kernel/linux.git/include/linux/fs.h, branch v6.12.107

include/linux/fs.h: add inode_lock_killable()

2026-08-23T12:22:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit d8c5507cd140d9471472ece673e70250b957c595 ] Prepare for making inode operations killable while they're waiting for the lock. Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250513150327.1373061-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Stable-dep-of: fa724e235cfd ("cifs: add fscache_resize_cookie() to cifs_setsize()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files

2026-08-23T12:22:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51 ] Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable file for write while it is being executed. This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this legacy behavior was broken by the change. We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to fill their content on-the-fly. To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are watched by pre-content events. This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems which do not have any pre-content event listeners. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Acked-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com Stable-dep-of: db1856ea9196 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fsnotify: opt-in for permission events at file open time

2026-08-23T12:22:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit a94204f4d48e28a711b7ed10399f749286c433e3 ] Legacy inotify/fanotify listeners can add watches for events on inode, parent or mount and expect to get events (e.g. FS_MODIFY) on files that were already open at the time of setting up the watches. fanotify permission events are typically used by Anti-malware sofware, that is watching the entire mount and it is not common to have more that one Anti-malware engine installed on a system. To reduce the overhead of the fsnotify_file_perm() hooks on every file access, relax the semantics of the legacy FAN_ACCESS_PERM event to generate events only if there were *any* permission event listeners on the filesystem at the time that the file was opened. The new semantic is implemented by extending the FMODE_NONOTIFY bit into two FMODE_NONOTIFY_* bits, that are used to store a mode for which of the events types to report. This is going to apply to the new fanotify pre-content events in order to reduce the cost of the new pre-content event vfs hooks. [Thanks to Bert Karwatzki for reporting a bug in this code with CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS disabled] Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAHk-=wj8L=mtcRTi=NECHMGfZQgXOp_uix1YVh04fEmrKaMnXA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5ea5f8e283d1edb55aa79c35187bfe344056af14.1731684329.git.josef@toxicpanda.com Stable-dep-of: db1856ea9196 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

super: use common iterator (Part 2)

2026-08-23T12:22:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit b47e42d10e8c20525febccbd6e0dc8528861aea4 ] Use a common iterator for all callbacks. We could go for something even more elaborate (advance step-by-step similar to iov_iter) but I really don't think this is warranted. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250329-work-freeze-v2-5-a47af37ecc3d@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Stable-dep-of: 749d7aa0377a ("super: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

super: use a common iterator (Part 1)

2026-08-23T12:22:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2992476528aeecbaee17ba0a6396a817481205a3 ] Use a common iterator for all callbacks. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250329-work-freeze-v2-4-a47af37ecc3d@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Stable-dep-of: 749d7aa0377a ("super: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap

2026-07-18T14:52:14+00:00

commit e187bc02f8fa4226d62814592cf064ee4557c470 upstream. Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch the various users in mm to it. The issue was found by manual code inspection & an off-list discussion with Jan Kara. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260625153853.913949-1-pfalcato@suse.de Fixes: 9caccd41541a ("fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP") Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Cc: Al Viro Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Liam R. Howlett Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks

2026-07-04T11:43:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 ] Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following new LSM hooks are being created: security_backing_file_alloc() security_backing_file_free() security_mmap_backing_file() The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook. There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks: * Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the security_backing_file_alloc() hook. * Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c. * Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into the common LSM audit code. Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() and supplying a fixup. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [ Mainline declares lsm_backing_file_cache in security/lsm.h. Linux 6.12.y does not have security/lsm_init.c or security/lsm.h; the cache variable is defined locally as static struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache in security/security.c. ] Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers

2026-07-04T11:43:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4e301d858af17ae2ce56886296e5458c5a08219a ] Add internal helper backing_file_set_user_path() for the only two cases that need to modify backing_file fields. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250607115304.2521155-2-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

shmem: fix recovery on rename failures

2026-01-08T09:13:54+00:00

[ Upstream commit e1b4c6a58304fd490124cc2b454d80edc786665c ] maple_tree insertions can fail if we are seriously short on memory; simple_offset_rename() does not recover well if it runs into that. The same goes for simple_offset_rename_exchange(). Moreover, shmem_whiteout() expects that if it succeeds, the caller will progress to d_move(), i.e. that shmem_rename2() won't fail past the successful call of shmem_whiteout(). Not hard to fix, fortunately - mtree_store() can't fail if the index we are trying to store into is already present in the tree as a singleton. For simple_offset_rename_exchange() that's enough - we just need to be careful about the order of operations. For simple_offset_rename() solution is to preinsert the target into the tree for new_dir; the rest can be done without any potentially failing operations. That preinsertion has to be done in shmem_rename2() rather than in simple_offset_rename() itself - otherwise we'd need to deal with the possibility of failure after successful shmem_whiteout(). Fixes: a2e459555c5f ("shmem: stable directory offsets") Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ext4: introduce linear search for dentries

2025-09-19T14:35:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9e28059d56649a7212d5b3f8751ec021154ba3dd ] This patch addresses an issue where some files in case-insensitive directories become inaccessible due to changes in how the kernel function, utf8_casefold(), generates case-folded strings from the commit 5c26d2f1d3f5 ("unicode: Don't special case ignorable code points"). There are good reasons why this change should be made; it's actually quite stupid that Unicode seems to think that the characters ❤ and ❤️ should be casefolded. Unfortimately because of the backwards compatibility issue, this commit was reverted in 231825b2e1ff. This problem is addressed by instituting a brute-force linear fallback if a lookup fails on case-folded directory, which does result in a performance hit when looking up files affected by the changing how thekernel treats ignorable Uniode characters, or when attempting to look up non-existent file names. So this fallback can be disabled by setting an encoding flag if in the future, the system administrator or the manufacturer of a mobile handset or tablet can be sure that there was no opportunity for a kernel to insert file names with incompatible encodings. Fixes: 5c26d2f1d3f5 ("unicode: Don't special case ignorable code points") Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin