<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.4.87</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.87</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.87'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-09-02T05:06:51+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>lightnvm: initialize ppa_addr in dev_to_generic_addr()</title>
<updated>2017-09-02T05:06:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Javier González</name>
<email>javier@cnexlabs.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-07T07:54:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5acdbe667cf467cefb8fc13ded0ecca58dd9a761'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5acdbe667cf467cefb8fc13ded0ecca58dd9a761</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5389a1dfb39786df08d4f6a482bd2734b1b50e33 upstream.

The -&gt;reserved bit is not initialized when allocated on stack.
This may lead targets to misinterpret the PPA as cached.

Signed-off-by: Javier González &lt;javier@cnexlabs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matias Bjørling &lt;m@bjorling.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pids: make task_tgid_nr_ns() safe</title>
<updated>2017-08-25T00:02:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-21T15:35:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b4cf49024cf412a94121e61f8056636c557ead98'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b4cf49024cf412a94121e61f8056636c557ead98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dd1c1f2f2028a7b851f701fc6a8ebe39dcb95e7c upstream.

This was reported many times, and this was even mentioned in commit
52ee2dfdd4f5 ("pids: refactor vnr/nr_ns helpers to make them safe") but
somehow nobody bothered to fix the obvious problem: task_tgid_nr_ns() is
not safe because task-&gt;group_leader points to nowhere after the exiting
task passes exit_notify(), rcu_read_lock() can not help.

We really need to change __unhash_process() to nullify group_leader,
parent, and real_parent, but this needs some cleanups.  Until then we
can turn task_tgid_nr_ns() into another user of __task_pid_nr_ns() and
fix the problem.

Reported-by: Troy Kensinger &lt;tkensinger@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpuset: fix a deadlock due to incomplete patching of cpusets_enabled()</title>
<updated>2017-08-16T20:40:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dima Zavin</name>
<email>dmitriyz@waymo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-02T20:32:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=97e371409da76ebe3282c0ba8bc86a84efc3694c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97e371409da76ebe3282c0ba8bc86a84efc3694c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 89affbf5d9ebb15c6460596822e8857ea2f9e735 upstream.

In codepaths that use the begin/retry interface for reading
mems_allowed_seq with irqs disabled, there exists a race condition that
stalls the patch process after only modifying a subset of the
static_branch call sites.

This problem manifested itself as a deadlock in the slub allocator,
inside get_any_partial.  The loop reads mems_allowed_seq value (via
read_mems_allowed_begin), performs the defrag operation, and then
verifies the consistency of mem_allowed via the read_mems_allowed_retry
and the cookie returned by xxx_begin.

The issue here is that both begin and retry first check if cpusets are
enabled via cpusets_enabled() static branch.  This branch can be
rewritted dynamically (via cpuset_inc) if a new cpuset is created.  The
x86 jump label code fully synchronizes across all CPUs for every entry
it rewrites.  If it rewrites only one of the callsites (specifically the
one in read_mems_allowed_retry) and then waits for the
smp_call_function(do_sync_core) to complete while a CPU is inside the
begin/retry section with IRQs off and the mems_allowed value is changed,
we can hang.

This is because begin() will always return 0 (since it wasn't patched
yet) while retry() will test the 0 against the actual value of the seq
counter.

The fix is to use two different static keys: one for begin
(pre_enable_key) and one for retry (enable_key).  In cpuset_inc(), we
first bump the pre_enable key to ensure that cpuset_mems_allowed_begin()
always return a valid seqcount if are enabling cpusets.  Similarly, when
disabling cpusets via cpuset_dec(), we first ensure that callers of
cpuset_mems_allowed_retry() will start ignoring the seqcount value
before we let cpuset_mems_allowed_begin() return 0.

The relevant stack traces of the two stuck threads:

  CPU: 1 PID: 1415 Comm: mkdir Tainted: G L  4.9.36-00104-g540c51286237 #4
  Hardware name: Default string Default string/Hardware, BIOS 4.29.1-20170526215256 05/26/2017
  task: ffff8817f9c28000 task.stack: ffffc9000ffa4000
  RIP: smp_call_function_many+0x1f9/0x260
  Call Trace:
    smp_call_function+0x3b/0x70
    on_each_cpu+0x2f/0x90
    text_poke_bp+0x87/0xd0
    arch_jump_label_transform+0x93/0x100
    __jump_label_update+0x77/0x90
    jump_label_update+0xaa/0xc0
    static_key_slow_inc+0x9e/0xb0
    cpuset_css_online+0x70/0x2e0
    online_css+0x2c/0xa0
    cgroup_apply_control_enable+0x27f/0x3d0
    cgroup_mkdir+0x2b7/0x420
    kernfs_iop_mkdir+0x5a/0x80
    vfs_mkdir+0xf6/0x1a0
    SyS_mkdir+0xb7/0xe0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xad

  ...

  CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G L  4.9.36-00104-g540c51286237 #4
  Hardware name: Default string Default string/Hardware, BIOS 4.29.1-20170526215256 05/26/2017
  task: ffff8818087c0000 task.stack: ffffc90000030000
  RIP: int3+0x39/0x70
  Call Trace:
    &lt;#DB&gt; ? ___slab_alloc+0x28b/0x5a0
    &lt;EOE&gt; ? copy_process.part.40+0xf7/0x1de0
    __slab_alloc.isra.80+0x54/0x90
    copy_process.part.40+0xf7/0x1de0
    copy_process.part.40+0xf7/0x1de0
    kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x8a/0x280
    copy_process.part.40+0xf7/0x1de0
    _do_fork+0xe7/0x6c0
    _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2d/0x60
    trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x136/0x1d0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xad
    do_syscall_64+0x27/0x350
    SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
    do_syscall_64+0x60/0x350
    entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170731040113.14197-1-dmitriyz@waymo.com
Fixes: 46e700abc44c ("mm, page_alloc: remove unnecessary taking of a seqlock when cpusets are disabled")
Signed-off-by: Dima Zavin &lt;dmitriyz@waymo.com&gt;
Reported-by: Cliff Spradlin &lt;cspradlin@waymo.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Christopher Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>workqueue: implicit ordered attribute should be overridable</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:09:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-23T12:36:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=34a08ae493f1970d5ce80dd3812b8dba4e5cbe22'/>
<id>urn:sha1:34a08ae493f1970d5ce80dd3812b8dba4e5cbe22</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a94efb5acbb6980d7c9ab604372d93cd507e4d8 upstream.

5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be
ordered") automatically enabled ordered attribute for unbound
workqueues w/ max_active == 1.  Because ordered workqueues reject
max_active and some attribute changes, this implicit ordered mode
broke cases where the user creates an unbound workqueue w/ max_active
== 1 and later explicitly changes the related attributes.

This patch distinguishes explicit and implicit ordered setting and
overrides from attribute changes if implict.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be ordered")
Cc: Holger Hoffstätte &lt;holger@applied-asynchrony.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: protect SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE from unintentional clearing.</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:08:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jamie Iles</name>
<email>jamie.iles@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-11T00:57:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bbe660db23e41647366039c1860cee0891fe9903'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bbe660db23e41647366039c1860cee0891fe9903</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d39b3cd34e6d323720d4c61bd714f5ae202c022 ]

Since commit 00cd5c37afd5 ("ptrace: permit ptracing of /sbin/init") we
can now trace init processes.  init is initially protected with
SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE which will prevent fatal signals such as SIGSTOP, but
there are a number of paths during tracing where SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE can
be implicitly cleared.

This can result in init becoming stoppable/killable after tracing.  For
example, running:

  while true; do kill -STOP 1; done &amp;
  strace -p 1

and then stopping strace and the kill loop will result in init being
left in state TASK_STOPPED.  Sending SIGCONT to init will resume it, but
init will now respond to future SIGSTOP signals rather than ignoring
them.

Make sure that when setting SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED
that we don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170104122017.25047-1-jamie.iles@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie.iles@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, slab: make sure that KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE will fit into MAX_ORDER</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:08:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Hocko</name>
<email>mhocko@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-11T00:57:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9c83b97bdeabfea1f9c51c1f505ee14f13e4c628'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9c83b97bdeabfea1f9c51c1f505ee14f13e4c628</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bb1107f7c6052c863692a41f78c000db792334bf ]

Andrey Konovalov has reported the following warning triggered by the
syzkaller fuzzer.

  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9935 at mm/page_alloc.c:3511 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x159c/0x1e20
  Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
  CPU: 1 PID: 9935 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.9.0-rc7+ #34
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    __alloc_pages_slowpath mm/page_alloc.c:3511
    __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x159c/0x1e20 mm/page_alloc.c:3781
    alloc_pages_current+0x1c7/0x6b0 mm/mempolicy.c:2072
    alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:469
    kmalloc_order+0x1f/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:1015
    kmalloc_order_trace+0x1f/0x160 mm/slab_common.c:1026
    kmalloc_large include/linux/slab.h:422
    __kmalloc+0x210/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:3723
    kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:495
    ep_write_iter+0x167/0xb50 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:664
    new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499
    __vfs_write+0x483/0x760 fs/read_write.c:512
    vfs_write+0x170/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560
    SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
    SyS_write+0xfb/0x230 fs/read_write.c:599
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

The issue is caused by a lack of size check for the request size in
ep_write_iter which should be fixed.  It, however, points to another
problem, that SLUB defines KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE too large because the its
KMALLOC_SHIFT_MAX is (MAX_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT) which means that the
resulting page allocator request might be MAX_ORDER which is too large
(see __alloc_pages_slowpath).

