<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include, branch v3.18.135</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.135</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.135'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-02-20T09:09:08+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>HID: debug: fix the ring buffer implementation</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T09:09:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladis Dronov</name>
<email>vdronov@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-29T10:58:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=be120f656b4f3f71d9d82d52d5604e2fb1fb9a94'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be120f656b4f3f71d9d82d52d5604e2fb1fb9a94</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 13054abbaa4f1fd4e6f3b4b63439ec033b4c8035 upstream.

Ring buffer implementation in hid_debug_event() and hid_debug_events_read()
is strange allowing lost or corrupted data. After commit 717adfdaf147
("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") it is possible to enter
an infinite loop in hid_debug_events_read() by providing 0 as count, this
locks up a system. Fix this by rewriting the ring buffer implementation
with kfifo and simplify the code.

This fixes CVE-2019-3819.

v2: fix an execution logic and add a comment
v3: use __set_current_state() instead of set_current_state()

Backport to v3.18: some (tree-wide) patches are missing in v3.18 so
cherry-pick relevant pieces from:
 * 6396bb221514 ("treewide: kzalloc() -&gt; kcalloc()")
 * a9a08845e9ac ("vfs: do bulk POLL* -&gt; EPOLL* replacement")
 * 92529623d242 ("HID: debug: improve hid_debug_event()")
 * 174cd4b1e5fb ("sched/headers: Prepare to move signal wakeup &amp; sigpending
   methods from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; into &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt;")
 * 8fec02a73e31 ("HID: debug: fix error handling in hid_debug_events_read()")


Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1669187
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.18+
Fixes: cd667ce24796 ("HID: use debugfs for events/reports dumping")
Fixes: 717adfdaf147 ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()")
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov &lt;vdronov@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires &lt;benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: compress: Fix stop handling on compressed capture streams</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T09:09:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Charles Keepax</name>
<email>ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-05T16:29:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f93d1086fd34f327221390baefb1be8adf58306a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f93d1086fd34f327221390baefb1be8adf58306a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4f2ab5e1d13d6aa77c55f4914659784efd776eb4 upstream.

It is normal user behaviour to start, stop, then start a stream
again without closing it. Currently this works for compressed
playback streams but not capture ones.

The states on a compressed capture stream go directly from OPEN to
PREPARED, unlike a playback stream which moves to SETUP and waits
for a write of data before moving to PREPARED. Currently however,
when a stop is sent the state is set to SETUP for both types of
streams. This leaves a capture stream in the situation where a new
start can't be sent as that requires the state to be PREPARED and
a new set_params can't be sent as that requires the state to be
OPEN. The only option being to close the stream, and then reopen.

Correct this issues by allowing snd_compr_drain_notify to set the
state depending on the stream direction, as we already do in
set_params.

Fixes: 49bb6402f1aa ("ALSA: compress_core: Add support for capture streams")
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax &lt;ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drbd: Avoid Clang warning about pointless switch statment</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T09:09:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nathan Chancellor</name>
<email>natechancellor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-20T16:23:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f98b0b6695b63a65e3c533b5aeb2f8e31972df74'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f98b0b6695b63a65e3c533b5aeb2f8e31972df74</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a52c5a16cf19d8a85831bb1b915a221dd4ffae3c ]

There are several warnings from Clang about no case statement matching
the constant 0:

In file included from drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c:48:
In file included from drivers/block/drbd/drbd_int.h:48:
In file included from ./include/linux/drbd_genl_api.h:54:
In file included from ./include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h:236:
./include/linux/drbd_genl.h:321:1: warning: no case matching constant
switch condition '0'
GENL_struct(DRBD_NLA_HELPER, 24, drbd_helper_info,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h:220:10: note: expanded from macro
'GENL_struct'
        switch (0) {
                ^

Silence this warning by adding a 'case 0:' statement. Additionally,
adjust the alignment of the statements in the ct_assert_unique macro to
avoid a checkpatch warning.

This solution was originally sent by Arnd Bergmann with a default case
statement: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/756723/

Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/43
Suggested-by: Lars Ellenberg &lt;lars.ellenberg@linbit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sunrpc: use-after-free in svc_process_common()</title>
<updated>2019-01-26T08:44:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-24T11:44:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b1c0a2b920e66a6cd90644e5cbbd861b755f40fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1c0a2b920e66a6cd90644e5cbbd861b755f40fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d4b09acf924b84bae77cad090a9d108e70b43643 upstream.

if node have NFSv41+ mounts inside several net namespaces
it can lead to use-after-free in svc_process_common()

svc_process_common()
        /* Setup reply header */
        rqstp-&gt;rq_xprt-&gt;xpt_ops-&gt;xpo_prep_reply_hdr(rqstp); &lt;&lt;&lt; HERE

svc_process_common() can use incorrect rqstp-&gt;rq_xprt,
its caller function bc_svc_process() takes it from serv-&gt;sv_bc_xprt.
The problem is that serv is global structure but sv_bc_xprt
is assigned per-netnamespace.

According to Trond, the whole "let's set up rqstp-&gt;rq_xprt
for the back channel" is nothing but a giant hack in order
to work around the fact that svc_process_common() uses it
to find the xpt_ops, and perform a couple of (meaningless
for the back channel) tests of xpt_flags.

All we really need in svc_process_common() is to be able to run
rqstp-&gt;rq_xprt-&gt;xpt_ops-&gt;xpo_prep_reply_hdr()

Bruce J Fields points that this xpo_prep_reply_hdr() call
is an awfully roundabout way just to do "svc_putnl(resv, 0);"
in the tcp case.

This patch does not initialiuze rqstp-&gt;rq_xprt in bc_svc_process(),
now it calls svc_process_common() with rqstp-&gt;rq_xprt = NULL.

To adjust reply header svc_process_common() just check
rqstp-&gt;rq_prot and calls svc_tcp_prep_reply_hdr() for tcp case.

To handle rqstp-&gt;rq_xprt = NULL case in functions called from
svc_process_common() patch intruduces net namespace pointer
svc_rqst-&gt;rq_bc_net and adjust SVC_NET() definition.
Some other function was also adopted to properly handle described case.

Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 23c20ecd4475 ("NFS: callback up - users counting cleanup")
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
v2: - added lost extern svc_tcp_prep_reply_hdr()
    - context changes in svc_process_common()
    - dropped trace_svc_process() changes
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: force inode writes when nfsd calls commit_metadata()</title>
<updated>2019-01-13T09:07:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-19T19:07:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b7c6fd47260a9673822032f2091363b49cd6c8ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b7c6fd47260a9673822032f2091363b49cd6c8ca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fde872682e175743e0c3ef939c89e3c6008a1529 upstream.

Some time back, nfsd switched from calling vfs_fsync() to using a new
commit_metadata() hook in export_operations().  If the file system did
not provide a commit_metadata() hook, it fell back to using
sync_inode_metadata().  Unfortunately doesn't work on all file
systems.  In particular, it doesn't work on ext4 due to how the inode
gets journalled --- the VFS writeback code will not always call
ext4_write_inode().

So we need to provide our own ext4_nfs_commit_metdata() method which
calls ext4_write_inode() directly.

Google-Bug-Id: 121195940
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sock: Make sock-&gt;sk_stamp thread-safe</title>
<updated>2019-01-13T09:07:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Deepa Dinamani</name>
<email>deepa.kernel@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-28T02:55:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ef5dd2c94a7ada4adf06a314ce26686aaf04c78f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ef5dd2c94a7ada4adf06a314ce26686aaf04c78f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3a0ed3e9619738067214871e9cb826fa23b2ddb9 ]

Al Viro mentioned (Message-ID
&lt;20170626041334.GZ10672@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;)
that there is probably a race condition
lurking in accesses of sk_stamp on 32-bit machines.

sock-&gt;sk_stamp is of type ktime_t which is always an s64.
On a 32 bit architecture, we might run into situations of
unsafe access as the access to the field becomes non atomic.

Use seqlocks for synchronization.
This allows us to avoid using spinlocks for readers as
readers do not need mutual exclusion.

Another approach to solve this is to require sk_lock for all
modifications of the timestamps. The current approach allows
for timestamps to have their own lock: sk_stamp_lock.
This allows for the patch to not compete with already
existing critical sections, and side effects are limited
to the paths in the patch.

