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<title>kernel/linux.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v6.18.21</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.18.21</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.18.21'/>
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<updated>2026-03-25T10:10:46+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:10:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-14T11:28:15+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a52e3970f971771b79950d38aa5479bcf5755a91</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream.

When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver
is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for
which the current domU is acting as a device model.

Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the
hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other
guests).

Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started
using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself
might result in violating the secure boot functionality.

This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be
tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option.

This is part of XSA-482

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'pull-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2025-10-03T18:14:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-03T18:14:02+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:33fc69a05c50f00f1218408a56348bcab95b831d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull d_name audit update from Al Viro:
 "Simplifying -&gt;d_name audits, easy part.

  Turn dentry-&gt;d_name into an anon union of const struct qsrt (d_name
  itself) and a writable alias (__d_name).

  With constification of some struct qstr * arguments of functions that
  get &amp;dentry-&gt;d_name passed to them, that ends up with all
  modifications provably done only in fs/dcache.c (and a fairly small
  part of it).

  Any new places doing modifications will be easy to find - grep for
  __d_name will suffice"

* tag 'pull-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  make it easier to catch those who try to modify -&gt;d_name
  generic_ci_validate_strict_name(): constify name argument
  afs_dir_search: constify qstr argument
  afs_edit_dir_{add,remove}(): constify qstr argument
  exfat_find(): constify qstr argument
  security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'audit-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit</title>
<updated>2025-09-30T15:22:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-30T15:22:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=56a0810d8ca406648fe01ec996ade1d61bf8ec8d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:56a0810d8ca406648fe01ec996ade1d61bf8ec8d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:

 - Proper audit support for multiple LSMs

   As the audit subsystem predated the work to enable multiple LSMs,
   some additional work was needed to support logging the different LSM
   labels for the subjects/tasks and objects on the system. Casey's
   patches add new auxillary records for subjects and objects that
   convey the additional labels.

 - Ensure fanotify audit events are always generated

   Generally speaking security relevant subsystems always generate audit
   events, unless explicitly ignored. However, up to this point fanotify
   events had been ignored by default, but starting with this pull
   request fanotify follows convention and generates audit events by
   default.

 - Replace an instance of strcpy() with strscpy()

 - Minor indentation, style, and comment fixes

* tag 'audit-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: fix skb leak when audit rate limit is exceeded
  audit: init ab-&gt;skb_list earlier in audit_buffer_alloc()
  audit: add record for multiple object contexts
  audit: add record for multiple task security contexts
  lsm: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection
  audit: create audit_stamp structure
  audit: add a missing tab
  audit: record fanotify event regardless of presence of rules
  audit: fix typo in auditfilter.c comment
  audit: Replace deprecated strcpy() with strscpy()
  audit: fix indentation in audit_log_exit()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument</title>
<updated>2025-09-16T01:08:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-05T02:25:18+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f9fadf23c7f1a0df72ef50a873e1bd3bd4631ec1</id>
<content type='text'>
Nothing outside of fs/dcache.c has any business modifying
dentry names; passing &amp;dentry-&gt;d_name as an argument should
have that argument declared as a const pointer.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt; # smack part
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>copy_process: pass clone_flags as u64 across calltree</title>
<updated>2025-09-01T13:31:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Simon Schuster</name>
<email>schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-01T13:09:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=edd3cb05c00a040dc72bed20b14b5ba865188bce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:edd3cb05c00a040dc72bed20b14b5ba865188bce</id>
<content type='text'>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.

While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.

Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of callees to
sys_clone3/copy_process (excluding the architecture-specific
copy_thread) to consistently pass clone_flags as u64, so that
no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on 32-bit architectures.

Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster &lt;schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-2-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection</title>
<updated>2025-08-30T14:15:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-16T17:28:57+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a59076f2669ec23a122549e1f4114e8d4255b632</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a parameter lsmid to security_lsmblob_to_secctx() to identify which
of the security modules that may be active should provide the security
context. If the value of lsmid is LSM_ID_UNDEF the first LSM providing
a hook is used. security_secid_to_secctx() is unchanged, and will
always report the first LSM providing a hook.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2025-07-29T01:20:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-29T01:20:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=30b9dcae9815ae7e752fe3aa00aa283fadf16c6a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:30b9dcae9815ae7e752fe3aa00aa283fadf16c6a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add Nicolas Bouchinet and Xiu Jianfeng as Lockdown maintainers

   The Lockdown LSM has been without a dedicated mantainer since its
   original acceptance upstream, and it has suffered as a result.
   Thankfully we have two new volunteers who together I believe have the
   background and desire to help ensure Lockdown is properly supported.

 - Remove the unused cap_mmap_file() declaration

* tag 'lsm-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  MAINTAINERS: Add Xiu and myself as Lockdown maintainers
  security: Remove unused declaration cap_mmap_file()
  lsm: trivial comment fix
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'vfs-6.17-rc1.fileattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2025-07-28T22:24:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-28T22:24:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=57fcb7d930d8f00f383e995aeebdcd2b416a187a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:57fcb7d930d8f00f383e995aeebdcd2b416a187a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull fileattr updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces the new file_getattr() and file_setattr() system calls
  after lengthy discussions.

  Both system calls serve as successors and extensible companions to
  the FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR system calls which have
  started to show their age in addition to being named in a way that
  makes it easy to conflate them with extended attribute related
  operations.

  These syscalls allow userspace to set filesystem inode attributes on
  special files. One of the usage examples is the XFS quota projects.

  XFS has project quotas which could be attached to a directory. All new
  inodes in these directories inherit project ID set on parent
  directory.

  The project is created from userspace by opening and calling
  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR on each inode. This is not possible for special
  files such as FIFO, SOCK, BLK etc. Therefore, some inodes are left
  with empty project ID. Those inodes then are not shown in the quota
  accounting but still exist in the directory. This is not critical but
  in the case when special files are created in the directory with
  already existing project quota, these new inodes inherit extended
  attributes. This creates a mix of special files with and without
  attributes. Moreover, special files with attributes don't have a
  possibility to become clear or change the attributes. This, in turn,
  prevents userspace from re-creating quota project on these existing
  files.

  In addition, these new system calls allow the implementation of
  additional attributes that we couldn't or didn't want to fit into the
  legacy ioctls anymore"

* tag 'vfs-6.17-rc1.fileattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  fs: tighten a sanity check in file_attr_to_fileattr()
  tree-wide: s/struct fileattr/struct file_kattr/g
  fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls
  fs: prepare for extending file_get/setattr()
  fs: make vfs_fileattr_[get|set] return -EOPNOTSUPP
  selinux: implement inode_file_[g|s]etattr hooks
  lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
  fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tree-wide: s/struct fileattr/struct file_kattr/g</title>
<updated>2025-07-04T14:14:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-03T07:36:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ca115d7e754691c0219eec95ec94dbac7f87daef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca115d7e754691c0219eec95ec94dbac7f87daef</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that we expose struct file_attr as our uapi struct rename all the
internal struct to struct file_kattr to clearly communicate that it is a
kernel internal struct. This is similar to struct mount_{k}attr and
others.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250703-restlaufzeit-baurecht-9ed44552b481@brauner
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr</title>
<updated>2025-07-01T20:44:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Albershteyn</name>
<email>aalbersh@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-30T16:20:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=defdd02d783c6fa22d0005bdc238ccd9174faf20'/>
<id>urn:sha1:defdd02d783c6fa22d0005bdc238ccd9174faf20</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).

Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn &lt;aalbersh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250630-xattrat-syscall-v6-2-c4e3bc35227b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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