The same applies to the SLOB allocator which allows even larger sizes.
Make sure that they are capped properly and never request more than
MAX_ORDER order.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161220130659.16461-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, mprotect: flush TLB if potentially racing with a parallel reclaim leaving stale TLB entries</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:08:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mel Gorman</name>
<email>mgorman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-02T20:31:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f1181047ff29d4d4d364435040bd347eb54483ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f1181047ff29d4d4d364435040bd347eb54483ca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3ea277194daaeaa84ce75180ec7c7a2075027a68 upstream.

Stable note for 4.4: The upstream patch patches madvise(MADV_FREE) but 4.4
	does not have support for that feature. The changelog is left
	as-is but the hunk related to madvise is omitted from the backport.

Nadav Amit identified a theoritical race between page reclaim and
mprotect due to TLB flushes being batched outside of the PTL being held.

He described the race as follows:

        CPU0                            CPU1
        ----                            ----
                                        user accesses memory using RW PTE
                                        [PTE now cached in TLB]
        try_to_unmap_one()
        ==&gt; ptep_get_and_clear()
        ==&gt; set_tlb_ubc_flush_pending()
                                        mprotect(addr, PROT_READ)
                                        ==&gt; change_pte_range()
                                        ==&gt; [ PTE non-present - no flush ]

                                        user writes using cached RW PTE
        ...

        try_to_unmap_flush()

The same type of race exists for reads when protecting for PROT_NONE and
also exists for operations that can leave an old TLB entry behind such
as munmap, mremap and madvise.

For some operations like mprotect, it's not necessarily a data integrity
issue but it is a correctness issue as there is a window where an
mprotect that limits access still allows access.  For munmap, it's
potentially a data integrity issue although the race is massive as an
munmap, mmap and return to userspace must all complete between the
window when reclaim drops the PTL and flushes the TLB.  However, it's
theoritically possible so handle this issue by flushing the mm if
reclaim is potentially currently batching TLB flushes.

Other instances where a flush is required for a present pte should be ok
as either the page lock is held preventing parallel reclaim or a page
reference count is elevated preventing a parallel free leading to
corruption.  In the case of page_mkclean there isn't an obvious path
that userspace could take advantage of without using the operations that
are guarded by this patch.  Other users such as gup as a race with
reclaim looks just at PTEs.  huge page variants should be ok as they
don't race with reclaim.  mincore only looks at PTEs.  userfault also
should be ok as if a parallel reclaim takes place, it will either fault
the page back in or read some of the data before the flush occurs
triggering a fault.

Note that a variant of this patch was acked by Andy Lutomirski but this
was for the x86 parts on top of his PCID work which didn't make the 4.13
merge window as expected.  His ack is dropped from this version and
there will be a follow-on patch on top of PCID that will include his
ack.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comments]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix spello]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170717155523.emckq2esjro6hf3z@suse.de
Reported-by: Nadav Amit &lt;nadav.amit@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pstore: Allow prz to control need for locking</title>
<updated>2017-08-07T02:19:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Fernandes</name>
<email>joelaf@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-20T07:34:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=aca5b1e3c5b7e73f20b686ca712cb4cf9fccb219'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aca5b1e3c5b7e73f20b686ca712cb4cf9fccb219</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 663deb47880f2283809669563c5a52ac7c6aef1a upstream.

In preparation of not locking at all for certain buffers depending on if
there's contention, make locking optional depending on the initialization
of the prz.

Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes &lt;joelaf@google.com&gt;
[kees: moved locking flag into prz instead of via caller arguments]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces</title>
<updated>2017-08-07T02:19:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-14T18:22:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=14ae9c4b5ae235bdaa74bb1c40de9a42ca691566'/>
<id>urn:sha1:14ae9c4b5ae235bdaa74bb1c40de9a42ca691566</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34dbbcdbf63360661ff7bda6c5f52f99ac515f92 upstream.

A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
wrong for filesystem interfaces.

The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
technique.

So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
use the file open credentials, not the current ones.  Normal file
accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
any such options.

It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
the file, though.  Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
needs.

[sumits: this is used in Ubuntu as a fix for CVE-2015-8944]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dentry name snapshots</title>
<updated>2017-08-07T02:19:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-07T18:51:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=407669f2c9fe9f32aeb39f715d748fe456718aac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:407669f2c9fe9f32aeb39f715d748fe456718aac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e upstream.

take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified).  In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.

dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().

Intended use:
	struct name_snapshot s;

	take_dentry_name_snapshot(&amp;s, dentry);
	...
	access s.name
	...
	release_dentry_name_snapshot(&amp;s);

Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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