<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/fs, branch v5.10.261</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.261</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.261'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:23+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: do not trim a device which is not writeable</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-20T18:38:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f41ae7e6664f3c4361129728f2c4d5f3ed995251'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f41ae7e6664f3c4361129728f2c4d5f3ed995251</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1b1937eb08f51319bf71575484cde2b8c517aedc ]

[BUG]
There is a bug report that btrfs/242 can randomly fail with the
following NULL pointer dereference:

  run fstests btrfs/242 at 2026-06-01 10:25:08
  BTRFS: device fsid d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874 devid 1 transid 9 /dev/sdc (8:32) scanned by mount (122609)
  BTRFS info (device sdc): first mount of filesystem d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874
  BTRFS info (device sdc): using crc32c checksum algorithm
  BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing
  BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing
  BTRFS info (device sdc): allowing degraded mounts
  BTRFS info (device sdc): turning on async discard
  BTRFS info (device sdc): enabling free space tree
  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000018
  user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000013fd6b000
  CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 122625 Comm: fstrim Not tainted 7.0.10-2-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed e9a5f6b24978fba3bf015a992f865837fdfff3dd
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20250812-19.fc42 08/12/2025
  pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs]
  lr : btrfs_trim_fs+0x1f0/0xa00 [btrfs]
  Call trace:
   btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] (P)
   btrfs_ioctl_fitrim+0xe8/0x178 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840]
   btrfs_ioctl+0xdd4/0x2bd8 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840]
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x108
   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x5c/0xd0
   el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xf0
   do_el0_svc+0x24/0x40
   el0_svc+0x40/0x1d0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
   el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b8
  Code: 17ffff83 f94017e0 f9002be0 f9402ea0 (f9400c00)
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000  ]---

Also the reporter is very kind to test the following ASSERT() added to
btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle():

	ASSERT(device-&gt;bdev,
	       "devid=%llu path=%s dev_state=0x%lx\n",
	       device-&gt;devid, btrfs_dev_name(device), device-&gt;dev_state);

And it shows the following output:

  assertion failed: device-&gt;bdev, in extent-tree.c:6630 (devid=2 path=/dev/sdd dev_state=0x82)

Which means the device-&gt;bdev is NULL, and the dev_state is
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_IN_FS_METADATA | BTRFS_DEV_STATE_ITEM_FOUND, without
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set.

[CAUSE]
The pc points to the following call chain:

  btrfs_trim_fs()
  |- btrfs_trim_free_extents()
     |- btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle()
        |- bdev_max_discard_sectors(device-&gt;bdev)

So the NULL pointer dereference is caused by device-&gt;bdev being NULL.

This looks impossible by a quick glance, as just before calling
btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle(), we have skipped any device that has
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag set.

However in this particular case, there is a window where the missing
device is later re-scanned, causing btrfs to remove the
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag:

  btrfs_control_ioctl()
  |- btrfs_scan_one_device()
     |- device_list_add()
        |- rcu_assign_pointer(device-&gt;name, name);
        |  This updates the missing device's path to the new good path.
        |
        |- clear_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING, &amp;device-&gt;dev_state)
           This removes the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag.

This allows the missing device to re-appear and clear the
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag.  However the device still does not have
the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set, nor is its bdev pointer updated.

The bdev pointer remains NULL, triggering the crash later.

[FIX]
This is a big de-synchronization between BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING and
device-&gt;bdev pointer, and shows a gap in btrfs's re-appearing-device
handling.

The proper handling of re-appearing device will need quite some extra
work, which is out of the context of this small fix.

Thankfully the regular bbio submission path has already handled it well
by checking if the device-&gt;bdev is NULL before submitting.

So here we just fix the crash by checking if the device is writeable and
has a bdev pointer before calling bdev_max_discard_sectors().

Reported-by: Su Yue &lt;glass.su@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/wlwir19t.fsf@damenly.org/
Fixes: 499f377f49f0 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tristan Madani</name>
<email>tristan@talencesecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-18T15:12:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c8dd112173c02adf539fe2ad34a45f5e0068780d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c8dd112173c02adf539fe2ad34a45f5e0068780d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 966cb76fb2857a4242cab6ea2ea17acf818a3da7 ]

check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against
node_size using u32 arithmetic.  When the caller passes a large len
value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()),
off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the
bounds check to pass when it should fail.

For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from
data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6,
which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and
the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer.

Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against
node_size.  This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic
straightforward.

