<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include/net/sctp, branch linux-2.6.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-2.6.16.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-2.6.16.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2006-08-26T00:39:03+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>SCTP: Reject sctp packets with broadcast addresses.</title>
<updated>2006-08-26T00:39:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-08-26T00:39:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cf7260ee89f7b187304a35b188cc0c889f7bdd24'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cf7260ee89f7b187304a35b188cc0c889f7bdd24</id>
<content type='text'>
Make SCTP handle broadcast properly

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk &lt;bunk@stusta.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix sctp privilege elevation (CVE-2006-3745)</title>
<updated>2006-08-23T16:01:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sridhar Samudrala</name>
<email>sri@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-08-23T16:01:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=28ea23d9847cadc58edf3d10b8c1651f18b8d26b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:28ea23d9847cadc58edf3d10b8c1651f18b8d26b</id>
<content type='text'>
sctp_make_abort_user() now takes the msg_len along with the msg
so that we don't have to recalculate the bytes in iovec.
It also uses memcpy_fromiovec() so that we don't go beyond the
length allocated.

It is good to have this fix even if verify_iovec() is fixed to
return error on overflow.

Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk &lt;bunk@stusta.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] SCTP: Respect the real chunk length when walking parameters (CVE-2006-1858)</title>
<updated>2006-05-20T22:00:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladislav Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-19T18:52:20+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0eca2317be1345e056fb75d256099a04c97f7021</id>
<content type='text'>
When performing bound checks during the parameter processing, we
want to use the real chunk and paramter lengths for bounds instead
of the rounded ones.  This prevents us from potentially walking of
the end if the chunk length was miscalculated.  We still use rounded
lengths when advancing the pointer. This was found during a
conformance test that changed the chunk length without modifying
parameters.

(Vlad noted elsewhere: the most you'd overflow is 3 bytes, so problem
is parameter dependent).

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] SCTP: Allow spillover of receive buffer to avoid deadlock. (CVE-2006-2275)</title>
<updated>2006-05-09T19:53:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-06T00:02:09+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2e2a2cd09dd7b3fbc99a1879a54090fd6db16f0c</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes a deadlock situation in the receive path by allowing
temporary spillover of the receive buffer.

- If the chunk we receive has a tsn that immediately follows the ctsn,
  accept it even if we run out of receive buffer space and renege data with
  higher TSNs.
- Once we accept one chunk in a packet, accept all the remaining chunks
  even if we run out of receive buffer space.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Butler &lt;butlerm@middle.net&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[SCTP]: Fix 'fast retransmit' to send a TSN only once.</title>
<updated>2006-02-03T00:57:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-02-03T00:57:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=27852c26baab8b95fc9a2b3e8a18770ecd553f10'/>
<id>urn:sha1:27852c26baab8b95fc9a2b3e8a18770ecd553f10</id>
<content type='text'>
SCTP used to "fast retransmit" a TSN every time we hit the number
of missing reports for the TSN.  However the Implementers Guide
specifies that we should only "fast retransmit" a given TSN once.
Subsequent retransmits should be timeouts only. Also change the
number of missing reports to 3 as per the latest IG(similar to TCP).

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[SCTP]: Fix couple of races between sctp_peeloff() and sctp_rcv().</title>
<updated>2006-01-17T19:56:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sridhar Samudrala</name>
<email>sri@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-17T19:56:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c4d2444e992c4eda1d7fc3287e93ba58295bf6b9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4d2444e992c4eda1d7fc3287e93ba58295bf6b9</id>
<content type='text'>
Validate and update the sk in sctp_rcv() to avoid the race where an
assoc/ep could move to a different socket after we get the sk, but before
the skb is added to the backlog.

Also migrate the skb's in backlog queue to new sk when doing a peeloff.

Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[SCTP]: Fix machine check/connection hang on IA64.</title>
<updated>2006-01-17T19:55:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-17T19:55:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=313e7b4d2588539e388d31c1febd50503a0083fc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:313e7b4d2588539e388d31c1febd50503a0083fc</id>
<content type='text'>
sctp_unpack_cookie used an on-stack array called digest as a result/out
parameter in the call to crypto_hmac. However, hmac code
(crypto_hmac_final)
assumes that the 'out' argument is in virtual memory (identity mapped
region)
and can use virt_to_page call on it.  This does not work with the on-stack
declared digest.  The problems observed so far have been:
 a) incorrect hmac digest
 b) machine check and hardware reset.

Solution is to define the digest in an identity mapped region by
kmalloc'ing
it.  We can do this once as part of the endpoint structure and re-use it
when
verifying the SCTP cookie.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[SCTP]: Fix bad sysctl formatting of SCTP timeout values on 64-bit m/cs.</title>
<updated>2006-01-17T19:55:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-17T19:55:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8116ffad4180b39d7a755345c1fde09da83930c0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8116ffad4180b39d7a755345c1fde09da83930c0</id>
<content type='text'>
Change all the structure members that hold jiffies to be of type
unsigned long.  This also corrects bad sysctl formating on 64 bit
architectures.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[SCTP]: Fix sctp_cookie alignment in the packet.</title>
<updated>2006-01-17T19:52:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-17T19:52:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9834a2bb4970547540222fcba04e0a37d04cb0a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9834a2bb4970547540222fcba04e0a37d04cb0a0</id>
<content type='text'>
On 64 bit architectures, sctp_cookie sent as part of INIT-ACK is not
aligned on a 64 bit boundry and thus causes unaligned access exceptions.

The layout of the cookie prameter is this:
|&lt;----- Parameter Header --------------------|&lt;--- Cookie DATA --------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
| param type (16 bits) | param len (16 bits) | sig [32 bytes] | cookie..
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

The cookie data portion contains 64 bit values on 64 bit architechtures
(timeval) that fall on a 32 bit alignment boundry when used as part of
the on-wire format, but align correctly when used in internal
structures.  This patch explicitely pads the on-wire format so that
it is properly aligned.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[NET]: Use NIP6_FMT in kernel.h</title>
<updated>2006-01-13T22:29:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-13T22:29:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=46b86a2da0fd14bd49765330df63a62279833acb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:46b86a2da0fd14bd49765330df63a62279833acb</id>
<content type='text'>
There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIP6 strings.
	ie: net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c

There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIPQUAD strings too.
	ie: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c

This patch:
	adds NIP6_FMT to kernel.h
	changes all code to use NIP6_FMT
	fixes net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
	adds NIPQUAD_FMT to kernel.h
	fixes net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c
	changes a few uses of "%u.%u.%u.%u" to NIPQUAD_FMT for symmetry to NIP6_FMT

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
