<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include/net/ip.h, branch linux-5.8.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.8.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.8.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-10-29T09:07:02+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv4: always honour route mtu during forwarding</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T09:07:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej Żenczykowski</name>
<email>maze@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-23T20:18:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f736e9e2f7502775c1fc03d22107a65adf0edc90'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f736e9e2f7502775c1fc03d22107a65adf0edc90</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 02a1b175b0e92d9e0fa5df3957ade8d733ceb6a0 ]

Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt:46 says:
  ip_forward_use_pmtu - BOOLEAN
    By default we don't trust protocol path MTUs while forwarding
    because they could be easily forged and can lead to unwanted
    fragmentation by the router.
    You only need to enable this if you have user-space software
    which tries to discover path mtus by itself and depends on the
    kernel honoring this information. This is normally not the case.
    Default: 0 (disabled)
    Possible values:
    0 - disabled
    1 - enabled

Which makes it pretty clear that setting it to 1 is a potential
security/safety/DoS issue, and yet it is entirely reasonable to want
forwarded traffic to honour explicitly administrator configured
route mtus (instead of defaulting to device mtu).

Indeed, I can't think of a single reason why you wouldn't want to.
Since you configured a route mtu you probably know better...

It is pretty common to have a higher device mtu to allow receiving
large (jumbo) frames, while having some routes via that interface
(potentially including the default route to the internet) specify
a lower mtu.

Note that ipv6 forwarding uses device mtu unless the route is locked
(in which case it will use the route mtu).

This approach is not usable for IPv4 where an 'mtu lock' on a route
also has the side effect of disabling TCP path mtu discovery via
disabling the IPv4 DF (don't frag) bit on all outgoing frames.

I'm not aware of a way to lock a route from an IPv6 RA, so that also
potentially seems wrong.

Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sunmeet Gill (Sunny) &lt;sgill@quicinc.com&gt;
Cc: Vinay Paradkar &lt;vparadka@qti.qualcomm.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Wear &lt;twear@quicinc.com&gt;
Cc: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: add ip_sock_set_pktinfo</title>
<updated>2020-05-28T18:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T05:12:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c1f9ec5776dd05eaf62cf6788ecdfc905dc8ec2b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c1f9ec5776dd05eaf62cf6788ecdfc905dc8ec2b</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a helper to directly set the IP_PKTINFO sockopt from kernel
space without going through a fake uaccess.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: add ip_sock_set_mtu_discover</title>
<updated>2020-05-28T18:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T05:12:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2de569bda2a66d1308ad3f205bb29cf4f95f5636'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2de569bda2a66d1308ad3f205bb29cf4f95f5636</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a helper to directly set the IP_MTU_DISCOVER sockopt from kernel
space without going through a fake uaccess.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt; [rxrpc bits]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: add ip_sock_set_recverr</title>
<updated>2020-05-28T18:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T05:12:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=db45c0ef258ef6c7ef3c1b8ea9e06e133e083c27'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db45c0ef258ef6c7ef3c1b8ea9e06e133e083c27</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a helper to directly set the IP_RECVERR sockopt from kernel space
without going through a fake uaccess.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: add ip_sock_set_freebind</title>
<updated>2020-05-28T18:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T05:12:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c4e446bf5a06a1db24b4f0115a89f0380a495c62'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4e446bf5a06a1db24b4f0115a89f0380a495c62</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a helper to directly set the IP_FREEBIND sockopt from kernel space
without going through a fake uaccess.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: add ip_sock_set_tos</title>
<updated>2020-05-28T18:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T05:12:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6ebf71bab9fb476fc8132be4c12b88201278f0ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6ebf71bab9fb476fc8132be4c12b88201278f0ca</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a helper to directly set the IP_TOS sockopt from kernel space without
going through a fake uaccess.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagi@grimberg.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: protect against too small mtu values.</title>
<updated>2019-12-07T19:55:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-06T04:43:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=501a90c945103e8627406763dac418f20f3837b2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:501a90c945103e8627406763dac418f20f3837b2</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot was once again able to crash a host by setting a very small mtu
on loopback device.

Let's make inetdev_valid_mtu() available in include/net/ip.h,
and use it in ip_setup_cork(), so that we protect both ip_append_page()
and __ip_append_data()

Also add a READ_ONCE() when the device mtu is read.

Pairs this lockless read with one WRITE_ONCE() in __dev_set_mtu(),
even if other code paths might write over this field.

Add a big comment in include/linux/netdevice.h about dev-&gt;mtu
needing READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Hopefully we will add the missing ones in followup patches.

