<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include/net, branch linux-5.8.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.8.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.8.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-11-01T11:45:34+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nftables_offload: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create</title>
<updated>2020-11-01T11:45:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Saeed Mirzamohammadi</name>
<email>saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-20T11:41:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6e1f770fbc0aea308be1d5b6f3dffee89d0717ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6e1f770fbc0aea308be1d5b6f3dffee89d0717ce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 31cc578ae2de19c748af06d859019dced68e325d upstream.

This patch fixes the issue due to:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nft_flow_rule_create+0x622/0x6a2
net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:40
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888103910b58 by task syz-executor227/16244

The error happens when expr-&gt;ops is accessed early on before performing the boundary check and after nft_expr_next() moves the expr to go out-of-bounds.

This patch checks the boundary condition before expr-&gt;ops that fixes the slab-out-of-bounds Read issue.

Add nft_expr_more() and use it to fix this problem.

Signed-off-by: Saeed Mirzamohammadi &lt;saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_log: missing vlan offload tag and proto</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T09:07:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-12T15:06:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=43edc7232737b553dfe9183aac07eda9d40a0c3b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:43edc7232737b553dfe9183aac07eda9d40a0c3b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0d9826bc18ce356e8909919ad681ad65d0a6061e ]

Dump vlan tag and proto for the usual vlan offload case if the
NF_LOG_MACDECODE flag is set on. Without this information the logging is
misleading as there is no reference to the VLAN header.

[12716.993704] test: IN=veth0 OUT= MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 VPROTO=8100 VID=10 MACPROTO=0800 SRC=192.168.10.2 DST=172.217.168.163 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=2548 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=55848 DPT=80 WINDOW=501 RES=0x00 ACK FIN URGP=0
[12721.157643] test: IN=veth0 OUT= MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 VPROTO=8100 VID=10 MACPROTO=0806 ARP HTYPE=1 PTYPE=0x0800 OPCODE=2 MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 IPSRC=192.168.10.2 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 IPDST=192.168.10.1

Fixes: 83e96d443b37 ("netfilter: log: split family specific code to nf_log_{ip,ip6,common}.c files")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv4: always honour route mtu during forwarding</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T09:07:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej Żenczykowski</name>
<email>maze@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-23T20:18:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f736e9e2f7502775c1fc03d22107a65adf0edc90'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f736e9e2f7502775c1fc03d22107a65adf0edc90</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 02a1b175b0e92d9e0fa5df3957ade8d733ceb6a0 ]

Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt:46 says:
  ip_forward_use_pmtu - BOOLEAN
    By default we don't trust protocol path MTUs while forwarding
    because they could be easily forged and can lead to unwanted
    fragmentation by the router.
    You only need to enable this if you have user-space software
    which tries to discover path mtus by itself and depends on the
    kernel honoring this information. This is normally not the case.
    Default: 0 (disabled)
    Possible values:
    0 - disabled
    1 - enabled

Which makes it pretty clear that setting it to 1 is a potential
security/safety/DoS issue, and yet it is entirely reasonable to want
forwarded traffic to honour explicitly administrator configured
route mtus (instead of defaulting to device mtu).

Indeed, I can't think of a single reason why you wouldn't want to.
Since you configured a route mtu you probably know better...

It is pretty common to have a higher device mtu to allow receiving
large (jumbo) frames, while having some routes via that interface
(potentially including the default route to the internet) specify
a lower mtu.

Note that ipv6 forwarding uses device mtu unless the route is locked
(in which case it will use the route mtu).

This approach is not usable for IPv4 where an 'mtu lock' on a route
also has the side effect of disabling TCP path mtu discovery via
disabling the IPv4 DF (don't frag) bit on all outgoing frames.

I'm not aware of a way to lock a route from an IPv6 RA, so that also
potentially seems wrong.

Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sunmeet Gill (Sunny) &lt;sgill@quicinc.com&gt;
Cc: Vinay Paradkar &lt;vparadka@qti.qualcomm.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Wear &lt;twear@quicinc.com&gt;
Cc: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sched: Fix suspicious RCU usage while accessing tcf_tunnel_info</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T09:07:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-14T08:56:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5e52ea477365e395745610e06a6ee60274d7f529'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5e52ea477365e395745610e06a6ee60274d7f529</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d086a1c65aabb5a4e1edc580ca583e2964c62b44 ]

