<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include/net, branch v4.9.223</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.223</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.223'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-05-02T15:23:08+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>tcp: cache line align MAX_TCP_HEADER</title>
<updated>2020-05-02T15:23:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-17T14:10:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=32004fbc6e8dcda732d6be24642b6b2fc8f500db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:32004fbc6e8dcda732d6be24642b6b2fc8f500db</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9bacd256f1354883d3c1402655153367982bba49 ]

TCP stack is dumb in how it cooks its output packets.

Depending on MAX_HEADER value, we might chose a bad ending point
for the headers.

If we align the end of TCP headers to cache line boundary, we
make sure to always use the smallest number of cache lines,
which always help.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ipv6: do not consider routes via gateways for anycast address check</title>
<updated>2020-04-24T05:59:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tim Stallard</name>
<email>code@timstallard.me.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-03T20:26:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a6047aaf91f76d36dc762a511b6493d1afc7a0da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6047aaf91f76d36dc762a511b6493d1afc7a0da</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 03e2a984b6165621f287fadf5f4b5cd8b58dcaba ]

The behaviour for what is considered an anycast address changed in
commit 45e4fd26683c ("ipv6: Only create RTF_CACHE routes after
encountering pmtu exception"). This now considers the first
address in a subnet where there is a route via a gateway
to be an anycast address.

This breaks path MTU discovery and traceroutes when a host in a
remote network uses the address at the start of a prefix
(eg 2600:: advertised as 2600::/48 in the DFZ) as ICMP errors
will not be sent to anycast addresses.

This patch excludes any routes with a gateway, or via point to
point links, like the behaviour previously from
rt6_is_gw_or_nonexthop in net/ipv6/route.c.

This can be tested with:
ip link add v1 type veth peer name v2
ip netns add test
ip netns exec test ip link set lo up
ip link set v2 netns test
ip link set v1 up
ip netns exec test ip link set v2 up
ip addr add 2001:db8::1/64 dev v1 nodad
ip addr add 2001:db8:100:: dev lo nodad
ip netns exec test ip addr add 2001:db8::2/64 dev v2 nodad
ip netns exec test ip route add unreachable 2001:db8:1::1
ip netns exec test ip route add 2001:db8:100::/64 via 2001:db8::1
ip netns exec test sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1
ip route add 2001:db8:1::1 via 2001:db8::2
ping -I 2001:db8::1 2001:db8:1::1 -c1
ping -I 2001:db8:100:: 2001:db8:1::1 -c1
ip addr delete 2001:db8:100:: dev lo
ip netns delete test

Currently the first ping will get back a destination unreachable ICMP
error, but the second will never get a response, with "icmp6_send:
acast source" logged. After this patch, both get destination
unreachable ICMP replies.

Fixes: 45e4fd26683c ("ipv6: Only create RTF_CACHE routes after encountering pmtu exception")
Signed-off-by: Tim Stallard &lt;code@timstallard.me.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fib: add missing attribute validation for tun_id</title>
<updated>2020-03-20T08:07:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-03T05:05:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0b21c9cbf647a8f1b4d9d45d6b30dfd47c8a5731'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0b21c9cbf647a8f1b4d9d45d6b30dfd47c8a5731</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4c16d64ea04056f1b1b324ab6916019f6a064114 ]

Add missing netlink policy entry for FRA_TUN_ID.

Fixes: e7030878fc84 ("fib: Add fib rule match on tunnel id")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sched: correct flower port blocking</title>
<updated>2020-03-11T06:53:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Baron</name>
<email>jbaron@akamai.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-17T20:38:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=259384b9b2c27b63ed94851932b4c5bac7f9046c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:259384b9b2c27b63ed94851932b4c5bac7f9046c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8a9093c79863b58cc2f9874d7ae788f0d622a596 ]

tc flower rules that are based on src or dst port blocking are sometimes
ineffective due to uninitialized stack data. __skb_flow_dissect() extracts
ports from the skb for tc flower to match against. However, the port
dissection is not done when when the FLOW_DIS_IS_FRAGMENT bit is set in
key_control-&gt;flags. All callers of __skb_flow_dissect(), zero-out the
key_control field except for fl_classify() as used by the flower
classifier. Thus, the FLOW_DIS_IS_FRAGMENT may be set on entry to
__skb_flow_dissect(), since key_control is allocated on the stack
and may not be initialized.

