kernel/linux.git/include/linux/sched, branch v5.10.86

shm: extend forced shm destroy to support objects from several IPC nses

2021-12-01T08:19:10+00:00

commit 85b6d24646e4125c591639841169baa98a2da503 upstream. Currently, the exit_shm() function not designed to work properly when task->sysvshm.shm_clist holds shm objects from different IPC namespaces. This is a real pain when sysctl kernel.shm_rmid_forced = 1, because it leads to use-after-free (reproducer exists). This is an attempt to fix the problem by extending exit_shm mechanism to handle shm's destroy from several IPC ns'es. To achieve that we do several things: 1. add a namespace (non-refcounted) pointer to the struct shmid_kernel 2. during new shm object creation (newseg()/shmget syscall) we initialize this pointer by current task IPC ns 3. exit_shm() fully reworked such that it traverses over all shp's in task->sysvshm.shm_clist and gets IPC namespace not from current task as it was before but from shp's object itself, then call shm_destroy(shp, ns). Note: We need to be really careful here, because as it was said before (1), our pointer to IPC ns non-refcnt'ed. To be on the safe side we using special helper get_ipc_ns_not_zero() which allows to get IPC ns refcounter only if IPC ns not in the "state of destruction". Q/A Q: Why can we access shp->ns memory using non-refcounted pointer? A: Because shp object lifetime is always shorther than IPC namespace lifetime, so, if we get shp object from the task->sysvshm.shm_clist while holding task_lock(task) nobody can steal our namespace. Q: Does this patch change semantics of unshare/setns/clone syscalls? A: No. It's just fixes non-covered case when process may leave IPC namespace without getting task->sysvshm.shm_clist list cleaned up. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/67bb03e5-f79c-1815-e2bf-949c67047418@colorfullife.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211109151501.4921-1-manfred@colorfullife.com Fixes: ab602f79915 ("shm: make exit_shm work proportional to task activity") Co-developed-by: Manfred Spraul Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: Greg KH Cc: Andrei Vagin Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov Cc: Vasily Averin Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid sched_task_group

2021-11-18T13:04:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4ef0c5c6b5ba1f38f0ea1cedad0cad722f00c14a ] There is a small race between copy_process() and sched_fork() where child->sched_task_group point to an already freed pointer. parent doing fork() | someone moving the parent | to another cgroup -------------------------------+------------------------------- copy_process() + dup_task_struct()<1> parent move to another cgroup, and free the old cgroup. <2> + sched_fork() + __set_task_cpu()<3> + task_fork_fair() + sched_slice()<4> In the worst case, this bug can lead to "use-after-free" and cause panic as shown above: (1) parent copy its sched_task_group to child at <1>; (2) someone move the parent to another cgroup and free the old cgroup at <2>; (3) the sched_task_group and cfs_rq that belong to the old cgroup will be accessed at <3> and <4>, which cause a panic: [] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 [] PGD 8000001fa0a86067 P4D 8000001fa0a86067 PUD 2029955067 PMD 0 [] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [] CPU: 7 PID: 648398 Comm: ebizzy Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE --------- - - 4.18.0.x86_64+ #1 [] RIP: 0010:sched_slice+0x84/0xc0 [] Call Trace: [] task_fork_fair+0x81/0x120 [] sched_fork+0x132/0x240 [] copy_process.part.5+0x675/0x20e0 [] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x63f/0x690 [] _do_fork+0xcd/0x3b0 [] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca [] RIP: 0033:0x7f04418cd7e1 Between cgroup_can_fork() and cgroup_post_fork(), the cgroup membership and thus sched_task_group can't change. So update child's sched_task_group at sched_post_fork() and move task_fork() and __set_task_cpu() (where accees the sched_task_group) from sched_fork() to sched_post_fork(). Fixes: 8323f26ce342 ("sched: Fix race in task_group") Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Tejun Heo Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210915064030.2231-1-zhangqiao22@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

task_stack: Fix end_of_stack() for architectures with upwards-growing stack

2021-11-18T13:04:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9cc2fa4f4a92ccc6760d764e7341be46ee8aaaa1 ] The function end_of_stack() returns a pointer to the last entry of a stack. For architectures like parisc where the stack grows upwards return the pointer to the highest address in the stack. Without this change I faced a crash on parisc, because the stackleak functionality wrote STACKLEAK_POISON to the lowest address and thus overwrote the first 4 bytes of the task_struct which included the TIF_FLAGS. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow

2021-07-20T14:05:50+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2beb4a53fc3f1081cedc1c1a198c7f56cc4fc60c ] The kernel pushes context on to the userspace stack to prepare for the user's signal handler. When the user has supplied an alternate signal stack, via sigaltstack(2), it is easy for the kernel to verify that the stack size is sufficient for the current hardware context. Check if writing the hardware context to the alternate stack will exceed it's size. If yes, then instead of corrupting user-data and proceeding with the original signal handler, an immediate SIGSEGV signal is delivered. Refactor the stack pointer check code from on_sig_stack() and use the new helper. While the kernel allows new source code to discover and use a sufficient alternate signal stack size, this check is still necessary to protect binaries with insufficient alternate signal stack size from data corruption. Fixes: c2bc11f10a39 ("x86, AVX-512: Enable AVX-512 States Context Switch") Reported-by: Florian Weimer Suggested-by: Jann Horn Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Len Brown Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518200320.17239-6-chang.seok.bae@intel.com Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=153531 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

include/linux/sched/mm.h: use rcu_dereference in in_vfork()

