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<title>kernel/linux.git/include/linux/ima.h, branch v5.3.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.3.5</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.3.5'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-07-09T03:28:59+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2019-07-09T03:28:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-09T03:28:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8b68150883ca466a23e90902dd4113b22e692f04'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b68150883ca466a23e90902dd4113b22e692f04</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:

   - IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
     IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
     label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
     being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
     deletions.

   - Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
     mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
     changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.

   - The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
     couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
     measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).

   - Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
     list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
     storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
     the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
     list"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
  ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
  KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
  IMA: Define a new template field buf
  IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
  IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
  integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
  ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
  ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
  LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
  x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
  ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
  ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
  x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments</title>
<updated>2019-06-24T12:29:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Prakhar Srivastava</name>
<email>prsriva02@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-24T06:23:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b0935123a18360d19f1dcc779ea33841cdc304cc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b0935123a18360d19f1dcc779ea33841cdc304cc</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently during soft reboot(kexec_file_load) boot command line
arguments are not measured. Define hooks needed to measure kexec
command line arguments during soft reboot(kexec_file_load).

- A new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline is defined to be called by the
kexec code.
- A new function process_buffer_measurement is defined to measure
the buffer hash into the IMA measurement list.
- A new func policy KEXEC_CMDLINE is defined to control the
 measurement.

Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava &lt;prsriva02@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/kexec_file: Disable kexec_load when IPLed secure</title>
<updated>2019-04-29T08:44:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Philipp Rudo</name>
<email>prudo@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T14:45:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=268a78404973594d1a7ec3a2b6a2474e0543a435'/>
<id>urn:sha1:268a78404973594d1a7ec3a2b6a2474e0543a435</id>
<content type='text'>
A kernel loaded via kexec_load cannot be verified. Thus disable kexec_load
systemcall in kernels which where IPLed securely. Use the IMA mechanism to
do so.

Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call</title>
<updated>2019-02-04T22:36:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-22T20:06:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fdb2410f7702f25f82804a261f90ad03422bd2c3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fdb2410f7702f25f82804a261f90ad03422bd2c3</id>
<content type='text'>
If tmpfiles can be made persistent, then newly created tmpfiles need to
be treated like any other new files in policy.

This patch indicates which newly created tmpfiles are in policy, causing
the file hash to be calculated on __fput().

Reported-by: Ignaz Forster &lt;ignaz.forster@gmx.de&gt;
[rgoldwyn@suse.com: Call ima_post_create_tmpfile() in vfs_tmpfile() as
opposed to do_tmpfile(). This will help the case for overlayfs where
copy_up is denied while overwriting a file.]
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues &lt;rgoldwyn@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode</title>
<updated>2018-12-11T12:19:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-18T09:08:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=399574c64eaf94e82b7cf056978d7e68748c0f1d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:399574c64eaf94e82b7cf056978d7e68748c0f1d</id>
<content type='text'>
The secure boot mode may not be detected on boot for some reason (eg.
buggy firmware).  This patch attempts one more time to detect the
secure boot mode.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86</title>
<updated>2018-12-11T12:13:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Richter</name>
<email>erichte@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T17:30:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d958083a8f6408e76850bc7394976050d7e43173'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d958083a8f6408e76850bc7394976050d7e43173</id>
<content type='text'>
On x86, there are two methods of verifying a kexec'ed kernel image
signature being loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall - an architecture
specific implementaton or a IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraisal rule. Neither
of these methods verify the kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded
via the kexec_load syscall.

Secure boot enabled systems require kexec images to be signed. Therefore,
this patch loads an IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule on secure boot
enabled systems not configured with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.

When IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM is configured, different IMA appraise modes
(eg. fix, log) can be specified on the boot command line, allowing unsigned
or invalidly signed kernel images to be kexec'ed. This patch permits
enabling IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM or IMA_ARCH_POLICY, but not both.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for arch specific policies</title>
<updated>2018-12-11T12:13:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T17:30:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6191706246de99ff2fac4b6f157f20205a0943cd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6191706246de99ff2fac4b6f157f20205a0943cd</id>
<content type='text'>
Builtin IMA policies can be enabled on the boot command line, and replaced
with a custom policy, normally during early boot in the initramfs. Build
time IMA policy rules were recently added. These rules are automatically
enabled on boot and persist after loading a custom policy.

There is a need for yet another type of policy, an architecture specific
policy, which is derived at runtime during kernel boot, based on the
runtime secure boot flags.  Like the build time policy rules, these rules
persist after loading a custom policy.

This patch adds support for loading an architecture specific IMA policy.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Co-Developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T12:38:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T17:30:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0914ade209c452cff6a29b1c0ae6fff3167fa1d0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0914ade209c452cff6a29b1c0ae6fff3167fa1d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall.
As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with
secureboot enabled.

This patch defines the new arch specific function called
arch_ima_get_secureboot() to retrieve the secureboot state of the system.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T17:25:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-15T17:25:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=92d4a03674b8c399c2f547580fa509db78226170'/>
<id>urn:sha1:92d4a03674b8c399c2f547580fa509db78226170</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers

 - Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
   kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
   descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.

 - Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
   just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
   Mimi.

 - Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
   using signed firmware), from Mimi.

 - Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
   measured by IMA, from Mimi.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
  security: export security_kernel_load_data function
  ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
  module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
  ima: add build time policy
  ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
  firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
  ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
  kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
  security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
  MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
</content>
</entry>
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