 1d 3d a6 a4 06 31 ff 89 RSP: 0018:ffff88809689f550 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815e4336 RDI: ffffed1012d13e9c RBP: ffff88809689f560 R08: ffff88809c50a3c0 R09: fffffbfff15d31b1 R10: fffffbfff15d31b0 R11: ffffffff8ae98d87 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000040100 R14: ffff888099041104 R15: ffff888218d96e40 refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:193 [inline] skb_set_owner_w+0x2b6/0x410 net/core/sock.c:1999 sock_wmalloc+0xf1/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2096 ip_append_page+0x7ef/0x1190 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1383 udp_sendpage+0x1c7/0x480 net/ipv4/udp.c:1276 inet_sendpage+0xdb/0x150 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:821 kernel_sendpage+0x92/0xf0 net/socket.c:3794 sock_sendpage+0x8b/0xc0 net/socket.c:936 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2da/0x3c0 fs/splice.c:458 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:512 [inline] __splice_from_pipe+0x3ee/0x7c0 fs/splice.c:636 splice_from_pipe+0x108/0x170 fs/splice.c:671 generic_splice_sendpage+0x3c/0x50 fs/splice.c:842 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:861 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x123/0x190 fs/splice.c:1035 splice_direct_to_actor+0x3b4/0xa30 fs/splice.c:990 do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1078 do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1464 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1525 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1511 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1dd/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1511 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441409 Code: e8 ac e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffb64c4f78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441409 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000073b8a R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000010001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000402180 R13: 0000000000402210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Fixes: 1470ddf7f8ce ("inet: Remove explicit write references to sk/inet in ip_append_data") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: Protect accesses to .ts_recent_stamp with {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()

2019-12-21T09:47:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit 721c8dafad26ccfa90ff659ee19755e3377b829d ] Syncookies borrow the ->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp field to store the timestamp of the last synflood. Protect them with READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() since reads and writes aren't serialised. Use of .rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp for storing the synflood timestamp was introduced by a0f82f64e269 ("syncookies: remove last_synq_overflow from struct tcp_sock"). But unprotected accesses were already there when timestamp was stored in .last_synq_overflow. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: tighten acceptance of ACKs not matching a child socket

2019-12-21T09:47:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit cb44a08f8647fd2e8db5cc9ac27cd8355fa392d8 ] When no synflood occurs, the synflood timestamp isn't updated. Therefore it can be so old that time_after32() can consider it to be in the future. That's a problem for tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() as it may report that a recent overflow occurred while, in fact, it's just that jiffies has grown past 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID + 2^31. Spurious detection of recent overflows lead to extra syncookie verification in cookie_v[46]_check(). At that point, the verification should fail and the packet dropped. But we should have dropped the packet earlier as we didn't even send a syncookie. Let's refine tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() to report a recent overflow only if jiffies is within the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval. This way, no spurious recent overflow is reported when jiffies wraps and 'last_overflow' becomes in the future from the point of view of time_after32(). However, if jiffies wraps and enters the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval (with 'last_overflow' being a stale synflood timestamp), then tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() still erroneously reports an overflow. In such cases, we have to rely on syncookie verification to drop the packet. We unfortunately have no way to differentiate between a fresh and a stale syncookie timestamp. In practice, using last_overflow as lower bound is problematic. If the synflood timestamp is concurrently updated between the time we read jiffies and the moment we store the timestamp in 'last_overflow', then 'now' becomes smaller than 'last_overflow' and tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() returns true, potentially dropping a valid syncookie. Reading jiffies after loading the timestamp could fix the problem, but that'd require a memory barrier. Let's just accommodate for potential timestamp growth instead and extend the interval using 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: fix rejected syncookies due to stale timestamps

2019-12-21T09:47:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit 04d26e7b159a396372646a480f4caa166d1b6720 ] If no synflood happens for a long enough period of time, then the synflood timestamp isn't refreshed and jiffies can advance so much that time_after32() can't accurately compare them any more. Therefore, we can end up in a situation where time_after32(now, last_overflow + HZ) returns false, just because these two values are too far apart. In that case, the synflood timestamp isn't updated as it should be, which can trick tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() into rejecting valid syncookies. For example, let's consider the following scenario on a system with HZ=1000: * The synflood timestamp is 0, either because that's the timestamp of the last synflood or, more commonly, because we're working with a freshly created socket. * We receive a new SYN, which triggers synflood protection. Let's say that this happens when jiffies == 2147484649 (that is, 'synflood timestamp' + HZ + 2^31 + 1). * Then tcp_synq_overflow() doesn't update the synflood timestamp, because time_after32(2147484649, 1000) returns false. With: - 2147484649: the value of jiffies, aka. 'now'. - 1000: the value of 'last_overflow' + HZ. * A bit later, we receive the ACK completing the 3WHS. But cookie_v[46]_check() rejects it because tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() says that we're not under synflood. That's because time_after32(2147484649, 120000) returns false. With: - 2147484649: the value of jiffies, aka. 'now'. - 120000: the value of 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID. Of course, in reality jiffies would have increased a bit, but this condition will last for the next 119 seconds, which is far enough to accommodate for jiffie's growth. Fix this by updating the overflow timestamp whenever jiffies isn't within the [last_overflow, last_overflow + HZ] range. That shouldn't have any performance impact since the update still happens at most once per second. Now we're guaranteed to have fresh timestamps while under synflood, so tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() can safely use it with time_after32() in such situations. Stale timestamps can still make tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() return the wrong verdict when not under synflood. This will be handled in the next patch. For 64 bits architectures, the problem was introduced with the conversion of ->tw_ts_recent_stamp to 32 bits integer by commit cca9bab1b72c ("tcp: use monotonic timestamps for PAWS"). The problem has always been there on 32 bits architectures. Fixes: cca9bab1b72c ("tcp: use monotonic timestamps for PAWS") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman