<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.9.276</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.276</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.276'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:21:09+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>power: supply: ab8500: Fix an old bug</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:21:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Walleij</name>
<email>linus.walleij@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-26T23:47:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ac4e43703809d2d6aa4d74b71de7c8024c68470b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ac4e43703809d2d6aa4d74b71de7c8024c68470b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f1c74a6c07e76fcb31a4bcc1f437c4361a2674ce upstream.

Trying to get the AB8500 charging driver working I ran into a bit
of bitrot: we haven't used the driver for a while so errors in
refactorings won't be noticed.

This one is pretty self evident: use argument to the macro or we
end up with a random pointer to something else.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marcus Cooper &lt;codekipper@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 297d716f6260 ("power_supply: Change ownership from driver to core")
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel &lt;sebastian.reichel@collabora.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: Fix implicit truncation warning in prandom_seed_state()</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:21:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Fitzgerald</name>
<email>rf@opensource.cirrus.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-25T12:20:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fe956b8a6395b3f8d77260195e7766b464cf0267'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe956b8a6395b3f8d77260195e7766b464cf0267</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d327ea15a305024ef0085252fa3657bbb1ce25f5 ]

sparse generates the following warning:

 include/linux/prandom.h:114:45: sparse: sparse: cast truncates bits from
 constant value

This is because the 64-bit seed value is manipulated and then placed in a
u32, causing an implicit cast and truncation. A forced cast to u32 doesn't
prevent this warning, which is reasonable because a typecast doesn't prove
that truncation was expected.

Logical-AND the value with 0xffffffff to make explicit that truncation to
32-bit is intended.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald &lt;rf@opensource.cirrus.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525122012.6336-3-rf@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, futex: fix shared futex pgoff on shmem huge page</title>
<updated>2021-07-11T10:46:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-25T01:39:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c52e6f64804267cc8c9f26ab41588eeeae6fb9a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c52e6f64804267cc8c9f26ab41588eeeae6fb9a7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fe19bd3dae3d15d2fbfdb3de8839a6ea0fe94264 ]

If more than one futex is placed on a shmem huge page, it can happen
that waking the second wakes the first instead, and leaves the second
waiting: the key's shared.pgoff is wrong.

When 3.11 commit 13d60f4b6ab5 ("futex: Take hugepages into account when
generating futex_key"), the only shared huge pages came from hugetlbfs,
and the code added to deal with its exceptional page-&gt;index was put into
hugetlb source.  Then that was missed when 4.8 added shmem huge pages.

page_to_pgoff() is what others use for this nowadays: except that, as
currently written, it gives the right answer on hugetlbfs head, but
nonsense on hugetlbfs tails.  Fix that by calling hugetlbfs-specific
hugetlb_basepage_index() on PageHuge tails as well as on head.

Yes, it's unconventional to declare hugetlb_basepage_index() there in
pagemap.h, rather than in hugetlb.h; but I do not expect anything but
page_to_pgoff() ever to need it.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: give hugetlb_basepage_index() prototype the correct scope]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b17d946b-d09-326e-b42a-52884c36df32@google.com
Fixes: 800d8c63b2e9 ("shmem: add huge pages support")
Reported-by: Neel Natu &lt;neelnatu@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Zhang Yi &lt;wetpzy@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;

Note on stable backport: leave redundant #include &lt;linux/hugetlb.h&gt;
in kernel/futex.c, to avoid conflict over the header files included.
Resolved trivial conflicts in include/linux/hugetlb.h.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: add VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE() macro</title>
<updated>2021-07-11T10:46:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alex Shi</name>
<email>alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-18T22:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2b123e354eff9d24a5e27efb2cb70f2720509f92'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2b123e354eff9d24a5e27efb2cb70f2720509f92</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a4055888629bc0467d12d912cd7c90acdf3d9b12 part ]

Add VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE() macro.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1604283436-18880-3-git-send-email-alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi &lt;alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;

Note on stable backport: original commit was titled
mm/memcg: warning on !memcg after readahead page charged
which included uses of this macro in mm/memcontrol.c: here omitted.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/linux/mmdebug.h: make VM_WARN* non-rvals</title>
<updated>2021-07-11T10:46:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Hocko</name>
<email>mhocko@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-05T23:25:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=88a899fa2032b34ef3ac5dae3c70c8394fa5287c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88a899fa2032b34ef3ac5dae3c70c8394fa5287c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91241681c62a5a690c88eb2aca027f094125eaac ]

At present the construct

	if (VM_WARN(...))

will compile OK with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y and will fail with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=n.  The reason is that VM_{WARN,BUG}* have always been
special wrt.  {WARN/BUG}* and never generate any code when DEBUG_VM is
disabled.  So we cannot really use it in conditionals.

We considered changing things so that this construct works in both cases
but that might cause unwanted code generation with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=n.
It is safer and simpler to make the build fail in both cases.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: changelog]
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: hwpoison: change PageHWPoison behavior on hugetlb pages</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Naoya Horiguchi</name>
<email>n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-10T22:47:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3c5c213e0668b03723128625f16ea24d4f7d732a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3c5c213e0668b03723128625f16ea24d4f7d732a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b37ff71cc626a0c1b5e098ff9a0b723815f6aaeb ]

We'd like to narrow down the error region in memory error on hugetlb
pages.  However, currently we set PageHWPoison flags on all subpages in
the error hugepage and add # of subpages to num_hwpoison_pages, which
doesn't fit our purpose.

So this patch changes the behavior and we only set PageHWPoison on the
head page then increase num_hwpoison_pages only by 1.  This is a
preparation for narrow-down part which comes in later patches.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-4-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: usbhid: fix info leak in hid_submit_ctrl</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anirudh Rayabharam</name>
<email>mail@anirudhrb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-25T17:33:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=41b1e71a2c57366b08dcca1a28b0d45ca69429ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:41b1e71a2c57366b08dcca1a28b0d45ca69429ce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6be388f4a35d2ce5ef7dbf635a8964a5da7f799f ]

In hid_submit_ctrl(), the way of calculating the report length doesn't
take into account that report-&gt;size can be zero. When running the
syzkaller reproducer, a report of size 0 causes hid_submit_ctrl) to
calculate transfer_buffer_length as 16384. When this urb is passed to
the usb core layer, KMSAN reports an info leak of 16384 bytes.

To fix this, first modify hid_report_len() to account for the zero
report size case by using DIV_ROUND_UP for the division. Then, call it
from hid_submit_ctrl().

Reported-by: syzbot+7c2bb71996f95a82524c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Rayabharam &lt;mail@anirudhrb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires &lt;benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: fix previous commit for 32-bit builds</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:36:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T05:49:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ea1d322cbfc2cb2bbae04f6e05c2a1aa0e623fbf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ea1d322cbfc2cb2bbae04f6e05c2a1aa0e623fbf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4422829e8053068e0225e4d0ef42dc41ea7c9ef5 upstream.

array_index_nospec does not work for uint64_t on 32-bit builds.
However, the size of a memory slot must be less than 20 bits wide
on those system, since the memory slot must fit in the user
address space.  So just store it in an unsigned long.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: avoid speculation-based attacks from out-of-range memslot accesses</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:36:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-08T19:31:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=740621309b25bbf619b8a0ba5fd50a8e58989441'/>
<id>urn:sha1:740621309b25bbf619b8a0ba5fd50a8e58989441</id>
<content type='text'>
commit da27a83fd6cc7780fea190e1f5c19e87019da65c upstream.

KVM's mechanism for accessing guest memory translates a guest physical
address (gpa) to a host virtual address using the right-shifted gpa
(also known as gfn) and a struct kvm_memory_slot.  The translation is
performed in __gfn_to_hva_memslot using the following formula:

      hva = slot-&gt;userspace_addr + (gfn - slot-&gt;base_gfn) * PAGE_SIZE

It is expected that gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory.  However, a guest can access invalid physical addresses
in such a way that the gfn is invalid.

