kernel/linux.git/include/net, branch v4.4.270

Bluetooth: verify AMP hci_chan before amp_destroy

2021-05-22T08:38:20+00:00

commit 5c4c8c9544099bb9043a10a5318130a943e32fc3 upstream. hci_chan can be created in 2 places: hci_loglink_complete_evt() if it is an AMP hci_chan, or l2cap_conn_add() otherwise. In theory, Only AMP hci_chan should be removed by a call to hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt(). However, the controller might mess up, call that function, and destroy an hci_chan which is not initiated by hci_loglink_complete_evt(). This patch adds a verification that the destroyed hci_chan must have been init'd by hci_loglink_complete_evt(). Example crash call trace: Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xe3/0x144 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x67/0x22a mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline] kasan_report+0x251/0x28f mm/kasan/report.c:396 hci_send_acl+0x3b/0x56e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4072 l2cap_send_cmd+0x5af/0x5c2 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:877 l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm_icid+0x8e/0xb1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4661 l2cap_move_fail net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5146 [inline] l2cap_move_channel_rsp net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5185 [inline] l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5464 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5799 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0x1d12/0x51aa net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7023 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x2ea/0x693 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7596 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4606 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x2bd/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4796 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 Allocated by task 38: set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0x8d/0x9a mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x102/0x129 mm/slub.c:2787 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline] hci_chan_create+0x86/0x26d net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1674 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1c/0x814 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7062 l2cap_conn_add net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7059 [inline] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x134/0x852 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7381 hci_connect_cfm+0x9d/0x122 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1404 hci_remote_ext_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4161 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x463f/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5981 hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 Freed by task 1732: set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x128 mm/kasan/kasan.c:493 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xaa/0xf6 mm/slub.c:1436 slab_free mm/slub.c:3009 [inline] kfree+0x182/0x21e mm/slub.c:3972 hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4891 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x6a1c/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6050 hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d7af9180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff8881d7af9180, ffff8881d7af9200) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00075ebe40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da403200 index:0x0 flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab) raw: 8000000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881da403200 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881d7af9080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881d7af9100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8881d7af9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881d7af9200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881d7af9280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka Reported-by: syzbot+98228e7407314d2d4ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Alain Michaud Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: George Kennedy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sch_red: fix off-by-one checks in red_check_params()

2021-04-16T10:00:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3a87571f0ffc51ba3bf3ecdb6032861d0154b164 ] This fixes following syzbot report: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/net/red.h:237:23 shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 8418 Comm: syz-executor170 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4-next-20210324-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 red_set_parms include/net/red.h:237 [inline] choke_change.cold+0x3c/0xc8 net/sched/sch_choke.c:414 qdisc_create+0x475/0x12f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1247 tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c8/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1663 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x43f039 Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdfa725168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000400488 RCX: 000000000043f039 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000403020 R08: 0000000000400488 R09: 0000000000400488 R10: 0000000000400488 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004030b0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000004ac018 R15: 0000000000400488 Fixes: 8afa10cbe281 ("net_sched: red: Avoid illegal values") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: sched: validate stab values

2021-03-30T12:45:01+00:00

commit e323d865b36134e8c5c82c834df89109a5c60dab upstream. iproute2 package is well behaved, but malicious user space can provide illegal shift values and trigger UBSAN reports. Add stab parameter to red_check_params() to validate user input. syzbot reported: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/net/red.h:312:18 shift exponent 111 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 14662 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 red_calc_qavg_from_idle_time include/net/red.h:312 [inline] red_calc_qavg include/net/red.h:353 [inline] choke_enqueue.cold+0x18/0x3dd net/sched/sch_choke.c:221 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3837 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1943/0x2e00 net/core/dev.c:4150 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:499 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x911/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:117 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:182 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x4c1/0xe10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:161 ip6_finish_output+0x35/0x200 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:192 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:290 [inline] ip6_output+0x1e4/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 dst_output include/net/dst.h:448 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:295 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x127e/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:320 inet6_csk_xmit+0x358/0x630 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135 dccp_transmit_skb+0x973/0x12c0 net/dccp/output.c:138 dccp_send_reset+0x21b/0x2b0 net/dccp/output.c:535 dccp_finish_passive_close net/dccp/proto.c:123 [inline] dccp_finish_passive_close+0xed/0x140 net/dccp/proto.c:118 dccp_terminate_connection net/dccp/proto.c:958 [inline] dccp_close+0xb3c/0xe60 net/dccp/proto.c:1028 inet_release+0x12e/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:431 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:478 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:599 sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1258 __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:140 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] Fixes: 8afa10cbe281 ("net_sched: red: Avoid illegal values") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

can: dev: Move device back to init netns on owning netns delete

2021-03-30T12:45:01+00:00

commit 3a5ca857079ea022e0b1b17fc154f7ad7dbc150f upstream. When a non-initial netns is destroyed, the usual policy is to delete all virtual network interfaces contained, but move physical interfaces back to the initial netns. This keeps the physical interface visible on the system. CAN devices are somewhat special, as they define rtnl_link_ops even if they are physical devices. If a CAN interface is moved into a non-initial netns, destroying that netns lets the interface vanish instead of moving it back to the initial netns. default_device_exit() skips CAN interfaces due to having rtnl_link_ops set. Reproducer: ip netns add foo ip link set can0 netns foo ip netns delete foo WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 84 at net/core/dev.c:11030 ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60 CPU: 1 PID: 84 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.10.19 #1 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [] (unwind_backtrace) from [] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [] (show_stack) from [] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8) [] (dump_stack) from [] (__warn+0xb8/0x114) [] (__warn) from [] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x7c/0xac) [] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [] (ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60) [] (ops_exit_list) from [] (cleanup_net+0x230/0x380) [] (cleanup_net) from [] (process_one_work+0x1d8/0x438) [] (process_one_work) from [] (worker_thread+0x64/0x5a8) [] (worker_thread) from [] (kthread+0x148/0x14c) [] (kthread) from [] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) To properly restore physical CAN devices to the initial netns on owning netns exit, introduce a flag on rtnl_link_ops that can be set by drivers. For CAN devices setting this flag, default_device_exit() considers them non-virtual, applying the usual namespace move. The issue was introduced in the commit mentioned below, as at that time CAN devices did not have a dellink() operation. Fixes: e008b5fc8dc7 ("net: Simplfy default_device_exit and improve batching.") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302122423.872326-1-martin@strongswan.org Signed-off-by: Martin Willi Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sched: prevent invalid Scell_log shift count

2021-01-12T18:47:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit bd1248f1ddbc48b0c30565fce897a3b6423313b8 ] Check Scell_log shift size in red_check_params() and modify all callers of red_check_params() to pass Scell_log. This prevents a shift out-of-bounds as detected by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/net/red.h:252:22 shift exponent 72 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' Fixes: 8afa10cbe281 ("net_sched: red: Avoid illegal values") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: syzbot+97c5bd9cc81eca63d36e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Nogah Frankel Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim Cc: Cong Wang Cc: Jiri Pirko Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vlan: consolidate VLAN parsing code and limit max parsing depth

2020-12-11T12:36:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit 469aceddfa3ed16e17ee30533fae45e90f62efd8 ] Toshiaki pointed out that we now have two very similar functions to extract the L3 protocol number in the presence of VLAN tags. And Daniel pointed out that the unbounded parsing loop makes it possible for maliciously crafted packets to loop through potentially hundreds of tags. Fix both of these issues by consolidating the two parsing functions and limiting the VLAN tag parsing to a max depth of 8 tags. As part of this, switch over __vlan_get_protocol() to use skb_header_pointer() instead of pskb_may_pull(), to avoid the possible side effects of the latter and keep the skb pointer 'const' through all the parsing functions. v2: - Use limit of 8 tags instead of 32 (matching XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT) Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann Fixes: d7bf2ebebc2b ("sched: consistently handle layer3 header accesses in the presence of VLANs") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bonding: wait for sysfs kobject destruction before freeing struct slave

2020-12-11T12:36:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit b9ad3e9f5a7a760ab068e33e1f18d240ba32ce92 ] syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, releasing a struct slave device could result in the following splat: kobject: 'bonding_slave' (00000000cecdd4fe): kobject_release, parent 0000000074ceb2b2 (delayed 1000) bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_1): Releasing backup interface ------------[ cut here ]------------ ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: workqueue_select_cpu_near kernel/workqueue.c:1549 [inline] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98 kernel/workqueue.c:1600 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 842 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 842 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #96 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 include/linux/bitmap.h:239 show_stack+0x34/0x48 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:142 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x360/0x7a0 kernel/panic.c:231 __warn+0x244/0x2ec kernel/panic.c:600 report_bug+0x240/0x398 lib/bug.c:198 bug_handler+0x50/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:974 call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:322 brk_handler+0x30/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:329 do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:864 el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:65 el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:93 el1_sync+0x80/0x100 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:594 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:967 [inline] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430 lib/debugobjects.c:998 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1536 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210 mm/slub.c:1577 slab_free mm/slub.c:3138 [inline] kfree+0x13c/0x460 mm/slub.c:4119 bond_free_slave+0x8c/0xf8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1492 __bond_release_one+0xe0c/0xec8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2190 bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3309 [inline] bond_netdev_event+0x8f0/0xa70 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3420 notifier_call_chain+0xf0/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:361 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x58 kernel/notifier.c:368 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbc/0x150 net/core/dev.c:2033 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline] rollback_registered_many+0x6a4/0xec0 net/core/dev.c:9347 unregister_netdevice_many.part.0+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:10509 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:10508 [inline] default_device_exit_batch+0x294/0x338 net/core/dev.c:10992 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xec/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:189 cleanup_net+0x44c/0x888 net/core/net_namespace.c:603 process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x390/0x498 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:925 This is a potential use-after-free if the sysfs nodes are being accessed whilst removing the struct slave, so wait for the object destruction to complete before freeing the struct slave itself. Fixes: 07699f9a7c8d ("bonding: add sysfs /slave dir for bond slave devices.") Fixes: a068aab42258 ("bonding: Fix reference count leak in bond_sysfs_slave_add.") Cc: Qiushi Wu Cc: Jay Vosburgh Cc: Veaceslav Falico Cc: Andy Gospodarek Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120142827.879226-1-jamie@nuviainc.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: allow driver to prevent two stations w/ same address

2020-11-24T11:48:13+00:00

commit 3110489117581a980537b6d999a3724214ba772c upstream. Some devices or drivers cannot deal with having the same station address for different virtual interfaces, say as a client to two virtual AP interfaces. Rather than requiring each driver with a limitation like that to enforce it, add a hardware flag for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/ipv4: always honour route mtu during forwarding

2020-10-29T08:03:00+00:00

[ Upstream commit 02a1b175b0e92d9e0fa5df3957ade8d733ceb6a0 ] Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt:46 says: ip_forward_use_pmtu - BOOLEAN By default we don't trust protocol path MTUs while forwarding because they could be easily forged and can lead to unwanted fragmentation by the router. You only need to enable this if you have user-space software which tries to discover path mtus by itself and depends on the kernel honoring this information. This is normally not the case. Default: 0 (disabled) Possible values: 0 - disabled 1 - enabled Which makes it pretty clear that setting it to 1 is a potential security/safety/DoS issue, and yet it is entirely reasonable to want forwarded traffic to honour explicitly administrator configured route mtus (instead of defaulting to device mtu). Indeed, I can't think of a single reason why you wouldn't want to. Since you configured a route mtu you probably know better... It is pretty common to have a higher device mtu to allow receiving large (jumbo) frames, while having some routes via that interface (potentially including the default route to the internet) specify a lower mtu. Note that ipv6 forwarding uses device mtu unless the route is locked (in which case it will use the route mtu). This approach is not usable for IPv4 where an 'mtu lock' on a route also has the side effect of disabling TCP path mtu discovery via disabling the IPv4 DF (don't frag) bit on all outgoing frames. I'm not aware of a way to lock a route from an IPv6 RA, so that also potentially seems wrong. Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Willem de Bruijn Cc: Lorenzo Colitti Cc: Sunmeet Gill (Sunny) Cc: Vinay Paradkar Cc: Tyler Wear Cc: David Ahern Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

2020-10-17T09:03:30+00:00

commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5 upstream. E0 is not allowed with Level 4: BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319: '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key not shortened' SC enabled: > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Page: 1/2 Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support) LE Supported (Host) Secure Connections (Host Support) > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02) SC disabled: > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Page: 1/2 Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support) LE Supported (Host) > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01) [May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3 Handle: 256 Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05) Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman