<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/fs, branch v6.6.143</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.143</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.143'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:38+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>smb: client: require net admin for CIFS SWN netlink</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-29T16:51:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=969bc6370334a5b4720c5470783295d6484bbc95'/>
<id>urn:sha1:969bc6370334a5b4720c5470783295d6484bbc95</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d1ebfce2c1d161186a82e77590bf7da2ea1bce91 ]

CIFS_GENL_CMD_SWN_NOTIFY is the userspace witness-notify command.  The
intended sender is the cifs.witness helper, but the generic-netlink
operation currently has no capability flag, so any local process can send
RESOURCE_CHANGE or CLIENT_MOVE notifications to the in-kernel witness
handler.

The same family exposes CIFS_GENL_MCGRP_SWN without multicast-group
capability flags.  Register messages sent to that group include the witness
registration id and, for NTLM-authenticated mounts, the username, domain,
and password attributes copied from the CIFS session.  An unprivileged
local process should not be able to join that group and receive those
messages.

Require CAP_NET_ADMIN for incoming SWN_NOTIFY commands with
GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and require CAP_NET_ADMIN over the network namespace for
joining the SWN multicast group with GENL_MCAST_CAP_NET_ADMIN.  The
cifs.witness service runs with the privileges needed for both operations.

Fixes: fed979a7e082 ("cifs: Set witness notification handler for messages from userspace daemon")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound requests</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada</name>
<email>manizada@pm.me</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-25T00:14:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=850452af77f55d185f9445e1f7a1db53c5e4aad4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:850452af77f55d185f9445e1f7a1db53c5e4aad4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fda9522ed6afaec45cabc198d8492270c394c7bc upstream.

When a compound request such as READ + QUERY_INFO(Security) is received,
and the first command (READ) consumes most of the response buffer,
ksmbd could write beyond the allocated buffer while building a security
descriptor.

The root cause was that smb2_get_info_sec() checked buffer space using
ppntsd_size from xattr, while build_sec_desc() often synthesized a
significantly larger descriptor from POSIX ACLs.

This patch introduces smb_acl_sec_desc_scratch_len() to accurately
compute the final descriptor size beforehand, performs proper buffer
checking with smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len(), and uses exact-sized
allocation + iov pinning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2b76ab8b5c9 ("ksmbd: add support for read compound")
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada &lt;manizada@pm.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
[ In v6.6, replace KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP with GFP_KERNEL per
commit 0066f623bce8 ("ksmbd: use __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL"). ]
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan &lt;alvalan9@foxmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mingyu Wang</name>
<email>25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-23T13:52:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b5fa9e32fb6718f70c986ee14dd5d01b4846f331'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5fa9e32fb6718f70c986ee14dd5d01b4846f331</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 00633c4683828acd5256fa8d5163f440d74bbe71 upstream.

A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in
send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.

When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both
functions use read_lock(&amp;tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list.
However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -&gt; kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -&gt; sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)

The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&amp;tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&amp;tasklist_lock) in
   fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire
   read_lock(&amp;tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.

Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already
RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly
required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with
rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the
single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of
service vector via TCP URG packets.

Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -&gt; SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[...]
Chain exists of:
  &amp;dev-&gt;event_lock --&gt; &amp;f_owner-&gt;lock --&gt; tasklist_lock

Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(tasklist_lock);
                           local_irq_disable();
                           lock(&amp;dev-&gt;event_lock);
                           lock(&amp;f_owner-&gt;lock);
  &lt;Interrupt&gt;
    lock(&amp;dev-&gt;event_lock);

*** DEADLOCK ***

Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang &lt;25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523135210.590928-1-w15303746062@163.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: reject fuse_notify() pagecache ops on directories</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-19T14:29:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=dd92773d4d9cea010474eb08a5133c14ff6ab53a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dd92773d4d9cea010474eb08a5133c14ff6ab53a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9c954499d43aefac01c5dfb57a82b13d2dcf4b94 upstream.

The operations FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE allow the
FUSE daemon to actively write/read pagecache contents.

For directories with FOPEN_CACHE_DIR, the pagecache is used as
kernel-internal cache storage, and userspace is not supposed to have
direct access to this cache - in particular, fuse_parse_cache() will hit
WARN_ON() if the cache contains bogus data.

Reject FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE on anything other than
regular files with -EINVAL.

Fixes: 5d7bc7e8680c ("fuse: allow using readdir cache")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260519-fuse-dir-pagecache-v2-1-5428fa48e175@google.com
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gil Portnoy</name>
<email>dddhkts1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-31T23:27:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0da2e073f9cbf4985a0fd9acb71bc5ff599f8afd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0da2e073f9cbf4985a0fd9acb71bc5ff599f8afd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f580d27e8928828693df44ba2db0fffdbe11dfea upstream.

A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on
conn-&gt;async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =
smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.

When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with
locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never
reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from
conn-&gt;async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays
matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,
until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().

smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second
SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs
smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
    __locks_delete_block
    locks_delete_block
    ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
    smb2_remove_blocked_lock
    smb2_cancel                 &lt;- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
    handle_ksmbd_work
  Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock &lt;- smb2_lock
  Freed by ...:     locks_free_lock  &lt;- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
  ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192

Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.

Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback
cannot be fired a second time.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy &lt;dddhkts1@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iomap: don't revert iov_iter on partially completed buffered writes</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brian Foster</name>
<email>bfoster@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-12T12:10:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f4e4b98cee82e9eef4a071e3b12bfda597906b0f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f4e4b98cee82e9eef4a071e3b12bfda597906b0f</id>
<content type='text'>
Gregg reports that the iomap retry behavior for nonblocking (nowait)
append writes is broken. The problem occurs when an append write is
first submitted in non-blocking mode (i.e. via io_uring), partially
completes before hitting -EAGAIN, and then is resubmitted from
blocking context.

The specific problem is that at least one iteration of the loop in
iomap_write_iter() completes in non-blocking context and thus has
bumped i_size. The next iteration hits -EAGAIN, reverts the iov_iter
and returns. io_uring retries the entire append write from blocking
context, but since i_size has already been increased, the data that
was partially written on the first attempt is rewritten at the new
i_size. This is essentially an intra-write data corruption since the
data written to the file does not reflect the write from userspace.

This problem is already fixed on master as of commit 1a1a3b574b97
("iomap: advance the iter directly on buffered writes"). That commit
was primarily intended to clean up iomap iter state tracking, but it
also happened to remove the iov_iter revert and thus accidentally
fix this problem as well. Without the revert, iomap will commit
partial progress internally and loop once more before it more than
likely hits -EAGAIN and returns partial progress consistent with the
inode updates. This means the blocking retry from io_uring will pick
up where the first attempt left off at the current i_size and
perform the remainder of the write correctly.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 18e419f6e80a ("iomap: Return -EAGAIN from iomap_write_iter()")
Reported-by: Gregg Leventhal &lt;gleventhal@janestreet.com&gt;
Reported-by: Eric Hagberg &lt;ehagberg@janestreet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix NULL-deref of opinfo-&gt;conn in oplock/lease break notifiers</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gil Portnoy</name>
<email>dddhkts1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-28T00:00:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=945a86b21b40fb17183f5b27461baa6f03e2467f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:945a86b21b40fb17183f5b27461baa6f03e2467f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b003086d76968298f22e7cf62239833b5a3a06b1 ]

smb2_oplock_break_noti() and smb2_lease_break_noti() read opinfo-&gt;conn
into a local with neither READ_ONCE() nor a NULL check.  Both run from
oplock_break() after opinfo_get_list() has dropped ci-&gt;m_lock, so a
concurrent SMB2 LOGOFF (session_fd_check()) can set op-&gt;conn = NULL
under ci-&gt;m_lock within that window.  ksmbd_conn_r_count_inc(conn) then
writes through NULL at offset 0xc4 -- a remotely triggerable oops.

Guard both reads the way compare_guid_key() already does: read
opinfo-&gt;conn with READ_ONCE() and return early if it is NULL, before
allocating the work struct so nothing leaks.  A NULL conn means the
client is gone and the break is moot, so return 0; oplock_break() treats
that as success and runs the normal teardown.

Fixes: c8efcc786146 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2")
Assisted-by: Henry (Claude):claude-opus-4
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy &lt;dddhkts1@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: OOB read regression in smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE-walk loops</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ali Ganiyev</name>
<email>ali.qaniyev@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-25T01:23:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0fe08c5776a798f46df1fd74b331be26bdd644d6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0fe08c5776a798f46df1fd74b331be26bdd644d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0e60dafe97eca61721f3db456f97d97a80c6c8ae upstream.

Commit d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in
smb_check_perm_dacl()") introduced a transposed bounds check:

    if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + aces_size &lt; CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)

Since offsetof(..sid) is 8 and CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE is 8, this evaluates
to `aces_size &lt; 0`. Because `aces_size` is always non-negative, this
check becomes dead code and never breaks the loop.

Worse, that commit removed the old 4-byte guard, meaning the loop now
reads `ace-&gt;size` (offset 2) even when `aces_size` is 0-3 bytes. This
re-opens a 2-byte heap out-of-bounds (OOB) read past the pntsd allocation
during subsequent SMB2_CREATE operations.

Fix this by properly transposing the comparison to require at least
16 bytes (8-byte offset + 8-byte SID base), matching the correct form
used in smb_inherit_dacl().

Fixes: d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ganiyev &lt;ali.qaniyev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hpfs: fix a crash if hpfs_map_dnode_bitmap fails</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-25T12:48:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7c58c55a2a16f7274772507bd1637be609351b4f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7c58c55a2a16f7274772507bd1637be609351b4f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 974820a59efde7c1a7e1260bcfe9bb81f833cc9f upstream.

If hpfs_map_dnode_bitmap fails, the code would call hpfs_brelse4 on
uninitialized quad buffer head, causing a crash.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Farhad Alemi &lt;farhad.alemi@berkeley.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Shen</name>
<email>grayhat@foxmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-26T13:07:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3127a884525dc8ca4def73254bfcd3ccef0bf812'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3127a884525dc8ca4def73254bfcd3ccef0bf812</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cc57232cae23c0df91b4a59d0f519141ce9b5b02 ]

FSCTL_SET_SPARSE in fsctl_set_sparse() modifies the file's sparse
attribute and saves it through xattr without any permission checks.

This exposes two issues:

1) A client on a read-only share can change the sparse attribute
   on files it opened, even though the share is read-only.
   Other FSCTL write operations already check
   test_tree_conn_flag(work-&gt;tcon, KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE),
   but FSCTL_SET_SPARSE does not.

2) Even on writable shares, clients without FILE_WRITE_DATA or
   FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES access should not modify the sparse
   attribute. Similar handle-level checks exist in other functions
   but are missing here.

Add both share-level writable check and per-handle access check.
Use goto out on error to avoid leaking file references.

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Shen &lt;grayhat@foxmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