__gfn_to_hva_memslot is called from kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot, which first
retrieves a memslot through __gfn_to_memslot.  While __gfn_to_memslot
does check that the gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory or not, a CPU can speculate the result of the check and
continue execution speculatively using an illegal gfn. The speculation
can result in calculating an out-of-bounds hva.  If the resulting host
virtual address is used to load another guest physical address, this
is effectively a Spectre gadget consisting of two consecutive reads,
the second of which is data dependent on the first.

Right now it's not clear if there are any cases in which this is
exploitable.  One interesting case was reported by the original author
of this patch, and involves visiting guest page tables on x86.  Right
now these are not vulnerable because the hva read goes through get_user(),
which contains an LFENCE speculation barrier.  However, there are
patches in progress for x86 uaccess.h to mask kernel addresses instead of
using LFENCE; once these land, a guest could use speculation to read
from the VMM's ring 3 address space.  Other architectures such as ARM
already use the address masking method, and would be susceptible to
this same kind of data-dependent access gadgets.  Therefore, this patch
proactively protects from these attacks by masking out-of-bounds gfns
in __gfn_to_hva_memslot, which blocks speculation of invalid hvas.

Sean Christopherson noted that this patch does not cover
kvm_read_guest_offset_cached.  This however is limited to a few bytes
past the end of the cache, and therefore it is unlikely to be useful in
the context of building a chain of data dependent accesses.

Reported-by: Artemiy Margaritov &lt;artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Artemiy Margaritov &lt;artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: usb: cdc_ncm: don't spew notifications</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:42:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Grant Grundler</name>
<email>grundler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-20T01:12:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7246d9cfe11b818c35bfb6780ef319e3298f0bd2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7246d9cfe11b818c35bfb6780ef319e3298f0bd2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit de658a195ee23ca6aaffe197d1d2ea040beea0a2 ]

RTL8156 sends notifications about every 32ms.
Only display/log notifications when something changes.

This issue has been reported by others:
	https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1832472
	https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/1083

...
[785962.779840] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd
[785962.929944] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0bda, idProduct=8156, bcdDevice=30.00
[785962.929949] usb 1-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=6
[785962.929952] usb 1-1: Product: USB 10/100/1G/2.5G LAN
[785962.929954] usb 1-1: Manufacturer: Realtek
[785962.929956] usb 1-1: SerialNumber: 000000001
[785962.991755] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_ether
[785963.017068] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0: MAC-Address: 00:24:27:88:08:15
[785963.017072] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0: setting rx_max = 16384
[785963.017169] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0: setting tx_max = 16384
[785963.017682] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 usb0: register 'cdc_ncm' at usb-0000:00:14.0-1, CDC NCM, 00:24:27:88:08:15
[785963.019211] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_ncm
[785963.023856] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_wdm
[785963.025461] usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_mbim
[785963.038824] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: renamed from usb0
[785963.089586] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: disconnected
[785963.121673] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: disconnected
[785963.153682] cdc_ncm 1-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: disconnected
...

This is about 2KB per second and will overwrite all contents of a 1MB
dmesg buffer in under 10 minutes rendering them useless for debugging
many kernel problems.

This is also an extra 180 MB/day in /var/logs (or 1GB per week) rendering
the majority of those logs useless too.

When the link is up (expected state), spew amount is &gt;2x higher:
...
[786139.600992] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: connected
[786139.632997] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: 2500 mbit/s downlink 2500 mbit/s uplink
[786139.665097] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: connected
[786139.697100] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: 2500 mbit/s downlink 2500 mbit/s uplink
[786139.729094] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: network connection: connected
[786139.761108] cdc_ncm 2-1:2.0 enx002427880815: 2500 mbit/s downlink 2500 mbit/s uplink
...

Chrome OS cannot support RTL8156 until this is fixed.

Signed-off-by: Grant Grundler &lt;grundler@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hayes Wang &lt;hayeswang@realtek.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210120011208.3768105-1-grundler@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