Since key_basic and key_control are present for all flow keys, let's
make sure they are initialized.

Fixes: 62230715fd24 ("flow_dissector: do not dissect l4 ports for fragments")
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cfg80211/mac80211: make ieee80211_send_layer2_update a public function</title>
<updated>2020-01-23T07:19:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dedy Lansky</name>
<email>dlansky@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-29T11:59:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ab567894b3c1b80b6aa3df2eb85e5528c2834fdd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab567894b3c1b80b6aa3df2eb85e5528c2834fdd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30ca1aa536211f5ac3de0173513a7a99a98a97f3 upstream.

Make ieee80211_send_layer2_update() a common function so other drivers
can re-use it.

Signed-off-by: Dedy Lansky &lt;dlansky@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.9 as dependency of commit 3e493173b784
 "mac80211: Do not send Layer 2 Update frame before authorization":
 - Retain type-casting of skb_put() return value
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add annotations on hh-&gt;hh_len lockless accesses</title>
<updated>2020-01-12T10:24:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-08T02:29:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=36d6d826d57173ec5e29df85942ca7055d555020'/>
<id>urn:sha1:36d6d826d57173ec5e29df85942ca7055d555020</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c305c6ae79e2ce20c22660ceda94f0d86d639a82 ]

KCSAN reported a data-race [1]

While we can use READ_ONCE() on the read sides,
we need to make sure hh-&gt;hh_len is written last.

[1]

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in eth_header_cache / neigh_resolve_output

write to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29760 on cpu 0:
 eth_header_cache+0xa9/0xd0 net/ethernet/eth.c:247
 neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1463 [inline]
 neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1480 [inline]
 neigh_resolve_output+0x415/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
 __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
 ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
 ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505
 ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647
 rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

read to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29572 on cpu 1:
 neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1479 [inline]
 neigh_resolve_output+0x113/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
 __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
 ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
 ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505
 ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647
 rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 29572 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events rt6_probe_deferred

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp/dccp: fix possible race __inet_lookup_established()</title>
<updated>2020-01-04T12:41:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-14T02:20:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=792365bfcf3c753a792a4150314d24dd6a7721ea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:792365bfcf3c753a792a4150314d24dd6a7721ea</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8dbd76e79a16b45b2ccb01d2f2e08dbf64e71e40 upstream.

Michal Kubecek and Firo Yang did a very nice analysis of crashes
happening in __inet_lookup_established().

Since a TCP socket can go from TCP_ESTABLISH to TCP_LISTEN
(via a close()/socket()/listen() cycle) without a RCU grace period,
I should not have changed listeners linkage in their hash table.

They must use the nulls protocol (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt),
so that a lookup can detect a socket in a hash list was moved in
another one.

Since we added code in commit d296ba60d8e2 ("soreuseport: Resolve
merge conflict for v4/v6 ordering fix"), we have to add
hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu() helper.

Fixes: 3b24d854cb35 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Firo Yang &lt;firo.yang@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20191120083919.GH27852@unicorn.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
[stable-4.9: we also need to update code in __inet_lookup_listener() and
 inet6_lookup_listener() which has been removed in 5.0-rc1.]
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dst: Force 4-byte alignment of dst_metrics</title>
<updated>2020-01-04T12:40:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Geert Uytterhoeven</name>
<email>geert@linux-m68k.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-20T13:31:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3420bd514a701b344146623a7800f88ac5dbbd07'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3420bd514a701b344146623a7800f88ac5dbbd07</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 258a980d1ec23e2c786e9536a7dd260bea74bae6 ]

When storing a pointer to a dst_metrics structure in dst_entry._metrics,
two flags are added in the least significant bits of the pointer value.
Hence this assumes all pointers to dst_metrics structures have at least
4-byte alignment.