Reported-by: syzbot+6df204b70bf3261691c5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6df204b70bf3261691c5
Tested-by: syzbot+6df204b70bf3261691c5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e76bf3d19b85350571ac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e76bf3d19b85350571ac
Tested-by: syzbot+e76bf3d19b85350571ac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: a431930c9bac ("hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani &lt;tristan@talencesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;slava@dubeyko.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;slava@dubeyko.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260505111300.3592757-2-tristmd@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;slava@dubeyko.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hfs/hfsplus: prevent getting negative values of offset/length</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Viacheslav Dubeyko</name>
<email>slava@dubeyko.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-18T15:12:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b65e29a5f44ef0e319d50fccae3468720f67cc24'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b65e29a5f44ef0e319d50fccae3468720f67cc24</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 00c14a09a70e10ae18eb3707d0059291425c04bd ]

The syzbot reported KASAN out-of-bounds issue in
hfs_bnode_move():

[   45.588165][ T9821] hfs: dst 14, src 65536, len -65536
[   45.588895][ T9821] ==================================================================
[   45.590114][ T9821] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_move+0xfd/0x140
[   45.591127][ T9821] Read of size 18446744073709486080 at addr ffff888035935400 by task repro/9821
[   45.592207][ T9821]
[   45.592420][ T9821] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9821 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7-dirty #42 PREEMPT(full)
[   45.592428][ T9821] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   45.592431][ T9821] Call Trace:
[   45.592434][ T9821]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   45.592437][ T9821]  dump_stack_lvl+0x1c1/0x2a0
[   45.592446][ T9821]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1c8/0x5c0
[   45.592454][ T9821]  ? __pfx_dump_stack_lvl+0x10/0x10
[   45.592461][ T9821]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[   45.592469][ T9821]  ? lock_release+0x4b/0x3e0
[   45.592476][ T9821]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1c8/0x5c0
[   45.592483][ T9821]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x4a5/0x5c0
[   45.592491][ T9821]  print_report+0x17e/0x7c0
[   45.592497][ T9821]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1c8/0x5c0
[   45.592504][ T9821]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x4a5/0x5c0
[   45.592511][ T9821]  ? __phys_addr+0xd3/0x180
[   45.592519][ T9821]  ? hfs_bnode_move+0xfd/0x140
[   45.592526][ T9821]  kasan_report+0x147/0x180
[   45.592531][ T9821]  ? _printk+0xcf/0x120
[   45.592537][ T9821]  ? hfs_bnode_move+0xfd/0x140
[   45.592544][ T9821]  ? hfs_bnode_move+0xfd/0x140
[   45.592552][ T9821]  kasan_check_range+0x2b0/0x2c0
[   45.592557][ T9821]  ? hfs_bnode_move+0xfd/0x140
[   45.592565][ T9821]  __asan_memmove+0x29/0x70
[   45.592572][ T9821]  hfs_bnode_move+0xfd/0x140
[   45.592580][ T9821]  hfs_brec_remove+0x473/0x560
[   45.592589][ T9821]  hfs_cat_move+0x6fb/0x960
[   45.592598][ T9821]  ? __pfx_hfs_cat_move+0x10/0x10
[   45.592607][ T9821]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x122/0x1c0
[   45.592614][ T9821]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x9c/0x150
[   45.592631][ T9821]  ? __lock_acquire+0xaec/0xd80
[   45.592641][ T9821]  hfs_rename+0x1dc/0x2d0
[   45.592649][ T9821]  ? __pfx_hfs_rename+0x10/0x10
[   45.592657][ T9821]  vfs_rename+0xac6/0xed0
[   45.592664][ T9821]  ? __pfx_vfs_rename+0x10/0x10
[   45.592670][ T9821]  ? d_alloc+0x144/0x190
[   45.592677][ T9821]  ? bpf_lsm_path_rename+0x9/0x20
[   45.592683][ T9821]  ? security_path_rename+0x17d/0x490
[   45.592691][ T9821]  do_renameat2+0x890/0xc50
[   45.592699][ T9821]  ? __pfx_do_renameat2+0x10/0x10
[   45.592707][ T9821]  ? getname_flags+0x1e5/0x540
[   45.592714][ T9821]  __x64_sys_rename+0x82/0x90
[   45.592720][ T9821]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   45.592725][ T9821]  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x3a0
[   45.592741][ T9821]  ? exc_page_fault+0x9f/0xf0
[   45.592748][ T9821]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   45.592754][ T9821] RIP: 0033:0x7f7f73fe3fc9
[   45.592760][ T9821] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 48
[   45.592765][ T9821] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7e116cf8 EFLAGS: 00000283 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000052
[   45.592772][ T9821] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7f73fe3fc9
[   45.592776][ T9821] RDX: 0000200000000871 RSI: 0000200000000780 RDI: 00002000000003c0
[   45.592781][ T9821] RBP: 00007ffc7e116d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffc7e116d30
[   45.592784][ T9821] R10: fffffffffffffff0 R11: 0000000000000283 R12: 00005557e81f8250
