kernel/linux.git/include/net/tcp.h, branch v5.4.175

tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT related hangs under mem pressure

2021-03-04T09:26:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit f969dc5a885736842c3511ecdea240fbb02d25d9 ] While commit 24adbc1676af ("tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs") fixed an issue vs too small sk_rcvbuf for given sk_rcvlowat constraint, it missed to address issue caused by memory pressure. 1) If we are under memory pressure and socket receive queue is empty. First incoming packet is allowed to be queued, after commit 76dfa6082032 ("tcp: allow one skb to be received per socket under memory pressure") But we do not send EPOLLIN yet, in case tcp_data_ready() sees sk_rcvlowat is bigger than skb length. 2) Then, when next packet comes, it is dropped, and we directly call sk->sk_data_ready(). 3) If application is using poll(), tcp_poll() will then use tcp_stream_is_readable() and decide the socket receive queue is not yet filled, so nothing will happen. Even when sender retransmits packets, phases 2) & 3) repeat and flow is effectively frozen, until memory pressure is off. Fix is to consider tcp_under_memory_pressure() to take care of global memory pressure or memcg pressure. Fixes: 24adbc1676af ("tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Arjun Roy Suggested-by: Wei Wang Reviewed-by: Wei Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tcp: make TCP_USER_TIMEOUT accurate for zero window probes

2021-02-07T14:35:47+00:00

commit 344db93ae3ee69fc137bd6ed89a8ff1bf5b0db08 upstream. The TCP_USER_TIMEOUT is checked by the 0-window probe timer. As the timer has backoff with a max interval of about two minutes, the actual timeout for TCP_USER_TIMEOUT can be off by up to two minutes. In this patch the TCP_USER_TIMEOUT is made more accurate by taking it into account when computing the timer value for the 0-window probes. This patch is similar to and builds on top of the one that made TCP_USER_TIMEOUT accurate for RTOs in commit b701a99e431d ("tcp: Add tcp_clamp_rto_to_user_timeout() helper to improve accuracy"). Fixes: 9721e709fa68 ("tcp: simplify window probe aborting on USER_TIMEOUT") Signed-off-by: Enke Chen Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122191306.GA99540@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: fix TLP timer not set when CA_STATE changes from DISORDER to OPEN

2021-02-03T22:26:02+00:00

commit 62d9f1a6945ba69c125e548e72a36d203b30596e upstream. Upon receiving a cumulative ACK that changes the congestion state from Disorder to Open, the TLP timer is not set. If the sender is app-limited, it can only wait for the RTO timer to expire and retransmit. The reason for this is that the TLP timer is set before the congestion state changes in tcp_ack(), so we delay the time point of calling tcp_set_xmit_timer() until after tcp_fastretrans_alert() returns and remove the FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER from ack_flag when the RACK reorder timer is set. This commit has two additional benefits: 1) Make sure to reset RTO according to RFC6298 when receiving ACK, to avoid spurious RTO caused by RTO timer early expires. 2) Reduce the xmit timer reschedule once per ACK when the RACK reorder timer is set. Fixes: df92c8394e6e ("tcp: fix xmit timer to only be reset if data ACKed/SACKed") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/1611311242-6675-1-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Cc: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1611464834-23030-1-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: correct read of TFO keys on big endian systems

2020-08-19T06:16:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit f19008e676366c44e9241af57f331b6c6edf9552 ] When TFO keys are read back on big endian systems either via the global sysctl interface or via getsockopt() using TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY, the values don't match what was written. For example, on s390x: # echo "1-2-3-4" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key 02000000-01000000-04000000-03000000 Instead of: # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key 00000001-00000002-00000003-00000004 Fix this by converting to the correct endianness on read. This was reported by Colin Ian King when running the 'tcp_fastopen_backup_key' net selftest on s390x, which depends on the read value matching what was written. I've confirmed that the test now passes on big and little endian systems. Signed-off-by: Jason Baron Fixes: 438ac88009bc ("net: fastopen: robustness and endianness fixes for SipHash") Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Eric Dumazet Reported-and-tested-by: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs

2020-05-20T06:20:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit 24adbc1676af4e134e709ddc7f34cf2adc2131e4 ] We autotune rcvbuf whenever SO_RCVLOWAT is set to account for 100% overhead in tcp_set_rcvlowat() This works well when skb->len/skb->truesize ratio is bigger than 0.5 But if we receive packets with small MSS, we can end up in a situation where not enough bytes are available in the receive queue to satisfy RCVLOWAT setting. As our sk_rcvbuf limit is hit, we send zero windows in ACK packets, preventing remote peer from sending more data. Even autotuning does not help, because it only triggers at the time user process drains the queue. If no EPOLLIN is generated, this can not happen. Note poll() has a similar issue, after commit c7004482e8dc ("tcp: Respect SO_RCVLOWAT in tcp_poll().") Fixes: 03f45c883c6f ("tcp: avoid extra wakeups for SO_RCVLOWAT users") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: cache line align MAX_TCP_HEADER

2020-04-29T14:33:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9bacd256f1354883d3c1402655153367982bba49 ] TCP stack is dumb in how it cooks its output packets. Depending on MAX_HEADER value, we might chose a bad ending point for the headers. If we align the end of TCP headers to cache line boundary, we make sure to always use the smallest number of cache lines, which always help. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Sockmap/tls, push write_space updates through ulp updates

2020-01-23T07:22:45+00:00

commit 33bfe20dd7117dd81fd896a53f743a233e1ad64f upstream. When sockmap sock with TLS enabled is removed we cleanup bpf/psock state and call tcp_update_ulp() to push updates to TLS ULP on top. However, we don't push the write_space callback up and instead simply overwrite the op with the psock stored previous op. This may or may not be correct so to ensure we don't overwrite the TLS write space hook pass this field to the ULP and have it fixup the ctx. This completes a previous fix that pushed the ops through to the ULP but at the time missed doing this for write_space, presumably because write_space TLS hook was added around the same time. Fixes: 95fa145479fbc ("bpf: sockmap/tls, close can race with map free") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200111061206.8028-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: Protect accesses to .ts_recent_stamp with {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()

2019-12-18T15:08:45+00:00

[ Upstream commit 721c8dafad26ccfa90ff659ee19755e3377b829d ] Syncookies borrow the ->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp field to store the timestamp of the last synflood. Protect them with READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() since reads and writes aren't serialised. Use of .rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp for storing the synflood timestamp was introduced by a0f82f64e269 ("syncookies: remove last_synq_overflow from struct tcp_sock"). But unprotected accesses were already there when timestamp was stored in .last_synq_overflow. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: tighten acceptance of ACKs not matching a child socket

2019-12-18T15:08:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit cb44a08f8647fd2e8db5cc9ac27cd8355fa392d8 ] When no synflood occurs, the synflood timestamp isn't updated. Therefore it can be so old that time_after32() can consider it to be in the future. That's a problem for tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() as it may report that a recent overflow occurred while, in fact, it's just that jiffies has grown past 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID + 2^31. Spurious detection of recent overflows lead to extra syncookie verification in cookie_v[46]_check(). At that point, the verification should fail and the packet dropped. But we should have dropped the packet earlier as we didn't even send a syncookie. Let's refine tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() to report a recent overflow only if jiffies is within the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval. This way, no spurious recent overflow is reported when jiffies wraps and 'last_overflow' becomes in the future from the point of view of time_after32(). However, if jiffies wraps and enters the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval (with 'last_overflow' being a stale synflood timestamp), then tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() still erroneously reports an overflow. In such cases, we have to rely on syncookie verification to drop the packet. We unfortunately have no way to differentiate between a fresh and a stale syncookie timestamp. In practice, using last_overflow as lower bound is problematic. If the synflood timestamp is concurrently updated between the time we read jiffies and the moment we store the timestamp in 'last_overflow', then 'now' becomes smaller than 'last_overflow' and tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() returns true, potentially dropping a valid syncookie. Reading jiffies after loading the timestamp could fix the problem, but that'd require a memory barrier. Let's just accommodate for potential timestamp growth instead and extend the interval using 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: fix rejected syncookies due to stale timestamps

2019-12-18T15:08:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit 04d26e7b159a396372646a480f4caa166d1b6720 ] If no synflood happens for a long enough period of time, then the synflood timestamp isn't refreshed and jiffies can advance so much that time_after32() can't accurately compare them any more. Therefore, we can end up in a situation where time_after32(now, last_overflow + HZ) returns false, just because these two values are too far apart. In that case, the synflood timestamp isn't updated as it should be, which can trick tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() into rejecting valid syncookies. For example, let's consider the following scenario on a system with HZ=1000: * The synflood timestamp is 0, either because that's the timestamp of the last synflood or, more commonly, because we're working with a freshly created socket. * We receive a new SYN, which triggers synflood protection. Let's say that this happens when jiffies == 2147484649 (that is, 'synflood timestamp' + HZ + 2^31 + 1). * Then tcp_synq_overflow() doesn't update the synflood timestamp, because time_after32(2147484649, 1000) returns false. With: - 2147484649: the value of jiffies, aka. 'now'. - 1000: the value of 'last_overflow' + HZ. * A bit later, we receive the ACK completing the 3WHS. But cookie_v[46]_check() rejects it because tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() says that we're not under synflood. That's because time_after32(2147484649, 120000) returns false. With: - 2147484649: the value of jiffies, aka. 'now'. - 120000: the value of 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID. Of course, in reality jiffies would have increased a bit, but this condition will last for the next 119 seconds, which is far enough to accommodate for jiffie's growth. Fix this by updating the overflow timestamp whenever jiffies isn't within the [last_overflow, last_overflow + HZ] range. That shouldn't have any performance impact since the update still happens at most once per second. Now we're guaranteed to have fresh timestamps while under synflood, so tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() can safely use it with time_after32() in such situations. Stale timestamps can still make tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() return the wrong verdict when not under synflood. This will be handled in the next patch. For 64 bits architectures, the problem was introduced with the conversion of ->tw_ts_recent_stamp to 32 bits integer by commit cca9bab1b72c ("tcp: use monotonic timestamps for PAWS"). The problem has always been there on 32 bits architectures. Fixes: cca9bab1b72c ("tcp: use monotonic timestamps for PAWS") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman