kernel/linux.git/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h, branch v3.16.61

seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation

2018-10-03T03:09:43+00:00

commit 00a02d0c502a06d15e07b857f8ff921e3e402675 upstream. If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when adding filters. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - We don't support SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC or SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG - Drop selftest changes] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall

2018-09-25T22:47:34+00:00

commit 48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c upstream. This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags" parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value, used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...). In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter" for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags, and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially filter the seccomp syscall itself. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux

2012-10-13T09:46:48+00:00

Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney Acked-by: Dave Jones