2021-03-17T16:06:34+00:00

[ Upstream commit 149fc787353f65b7e72e05e7b75d34863266c3e2 ] Fix a sparse warning by using rcu_dereference(). Technically this is a bug and a sufficiently aggressive compiler could reload the `real_parent' pointer outside the protection of the rcu lock (and access freed memory), but I think it's pretty unlikely to happen. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210221194207.1351703-1-willy@infradead.org Fixes: b18dc5f291c0 ("mm, oom: skip vforked tasks from being selected") Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin Acked-by: Michal Hocko Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore

2021-01-09T12:46:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ] Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users of exec_update_mutex. The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep was: perf_event_open (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex) chown (ovl_i_mutex -> sb_writes) sendfile (sb_writes -> p->lock) by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs proc_pid_syscall (p->lock -> exec_update_mutex) While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given process to remain the same. They are all readers. The only writer is exec. There is no reason for readers to block on each other. So fix this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing. Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov Cc: Al Viro Cc: Bernd Edlinger Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Christopher Yeoh Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: Sargun Dhillon Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex") [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

treewide: Convert macro and uses of section(foo) to section("foo")

2020-10-25T21:51:49+00:00

Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid complications with clang and gcc differences. Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro. Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo"). Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo") even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms. Conversion done using the script at: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75393e5ddc272dc7403de74d645e6c6e0f4e70eb.camel@perches.com/2-convert_section.pl Signed-off-by: Joe Perches Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: kmem: prepare remote memcg charging infra for interrupt contexts

2020-10-18T16:27:09+00:00

Remote memcg charging API uses current->active_memcg to store the currently active memory cgroup, which overwrites the memory cgroup of the current process. It works well for normal contexts, but doesn't work for interrupt contexts: indeed, if an interrupt occurs during the execution of a section with an active memcg set, all allocations inside the interrupt will be charged to the active memcg set (given that we'll enable accounting for allocations from an interrupt context). But because the interrupt might have no relation to the active memcg set outside, it's obviously wrong from the accounting prospective. To resolve this problem, let's add a global percpu int_active_memcg variable, which will be used to store an active memory cgroup which will be used from interrupt contexts. set_active_memcg() will transparently use current->active_memcg or int_active_memcg depending on the context. To make the read part simple and transparent for the caller, let's introduce two new functions: - struct mem_cgroup *active_memcg(void), - struct mem_cgroup *get_active_memcg(void). They are returning the active memcg if it's set, hiding all implementation details: where to get it depending on the current context. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Michal Hocko Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-4-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, memcg: rework remote charging API to support nesting

2020-10-18T16:27:09+00:00

Currently the remote memcg charging API consists of two functions: memalloc_use_memcg() and memalloc_unuse_memcg(), which set and clear the memcg value, which overwrites the memcg of the current task. memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg); <...> memalloc_unuse_memcg(); It works perfectly for allocations performed from a normal context, however an attempt to call it from an interrupt context or just nest two remote charging blocks will lead to an incorrect accounting. On exit from the inner block the active memcg will be cleared instead of being restored. memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg); memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg_2); <...> memalloc_unuse_memcg(); Error: allocation here are charged to the memcg of the current process instead of target_memcg. memalloc_unuse_memcg(); This patch extends the remote charging API by switching to a single function: struct mem_cgroup *set_active_memcg(struct mem_cgroup *memcg), which sets the new value and returns the old one. So a remote charging block will look like: old_memcg = set_active_memcg(target_memcg); <...> set_active_memcg(old_memcg); This patch is heavily based on the patch by Johannes Weiner, which can be found here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/28/806 . Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Dan Schatzberg Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821212056.3769116-1-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: remove the now-unnecessary mmget_still_valid() hack

2020-10-16T18:11:22+00:00

The preceding patches have ensured that core dumping properly takes the mmap_lock. Thanks to that, we can now remove mmget_still_valid() and all its users. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Hugh Dickins Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-8-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kernel/linux.git/include/linux/sched, branch v5.10.86

shm: extend forced shm destroy to support objects from several IPC nses

kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid sched_task_group

task_stack: Fix end_of_stack() for architectures with upwards-growing stack

x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow

include/linux/sched/mm.h: use rcu_dereference in in_vfork()

exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore

treewide: Convert macro and uses of __section(foo) to __section("foo")

mm: kmem: prepare remote memcg charging infra for interrupt contexts

mm, memcg: rework remote charging API to support nesting

mm: remove the now-unnecessary mmget_still_valid() hack

treewide: Convert macro and uses of section(foo) to section("foo")