However, on m68k, the minimum alignment of 32-bit values is 2 bytes, not
4 bytes.  Hence in some kernel builds, dst_default_metrics may be only
2-byte aligned, leading to obscure boot warnings like:

    WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x44/0x9a
    refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G        W         5.5.0-rc2-atari-01448-g114a1a1038af891d-dirty #261
    Stack from 10835e6c:
	    10835e6c 0038134f 00023fa6 00394b0f 0000001c 00000009 00321560 00023fea
	    00394b0f 0000001c 001a70f8 00000009 00000000 10835eb4 00000001 00000000
	    04208040 0000000a 00394b4a 10835ed4 00043aa8 001a70f8 00394b0f 0000001c
	    00000009 00394b4a 0026aba8 003215a4 00000003 00000000 0026d5a8 00000001
	    003215a4 003a4361 003238d6 000001f0 00000000 003215a4 10aa3b00 00025e84
	    003ddb00 10834000 002416a8 10aa3b00 00000000 00000080 000aa038 0004854a
    Call Trace: [&lt;00023fa6&gt;] __warn+0xb2/0xb4
     [&lt;00023fea&gt;] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x42/0x64
     [&lt;001a70f8&gt;] refcount_warn_saturate+0x44/0x9a
     [&lt;00043aa8&gt;] printk+0x0/0x18
     [&lt;001a70f8&gt;] refcount_warn_saturate+0x44/0x9a
     [&lt;0026aba8&gt;] refcount_sub_and_test.constprop.73+0x38/0x3e
     [&lt;0026d5a8&gt;] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x5e/0x7e
     [&lt;00025e84&gt;] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x0/0x8e
     [&lt;002416a8&gt;] dst_destroy+0x40/0xae

Fix this by forcing 4-byte alignment of all dst_metrics structures.

Fixes: e5fd387ad5b30ca3 ("ipv6: do not overwrite inetpeer metrics prematurely")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Protect accesses to .ts_recent_stamp with {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()</title>
<updated>2019-12-21T09:42:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guillaume Nault</name>
<email>gnault@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-06T11:38:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e7a3b025b8c387fa65dc28c50db88642b1add300'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e7a3b025b8c387fa65dc28c50db88642b1add300</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 721c8dafad26ccfa90ff659ee19755e3377b829d ]

Syncookies borrow the -&gt;rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp field to store the
timestamp of the last synflood. Protect them with READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE() since reads and writes aren't serialised.

Use of .rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp for storing the synflood timestamp was
introduced by a0f82f64e269 ("syncookies: remove last_synq_overflow from
struct tcp_sock"). But unprotected accesses were already there when
timestamp was stored in .last_synq_overflow.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: tighten acceptance of ACKs not matching a child socket</title>
<updated>2019-12-21T09:42:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guillaume Nault</name>
<email>gnault@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-06T11:38:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0c8cd7f6bb8a53b244ecc498dc733204099b6cf3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c8cd7f6bb8a53b244ecc498dc733204099b6cf3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb44a08f8647fd2e8db5cc9ac27cd8355fa392d8 ]

When no synflood occurs, the synflood timestamp isn't updated.
Therefore it can be so old that time_after32() can consider it to be
in the future.

That's a problem for tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() as it may report
that a recent overflow occurred while, in fact, it's just that jiffies
has grown past 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID + 2^31.

Spurious detection of recent overflows lead to extra syncookie
verification in cookie_v[46]_check(). At that point, the verification
should fail and the packet dropped. But we should have dropped the
packet earlier as we didn't even send a syncookie.

Let's refine tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() to report a recent overflow
only if jiffies is within the
[last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval. This
way, no spurious recent overflow is reported when jiffies wraps and
'last_overflow' becomes in the future from the point of view of
time_after32().

However, if jiffies wraps and enters the
[last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval (with
'last_overflow' being a stale synflood timestamp), then
tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() still erroneously reports an
overflow. In such cases, we have to rely on syncookie verification
to drop the packet. We unfortunately have no way to differentiate
between a fresh and a stale syncookie timestamp.

In practice, using last_overflow as lower bound is problematic.
If the synflood timestamp is concurrently updated between the time
we read jiffies and the moment we store the timestamp in
'last_overflow', then 'now' becomes smaller than 'last_overflow' and
tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() returns true, potentially dropping a
valid syncookie.

Reading jiffies after loading the timestamp could fix the problem,
but that'd require a memory barrier. Let's just accommodate for
potential timestamp growth instead and extend the interval using
'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound.

Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
