kernel/linux.git/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h, branch v6.19.11

posix-timers: Move sequence logic into struct k_itimer

2024-11-07T01:14:45+00:00

The posix timer signal handling uses siginfo::si_sys_private for handling the sequence counter check. That indirection is not longer required and the sequence count value at signal queueing time can be stored in struct k_itimer itself. This removes the requirement of treating siginfo::si_sys_private special as it's now always zero as the kernel does not touch it anymore. Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241105064213.852619866@linutronix.de

kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers

2023-09-11T08:13:18+00:00

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel

x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler

2023-08-02T22:01:50+00:00

A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) Tested-by: Pengfei Xu Tested-by: John Allen Tested-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com

signal: Deliver SIGTRAP on perf event asynchronously if blocked

2022-04-22T10:14:05+00:00

With SIGTRAP on perf events, we have encountered termination of processes due to user space attempting to block delivery of SIGTRAP. Consider this case: ... sigset_t s; sigemptyset(&s); sigaddset(&s, SIGTRAP | ); sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &s, ...); ... When the perf event triggers, while SIGTRAP is blocked, force_sig_perf() will force the signal, but revert back to the default handler, thus terminating the task. This makes sense for error conditions, but not so much for explicitly requested monitoring. However, the expectation is still that signals generated by perf events are synchronous, which will no longer be the case if the signal is blocked and delivered later. To give user space the ability to clearly distinguish synchronous from asynchronous signals, introduce siginfo_t::si_perf_flags and TRAP_PERF_FLAG_ASYNC (opted for flags in case more binary information is required in future). The resolution to the problem is then to (a) no longer force the signal (avoiding the terminations), but (b) tell user space via si_perf_flags if the signal was synchronous or not, so that such signals can be handled differently (e.g. let user space decide to ignore or consider the data imprecise). The alternative of making the kernel ignore SIGTRAP on perf events if the signal is blocked may work for some usecases, but likely causes issues in others that then have to revert back to interception of sigprocmask() (which we want to avoid). [ A concrete example: when using breakpoint perf events to track data-flow, in a region of code where signals are blocked, data-flow can no longer be tracked accurately. When a relevant asynchronous signal is received after unblocking the signal, the data-flow tracking logic needs to know its state is imprecise. ] Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404111204.935357-1-elver@google.com

signal: Verify the alignment and size of siginfo_t

2021-07-23T18:15:31+00:00

Update the static assertions about siginfo_t to also describe it's alignment and size. While investigating if it was possible to add a 64bit field into siginfo_t[1] it became apparent that the alignment of siginfo_t is as much a part of the ABI as the size of the structure. If the alignment changes siginfo_t when embedded in another structure can move to a different offset. Which is not acceptable from an ABI structure. So document that fact and add static assertions to notify developers if they change change the alignment by accident. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YJEZdhe6JGFNYlum@elver.google.com Acked-by: Marco Elver v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210505141101.11519-4-ebiederm@xmission.co Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/875yxaxmyl.fsf_-_@disp2133 Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

signal: Deliver all of the siginfo perf data in _perf

2021-05-18T21:20:54+00:00

Don't abuse si_errno and deliver all of the perf data in _perf member of siginfo_t. Note: The data field in the perf data structures in a u64 to allow a pointer to be encoded without needed to implement a 32bit and 64bit version of the same structure. There already exists a 32bit and 64bit versions siginfo_t, and the 32bit version can not include a 64bit member as it only has 32bit alignment. So unsigned long is used in siginfo_t instead of a u64 as unsigned long can encode a pointer on all architectures linux supports. v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/m11rarqqx2.fsf_-_@fess.ebiederm.org v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503203814.25487-10-ebiederm@xmission.com v3: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210505141101.11519-11-ebiederm@xmission.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210517195748.8880-4-ebiederm@xmission.com Reviewed-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

siginfo: Move si_trapno inside the union inside _si_fault

2021-05-18T21:17:03+00:00

It turns out that linux uses si_trapno very sparingly, and as such it can be considered extra information for a very narrow selection of signals, rather than information that is present with every fault reported in siginfo. As such move si_trapno inside the union inside of _si_fault. This results in no change in placement, and makes it eaiser to extend _si_fault in the future as this reduces the number of special cases. In particular with si_trapno included in the union it is no longer a concern that the union must be pointer aligned on most architectures because the union follows immediately after si_addr which is a pointer. This change results in a difference in siginfo field placement on sparc and alpha for the fields si_addr_lsb, si_lower, si_upper, si_pkey, and si_perf. These architectures do not implement the signals that would use si_addr_lsb, si_lower, si_upper, si_pkey, and si_perf. Further these architecture have not yet implemented the userspace that would use si_perf. The point of this change is in fact to correct these placement issues before sparc or alpha grow userspace that cares. This change was discussed[1] and the agreement is that this change is currently safe. [1]: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAK8P3a0+uKYwL1NhY6Hvtieghba2hKYGD6hcKx5n8=4Gtt+pHA@mail.gmail.com Acked-by: Marco Elver v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/m1tunns7yf.fsf_-_@fess.ebiederm.org v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210505141101.11519-5-ebiederm@xmission.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210517195748.8880-1-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

signal, perf: Fix siginfo_t by avoiding u64 on 32-bit architectures

2021-04-23T07:03:16+00:00

The alignment of a structure is that of its largest member. On architectures like 32-bit Arm (but not e.g. 32-bit x86) 64-bit integers will require 64-bit alignment and not its natural word size. This means that there is no portable way to add 64-bit integers to siginfo_t on 32-bit architectures without breaking the ABI, because siginfo_t does not yet (and therefore likely never will) contain 64-bit fields on 32-bit architectures. Adding a 64-bit integer could change the alignment of the union after the 3 initial int si_signo, si_errno, si_code, thus introducing 4 bytes of padding shifting the entire union, which would break the ABI. One alternative would be to use the __packed attribute, however, it is non-standard C. Given siginfo_t has definitions outside the Linux kernel in various standard libraries that can be compiled with any number of different compilers (not just those we rely on), using non-standard attributes on siginfo_t should be avoided to ensure portability. In the case of the si_perf field, word size is sufficient since there is no exact requirement on size, given the data it contains is user-defined via perf_event_attr::sig_data. On 32-bit architectures, any excess bits of perf_event_attr::sig_data will therefore be truncated when copying into si_perf. Since si_perf is intended to disambiguate events (e.g. encoding relevant information if there are more events of the same type), 32 bits should provide enough entropy to do so on 32-bit architectures. For 64-bit architectures, no change is intended. Fixes: fb6cc127e0b6 ("signal: Introduce TRAP_PERF si_code and si_perf to siginfo") Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski Reported-by: Jon Hunter Signed-off-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski Tested-by: Jon Hunter Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210422191823.79012-1-elver@google.com

signal: Introduce TRAP_PERF si_code and si_perf to siginfo

2021-04-16T14:32:41+00:00

Introduces the TRAP_PERF si_code, and associated siginfo_t field si_perf. These will be used by the perf event subsystem to send signals (if requested) to the task where an event occurred. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven # m68k Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann # asm-generic Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210408103605.1676875-6-elver@google.com

signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type

2020-12-02T09:32:16+00:00

SYS_USER_DISPATCH will be triggered when a syscall is sent to userspace by the Syscall User Dispatch mechanism. This adjusts eventual BUILD_BUG_ON around the tree. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Christian Brauner Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-3-krisman@collabora.com