[1]

refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9464 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 9464 Comm: syz-executor850 Not tainted 5.4.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 panic+0x2e3/0x75c kernel/panic.c:221
 __warn.cold+0x2f/0x3e kernel/panic.c:582
 report_bug+0x289/0x300 lib/bug.c:195
 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline]
 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:169 [inline]
 do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:267
 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:286
 invalid_op+0x23/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1027
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22
Code: 06 31 ff 89 de e8 c8 f5 e6 fd 84 db 0f 85 6f ff ff ff e8 7b f4 e6 fd 48 c7 c7 e0 71 4f 88 c6 05 56 a6 a4 06 01 e8 c7 a8 b7 fd &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 50 ff ff ff e8 5c f4 e6 fd 0f b6 1d 3d a6 a4 06 31 ff 89
RSP: 0018:ffff88809689f550 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815e4336 RDI: ffffed1012d13e9c
RBP: ffff88809689f560 R08: ffff88809c50a3c0 R09: fffffbfff15d31b1
R10: fffffbfff15d31b0 R11: ffffffff8ae98d87 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000040100 R14: ffff888099041104 R15: ffff888218d96e40
 refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:193 [inline]
 skb_set_owner_w+0x2b6/0x410 net/core/sock.c:1999
 sock_wmalloc+0xf1/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2096
 ip_append_page+0x7ef/0x1190 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1383
 udp_sendpage+0x1c7/0x480 net/ipv4/udp.c:1276
 inet_sendpage+0xdb/0x150 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:821
 kernel_sendpage+0x92/0xf0 net/socket.c:3794
 sock_sendpage+0x8b/0xc0 net/socket.c:936
 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2da/0x3c0 fs/splice.c:458
 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:512 [inline]
 __splice_from_pipe+0x3ee/0x7c0 fs/splice.c:636
 splice_from_pipe+0x108/0x170 fs/splice.c:671
 generic_splice_sendpage+0x3c/0x50 fs/splice.c:842
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:861 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0x123/0x190 fs/splice.c:1035
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x3b4/0xa30 fs/splice.c:990
 do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1078
 do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1464
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1525 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1511 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1dd/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1511
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x441409
Code: e8 ac e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffb64c4f78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441409
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000073b8a R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000010001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000402180
R13: 0000000000402210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..

Fixes: 1470ddf7f8ce ("inet: Remove explicit write references to sk/inet in ip_append_data")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: inet_is_local_reserved_port() port arg should be unsigned short</title>
<updated>2019-11-26T23:15:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej Żenczykowski</name>
<email>maze@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-26T22:44:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=66e2f5f7c7728862e9394769722231b9ce3d8672'/>
<id>urn:sha1:66e2f5f7c7728862e9394769722231b9ce3d8672</id>
<content type='text'>
Any argument outside of that range would result in an out of bound
memory access, since the accessed array is 65536 bits long.

Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: port &lt; inet_prot_sock(net) --&gt; inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port)</title>
<updated>2019-11-26T21:20:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej Żenczykowski</name>
<email>maze@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-25T23:37:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=82f31ebf61bed3077c9935308e0a4b6c44842c5a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82f31ebf61bed3077c9935308e0a4b6c44842c5a</id>
<content type='text'>
Note that the sysctl write accessor functions guarantee that:
  net-&gt;ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock &lt;= net-&gt;ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0]
invariant is maintained, and as such the max() in selinux hooks is actually spurious.

ie. even though
  if (snum &lt; max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) || snum &gt; high) {
per logic is the same as
  if ((snum &lt; inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) &amp;&amp; snum &lt; low) || snum &gt; high) {
it is actually functionally equivalent to:
  if (snum &lt; low || snum &gt; high) {
which is equivalent to:
  if (snum &lt; inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) || snum &lt; low || snum &gt; high) {
even though the first clause is spurious.

But we want to hold on to it in case we ever want to change what what
inet_port_requires_bind_service() means (for example by changing
it from a, by default, [0..1024) range to some sort of set).

Test: builds, git 'grep inet_prot_sock' finds no other references
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: inet_is_local_reserved_port() should return bool not int</title>
<updated>2019-11-23T00:52:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej Żenczykowski</name>
<email>maze@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-22T21:50:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=30429fba99b51836ea8a11174be95ddaa8c47703'/>
<id>urn:sha1:30429fba99b51836ea8a11174be95ddaa8c47703</id>
<content type='text'>
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
