kernel/linux.git/include/linux/netfilter, branch v3.16.61

netfilter: x_tables: speed up jump target validation

2016-11-20T01:16:53+00:00

commit f4dc77713f8016d2e8a3295e1c9c53a21f296def upstream. The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken, most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains(). In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require several minutes. sample ruleset that shows the behaviour: echo "*filter" for i in $(seq 0 100000);do printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i done for i in $(seq 0 100000);do printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i done echo COMMIT [ pipe result into iptables-restore ] This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever (gave up after 10 minutes) Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct, then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not. After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one gets when reverting 36472341017529e (~3 seconds on my workstation). [1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get 300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries Fixes: 36472341017529e ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps") Reported-by: Jeff Wu Tested-by: Jeff Wu Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin [carnil: backport to 3.16, adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user

2016-08-22T21:38:31+00:00

commit d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce upstream. The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that. Make sure info.name is 0-terminated. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

netfilter: x_tables: xt_compat_match_from_user doesn't need a retval

2016-08-22T21:38:31+00:00

commit 0188346f21e6546498c2a0f84888797ad4063fc5 upstream. Always returned 0. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset

2016-08-22T21:38:30+00:00

commit ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c upstream. We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff. Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta. We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

netfilter: x_tables: add compat version of xt_check_entry_offsets

2016-08-22T21:38:29+00:00

commit fc1221b3a163d1386d1052184202d5dc50d302d1 upstream. 32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_entry_offsets

2016-08-22T21:38:29+00:00

commit 7d35812c3214afa5b37a675113555259cfd67b98 upstream. Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule. Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient. To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

netfilter: nfnetlink_acct: Adding quota support to accounting framework

2014-04-29T16:25:14+00:00

nfacct objects already support accounting at the byte and packet level. As such it is a natural extension to add the possiblity to define a ceiling limit for both metrics. All the support for quotas itself is added to nfnetlink acctounting framework to stay coherent with current accounting object management. Quota limit checks are implemented in xt_nfacct filter where statistic collection is already done. Pablo Neira Ayuso has also contributed to this feature. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso

netfilter: nf_conntrack: flush net_gre->keymap_list only from gre helper

2014-04-08T08:56:12+00:00

nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush() removes a nf_ct_gre_keymap object from net_gre->keymap_list and frees the object. But it doesn't clean a reference on this object from ct_pptp_info->keymap[dir]. Then nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy() may release the same object again. So nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush() can be called only when we are sure that when nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy will not be called. nf_ct_gre_keymap is created by nf_ct_gre_keymap_add() and the right way to destroy it is to call nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy(). This patch marks nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush() as static, so this patch can break compilation of third party modules, which use nf_ct_gre_keymap_flush. I'm not sure this is the right way to deprecate this function. [ 226.540793] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 226.541750] Modules linked in: nf_nat_pptp nf_nat_proto_gre nf_conntrack_pptp nf_conntrack_proto_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre ppp_deflate bsd_comp ppp_async crc_ccitt ppp_generic slhc xt_nat iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack veth tun bridge stp llc ppdev microcode joydev pcspkr serio_raw virtio_console virtio_balloon floppy parport_pc parport pvpanic i2c_piix4 virtio_net drm_kms_helper ttm ata_generic virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio drm i2c_core pata_acpi [last unloaded: ip_tunnel] [ 226.541776] CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc8+ #101 [ 226.541776] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 226.541776] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 226.541776] task: ffff8800371e0000 ti: ffff88003730c000 task.ti: ffff88003730c000 [ 226.541776] RIP: 0010:[] [] __list_del_entry+0x29/0xd0 [ 226.541776] RSP: 0018:ffff88003730dbd0 EFLAGS: 00010a83 [ 226.541776] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8800374e6c40 RCX: dead000000200200 [ 226.541776] RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: ffff8800371e07d0 RDI: ffff8800374e6c40 [ 226.541776] RBP: ffff88003730dbd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 226.541776] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88003730d92e R12: 0000000000000002 [ 226.541776] R13: ffff88007a4c42d0 R14: ffff88007aef0000 R15: ffff880036cf0018 [ 226.541776] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 226.541776] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 226.541776] CR2: 00007f07f643f7d0 CR3: 0000000036fd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 226.541776] Stack: [ 226.541776] ffff88003730dbe8 ffffffff81389c5d ffff8800374ffbe4 ffff88003730dc28 [ 226.541776] ffffffffa0162a43 ffffffffa01627c5 ffff88007a4c42d0 ffff88007aef0000 [ 226.541776] ffffffffa01651c0 ffff88007a4c45e0 ffff88007aef0000 ffff88003730dc40 [ 226.541776] Call Trace: [ 226.541776] [] list_del+0xd/0x30 [ 226.541776] [] nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy+0x283/0x2d0 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [] ? nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy+0x5/0x2d0 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [] gre_destroy+0x27/0x70 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [] destroy_conntrack+0x83/0x200 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [] ? destroy_conntrack+0x27/0x200 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [] ? nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert+0x2e0/0x2e0 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [] nf_conntrack_destroy+0x72/0x180 [ 226.541776] [] ? nf_conntrack_destroy+0x5/0x180 [ 226.541776] [] ? kill_l3proto+0x20/0x20 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [] nf_ct_iterate_cleanup+0x14e/0x170 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [] nf_ct_l4proto_pernet_unregister+0x5b/0x90 [nf_conntrack] [ 226.541776] [] proto_gre_net_exit+0x19/0x30 [nf_conntrack_proto_gre] [ 226.541776] [] ops_exit_list.isra.1+0x39/0x60 [ 226.541776] [] cleanup_net+0x100/0x1d0 [ 226.541776] [] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x4f0 [ 226.541776] [] ? process_one_work+0x188/0x4f0 [ 226.541776] [] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 [ 226.541776] [] ? process_one_work+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ 226.541776] [] kthread+0xed/0x110 [ 226.541776] [] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40 [ 226.541776] [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 226.541776] [] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 226.541776] [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 226.541776] Code: 00 00 55 48 8b 17 48 b9 00 01 10 00 00 00 ad de 48 8b 47 08 48 89 e5 48 39 ca 74 29 48 b9 00 02 20 00 00 00 ad de 48 39 c8 74 7a <4c> 8b 00 4c 39 c7 75 53 4c 8b 42 08 4c 39 c7 75 2b 48 89 42 08 [ 226.541776] RIP [] __list_del_entry+0x29/0xd0 [ 226.541776] RSP [ 226.612193] ---[ end trace 985ae23ddfcc357c ]--- Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso Cc: Patrick McHardy Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik Cc: "David S. Miller" Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso

netfilter: ipset: add forceadd kernel support for hash set types

2014-03-06T08:31:43+00:00

Adds a new property for hash set types, where if a set is created with the 'forceadd' option and the set becomes full the next addition to the set may succeed and evict a random entry from the set. To keep overhead low eviction is done very simply. It checks to see which bucket the new entry would be added. If the bucket's pos value is non-zero (meaning there's at least one entry in the bucket) it replaces the first entry in the bucket. If pos is zero, then it continues down the normal add process. This property is useful if you have a set for 'ban' lists where it may not matter if you release some entries from the set early. Signed-off-by: Josh Hunt Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik

netfilter: ipset: Prepare the kernel for create option flags when no extension is needed

2014-03-06T08:31:42+00:00

Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik