<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include/linux, branch v5.15.45</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.45</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.45'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2022-06-06T06:43:37+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>pipe: make poll_usage boolean and annotate its access</title>
<updated>2022-06-06T06:43:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.co.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-29T21:38:01+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e6acf868ff0e09efd0a4bee109989640ac792ccf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f485922d8fe4e44f6d52a5bb95a603b7c65554bb upstream.

Patch series "Fix data-races around epoll reported by KCSAN."

This series suppresses a false positive KCSAN's message and fixes a real
data-race.


This patch (of 2):

pipe_poll() runs locklessly and assigns 1 to poll_usage.  Once poll_usage
is set to 1, it never changes in other places.  However, concurrent writes
of a value trigger KCSAN, so let's make KCSAN happy.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in pipe_poll / pipe_poll

write to 0xffff8880042f6678 of 4 bytes by task 174 on cpu 3:
 pipe_poll (fs/pipe.c:656)
 ep_item_poll.isra.0 (./include/linux/poll.h:88 fs/eventpoll.c:853)
 do_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:1692 fs/eventpoll.c:1806 fs/eventpoll.c:2234)
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:2246 fs/eventpoll.c:2241 fs/eventpoll.c:2241)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113)

write to 0xffff8880042f6678 of 4 bytes by task 177 on cpu 1:
 pipe_poll (fs/pipe.c:656)
 ep_item_poll.isra.0 (./include/linux/poll.h:88 fs/eventpoll.c:853)
 do_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:1692 fs/eventpoll.c:1806 fs/eventpoll.c:2234)
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:2246 fs/eventpoll.c:2241 fs/eventpoll.c:2241)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113)

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 177 Comm: epoll_race Not tainted 5.17.0-58927-gf443e374ae13 #6
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.amzn2 04/01/2014

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220322002653.33865-1-kuniyu@amazon.co.jp
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220322002653.33865-2-kuniyu@amazon.co.jp
Fixes: 3b844826b6c6 ("pipe: avoid unnecessary EPOLLET wakeups under normal loads")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexander.h.duyck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuni1840@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Soheil Hassas Yeganeh" &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Sridhar Samudrala" &lt;sridhar.samudrala@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-14T11:59:30+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:64cb7f01ddd289fefbd2a8051c288aaf5d50a9c7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ad7dd882e45d7fe432c32e896e2aaa0b21746ea upstream.

randomize_page is an mm function. It is documented like one. It contains
the history of one. It has the naming convention of one. It looks
just like another very similar function in mm, randomize_stack_top().
And it has always been maintained and updated by mm people. There is no
need for it to be in random.c. In the "which shape does not look like
the other ones" test, pointing to randomize_page() is correct.

So move randomize_page() into mm/util.c, right next to the similar
randomize_stack_top() function.

This commit contains no actual code changes.

Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: make consistent use of buf and len</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T11:18:46+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:542a60612d2ab0146eec2ed5a0e971ccf7ae658b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a19402634c435a4eae226df53c141cdbb9922e7b upstream.

The current code was a mix of "nbytes", "count", "size", "buffer", "in",
and so forth. Instead, let's clean this up by naming input parameters
"buf" (or "ubuf") and "len", so that you always understand that you're
reading this variety of function argument.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T10:32:23+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:29ed26a33436bb4bbfff5189a4cf3e34863d77dd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c3a8a1db5e03d02cc0abb3357a84b8b326dfac3 upstream.

Before these were returning signed values, but the API is intended to be
used with unsigned values.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: remove extern from functions in header</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T10:29:38+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:55729575eaa990f5881891b5a2b9c0fec0ec24ea</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7782cfeca7d420e8bb707613d4cfb0f7ff29bb3a upstream.

Accoriding to the kernel style guide, having `extern` on functions in
headers is old school and deprecated, and doesn't add anything. So remove
them from random.h, and tidy up the file a little bit too.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-05T00:20:22+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:11cce5040c29485f0891e4c2278c5a9d3e65a80e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2f14062bb14b0fcfcc21e6dc7d5b5c0d25966164 upstream.

Currently, start_kernel() adds latent entropy and the command line to
the entropy bool *after* the RNG has been initialized, deferring when
it's actually used by things like stack canaries until the next time
the pool is seeded. This surely is not intended.

Rather than splitting up which entropy gets added where and when between
start_kernel() and random_init(), just do everything in random_init(),
which should eliminate these kinds of bugs in the future.

While we're at it, rename the awkwardly titled "rand_initialize()" to
the more standard "random_init()" nomenclature.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-07T12:03:46+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f4cb809a90df1daeaab4e65ae2064918575b4e6d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e73aaae2fa9024832e1f42e30c787c7baf61d014 upstream.

The SipHash family of permutations is currently used in three places:

- siphash.c itself, used in the ordinary way it was intended.
- random32.c, in a construction from an anonymous contributor.
- random.c, as part of its fast_mix function.

Each one of these places reinvents the wheel with the same C code, same
rotation constants, and same symmetry-breaking constants.

This commit tidies things up a bit by placing macros for the
permutations and constants into siphash.h, where each of the three .c
users can access them. It also leaves a note dissuading more users of
them from emerging.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-10T14:49:50+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:82f182812f1772ee0d56e82f03f5c252b2bd2140</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1366992e16bddd5e2d9a561687f367f9f802e2e4 upstream.

The addition of random_get_entropy_fallback() provides access to
whichever time source has the highest frequency, which is useful for
gathering entropy on platforms without available cycle counters. It's
not necessarily as good as being able to quickly access a cycle counter
that the CPU has, but it's still something, even when it falls back to
being jiffies-based.

In the event that a given arch does not define get_cycles(), falling
back to the get_cycles() default implementation that returns 0 is really
not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling
random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always
needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually.
It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision
or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all
the time is better than returning zero all the time.

Finally, since random_get_entropy_fallback() is used during extremely
early boot when randomizing freelists in mm_init(), it can be called
before timekeeping has been initialized. In that case there really is
nothing we can do; jiffies hasn't even started ticking yet. So just give
up and return 0.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-08T16:14:57+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8b373c113a4caccfb99579f16d2faa63b251737b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b0c3e796f24b588b862b61ce235d3c9417dc8983 upstream.

Some implementations were returning type `unsigned long`, while others
that fell back to get_cycles() were implicitly returning a `cycles_t` or
an untyped constant int literal. That makes for weird and confusing
code, and basically all code in the kernel already handled it like it
was an `unsigned long`. I recently tried to handle it as the largest
type it could be, a `cycles_t`, but doing so doesn't really help with
much.

Instead let's just make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long all
the time. This also matches the commonly used `arch_get_random_long()`
function, so now RDRAND and RDTSC return the same sized integer, which
means one can fallback to the other more gracefully.

Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:29:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-01T19:03:49+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6da877d2d46ba59a65352061cafbdac790cb8d68</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5acd35487dc911541672b3ffc322851769c32a56 upstream.

We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only
has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard
atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also
unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional
builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification
handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but
given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this
anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the
simplification we receive here.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
[Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