The addition of the new field maintains the data locality
optimizations from
commit 9115e8cd2a0c ("net: reorganize struct sock for better data
locality")

Note that all the instances of the sk_stamp accesses
are either through the ioctl or the syscall recvmsg.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T13:08:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-01T20:02:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2f5f58a8b5d8eb12cfc955cca62ccb5254bab951'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f5f58a8b5d8eb12cfc955cca62ccb5254bab951</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 78c9c4dfbf8c04883941445a195276bb4bb92c76 upstream.

The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.

The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.

Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.

Reported-by: Team OWL337 &lt;icytxw@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
[florian: Make patch apply to v4.9.135]
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;f.fainelli@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: pcm: remove SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_INFO internal command</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T13:08:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Sakamoto</name>
<email>o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-14T10:30:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=50ebcbade88d99aeb2d7917169ed8a3c3fc5da0d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50ebcbade88d99aeb2d7917169ed8a3c3fc5da0d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e11f0f90a626f93899687b1cc909ee37dd6c5809 upstream.

Drivers can implement 'struct snd_pcm_ops.ioctl' to handle some requests
from ALSA PCM core. These requests are internal purpose in kernel land.
Usually common set of operations are used for it.

SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_INFO is one of the requests. According to code comment,
it has been obsoleted in the old days.

We can see old releases in ftp.alsa-project.org. The command was firstly
introduced in v0.5.0 release as SND_PCM_IOCTL1_INFO, to allow drivers to
fill data of 'struct snd_pcm_channel_info' type. In v0.9.0 release,
this was obsoleted by the other commands for ioctl(2) such as
SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_CHANNEL_INFO.

This commit removes the long-abandoned command, bye.

Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto &lt;o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: avoid gcc-8 warning for get_task_comm</title>
<updated>2018-12-17T09:07:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-14T23:32:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8b0673c3f6989976265f8816ab250f39ee33f47a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b0673c3f6989976265f8816ab250f39ee33f47a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3756f6401c302617c5e091081ca4d26ab604bec5 upstream.

gcc-8 warns about using strncpy() with the source size as the limit:

  fs/exec.c:1223:32: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]

This is indeed slightly suspicious, as it protects us from source
arguments without NUL-termination, but does not guarantee that the
destination is terminated.

This keeps the strncpy() to ensure we have properly padded target
buffer, but ensures that we use the correct length, by passing the
actual length of the destination buffer as well as adding a build-time
check to ensure it is exactly TASK_COMM_LEN.

There are only 23 callsites which I all reviewed to ensure this is
currently the case.  We could get away with doing only the check or
passing the right length, but it doesn't hurt to do both.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205151724.1764896-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;asarai@suse.de&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>neighbour: Avoid writing before skb-&gt;head in neigh_hh_output()</title>
<updated>2018-12-17T09:07:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Brivio</name>
<email>sbrivio@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-06T18:30:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ba5720a0d3db9061a0cff3874ce3ab572c9eec6e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ba5720a0d3db9061a0cff3874ce3ab572c9eec6e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e6ac64d4c4d095085d7dd71cbd05704ac99829b2 ]

While skb_push() makes the kernel panic if the skb headroom is less than
the unaligned hardware header size, it will proceed normally in case we
copy more than that because of alignment, and we'll silently corrupt
adjacent slabs.

In the case fixed by the previous patch,
"ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options", we
end up in neigh_hh_output() with 14 bytes headroom, 14 bytes hardware
header and write 16 bytes, starting 2 bytes before the allocated buffer.

Always check we're not writing before skb-&gt;head and, if the headroom is
not enough, warn and drop the packet.

v2:
 - instead of panicking with BUG_ON(), WARN_ON_ONCE() and drop the packet
   (Eric Dumazet)
 - if we avoid the panic, though, we need to explicitly check the headroom
   before the memcpy(), otherwise we'll have corrupted slabs on a running
   kernel, after we warn
 - use __skb_push() instead of skb_push(), as the headroom check is
   already implemented here explicitly (Eric Dumazet)

Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio &lt;sbrivio@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