The access of tcf_tunnel_info() produces the following splat, so fix it
by dereferencing the tcf_tunnel_key_params pointer with marker that
internal tcfa_liock is held.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 5.9.0+ #1 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/net/tc_act/tc_tunnel_key.h:59 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by tc/34839:
  #0: ffff88828572c2a0 (&amp;p-&gt;tcfa_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: tc_setup_flow_action+0xb3/0x48b5
 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 1 PID: 34839 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.9.0+ #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0
  tc_setup_flow_action+0x14cb/0x48b5
  fl_hw_replace_filter+0x347/0x690 [cls_flower]
  fl_change+0x2bad/0x4875 [cls_flower]
  tc_new_tfilter+0xf6f/0x1ba0
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x5f2/0x870
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x124/0x350
  netlink_unicast+0x433/0x700
  netlink_sendmsg+0x6f1/0xbd0
  sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x4fa/0x6d0
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x12e/0x1b0
  __sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x120
  do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 RIP: 0033:0x7f1f8cd4fe57
 Code: 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
 RSP: 002b:00007ffdc1e193b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1f8cd4fe57
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffdc1e19420 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000000005f85aafa R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdc1e1936c
 R10: 000000000040522d R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdc1e1d6f0 R15: 0000000000482420

Fixes: 3ebaf6da0716 ("net: sched: Do not assume RTNL is held in tunnel key action helpers")
Fixes: 7a47281439ba ("net: sched: lock action when translating it to flow_action infra")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@nvidia.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4</title>
<updated>2020-10-17T06:56:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-20T21:20:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1b7150e1c95eb61c8fec801203f84b17f90563bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b7150e1c95eb61c8fec801203f84b17f90563bd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5 upstream.

E0 is not allowed with Level 4:

BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:

  '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
   required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
   SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
   not shortened'

SC enabled:

&gt; HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
          Secure Connections (Host Support)
&gt; HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)

SC disabled:

&gt; HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
&gt; HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
&lt; HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt &lt;hegtvedt@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix calling sk_filter on non-socket based channel</title>
<updated>2020-10-17T06:56:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-06T18:17:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ffddc73458e83e015f47e5e92c880fd54be27f95'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ffddc73458e83e015f47e5e92c880fd54be27f95</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f19425641cb2572a33cb074d5e30283720bd4d22 upstream.

Only sockets will have the chan-&gt;data set to an actual sk, channels
like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when
calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been
introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary.

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net_sched: defer tcf_idr_insert() in tcf_action_init_1()</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T09:56:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-23T03:56:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1e02bbf908d35c98aa673ea7fdd7d1de8bcc0adc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1e02bbf908d35c98aa673ea7fdd7d1de8bcc0adc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e49d8c22f1261c43a986a7fdbf677ac309682a07 upstream.

All TC actions call tcf_idr_insert() for new action at the end
of their -&gt;init(), so we can actually move it to a central place
in tcf_action_init_1().

And once the action is inserted into the global IDR, other parallel
process could free it immediately as its refcnt is still 1, so we can
not fail after this, we need to move it after the goto action
validation to avoid handling the failure case after insertion.

This is found during code review, is not directly triggered by syzbot.
And this prepares for the next patch.

Cc: Vlad Buslov &lt;vladbu@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: fix policy dump leak</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T09:55:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-02T07:46:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=912721b3ad7206d109162e679b0e07b496c7463e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:912721b3ad7206d109162e679b0e07b496c7463e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a95bc734e60449e7b073ff7ff70c35083b290ae9 upstream.

If userspace doesn't complete the policy dump, we leak the
allocated state. Fix this.

Fixes: d07dcf9aadd6 ("netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: clone XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL in xfrm_do_migrate</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T09:55:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Antony Antony</name>
<email>antony.antony@secunet.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T06:49:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3ab37554e6ce52f2ed330872d4949775efbebaf2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3ab37554e6ce52f2ed330872d4949775efbebaf2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91a46c6d1b4fcbfa4773df9421b8ad3e58088101 ]

XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL was not cloned completely from the old to the new.
Migrate this attribute during XFRMA_MSG_MIGRATE

v1-&gt;v2:
 - move curleft cloning to a separate patch

Fixes: af2f464e326e ("xfrm: Assign esn pointers when cloning a state")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony &lt;antony.antony@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: Fix IPv6 ancestor_size calc in sctp_copy_descendant</title>
<updated>2020-09-26T16:05:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Henry Ptasinski</name>
<email>hptasinski@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-19T00:12:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5bda4b3ec1c9faf236b30d5892f5467c55300414'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5bda4b3ec1c9faf236b30d5892f5467c55300414</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fe81d9f6182d1160e625894eecb3d7ff0222cac5 ]

When calculating ancestor_size with IPv6 enabled, simply using
sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo) doesn't account for extra bytes needed for
alignment in the struct sctp6_sock. On x86, there aren't any extra
bytes, but on ARM the ipv6_pinfo structure is aligned on an 8-byte
boundary so there were 4 pad bytes that were omitted from the
ancestor_size calculation.  This would lead to corruption of the
pd_lobby pointers, causing an oops when trying to free the sctp
structure on socket close.

Fixes: 636d25d557d1 ("sctp: not copy sctp_sock pd_lobby in sctp_copy_descendant")
Signed-off-by: Henry Ptasinski &lt;hptasinski@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