[   45.592788][ T9821] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   45.592795][ T9821]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[   45.592797][ T9821]
[   45.619721][ T9821] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   45.620300][ T9821] page: refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x559a88174 pfn:0x35935
[   45.621150][ T9821] memcg:ffff88810a1d5b00
[   45.621531][ T9821] anon flags: 0xfff60000020838(uptodate|dirty|lru|owner_2|swapbacked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[   45.622496][ T9821] raw: 00fff60000020838 ffffea0000d64d88 ffff888021753e10 ffff888029da0771
[   45.623260][ T9821] raw: 0000000559a88174 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff88810a1d5b00
[   45.624030][ T9821] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   45.624602][ T9821] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[   45.625115][ T9821] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x140dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_ZERO0
[   45.626685][ T9821]  post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0
[   45.627127][ T9821]  get_page_from_freelist+0x2101/0x21e0
[   45.627628][ T9821]  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x274/0x380
[   45.628154][ T9821]  alloc_pages_mpol+0x241/0x4b0
[   45.628593][ T9821]  vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0xe4/0x210
[   45.629066][ T9821]  folio_prealloc+0x30/0x180
[   45.629487][ T9821]  __handle_mm_fault+0x34bd/0x5640
[   45.629957][ T9821]  handle_mm_fault+0x40e/0x8e0
[   45.630392][ T9821]  do_user_addr_fault+0xa81/0x1390
[   45.630862][ T9821]  exc_page_fault+0x76/0xf0
[   45.631273][ T9821]  asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[   45.631712][ T9821] page last free pid 5269 tgid 5269 stack trace:
[   45.632281][ T9821]  free_unref_folios+0xc73/0x14c0
[   45.632740][ T9821]  folios_put_refs+0x55b/0x640
[   45.633177][ T9821]  free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x26d/0x510
[   45.633685][ T9821]  tlb_flush_mmu+0x3a0/0x680
[   45.634105][ T9821]  tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200
[   45.634525][ T9821]  exit_mmap+0x44c/0xb70
[   45.634914][ T9821]  __mmput+0x118/0x420
[   45.635286][ T9821]  exit_mm+0x1da/0x2c0
[   45.635659][ T9821]  do_exit+0x652/0x2330
[   45.636039][ T9821]  do_group_exit+0x21c/0x2d0
[   45.636457][ T9821]  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40
[   45.636915][ T9821]  x64_sys_call+0x21ba/0x21c0
[   45.637342][ T9821]  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x3a0
[   45.637756][ T9821]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   45.638290][ T9821] page has been migrated, last migrate reason: numa_misplaced
[   45.638956][ T9821]
[   45.639173][ T9821] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   45.639677][ T9821]  ffff888035935300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   45.640397][ T9821]  ffff888035935380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   45.641117][ T9821] &gt;ffff888035935400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   45.641837][ T9821]                    ^
[   45.642207][ T9821]  ffff888035935480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   45.642929][ T9821]  ffff888035935500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   45.643650][ T9821] ==================================================================

This commit [1] fixes the issue if an offset inside of b-tree node
or length of the request is bigger than b-tree node. However,
this fix is still not ready for negative values
of the offset or length. Moreover, negative values of
the offset or length doesn't make sense for b-tree's
operations. Because we could try to access the memory address
outside of the beginning of memory page's addresses range.
Also, using of negative values make logic very complicated,
unpredictable, and we could access the wrong item(s)
in the b-tree node.

This patch changes b-tree interface by means of converting
signed integer arguments of offset and length on u32 type.
Such conversion has goal to prevent of using negative values
unintentionally or by mistake in b-tree operations.

[1] 'commit a431930c9bac ("hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read()")'

Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;slava@dubeyko.com&gt;
cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz &lt;glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de&gt;
cc: Yangtao Li &lt;frank.li@vivo.com&gt;
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251002200020.2578311-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;slava@dubeyko.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 966cb76fb285 ("hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: use null daddr for unset first bad log block</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yousef Alhouseen</name>
<email>alhouseenyousef@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-18T11:21:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=dbc2b2a26a1d9479a388cd8b041ba1ce5a137b7c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbc2b2a26a1d9479a388cd8b041ba1ce5a137b7c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cc9af5e461ea5f6e37738f3f1e41c45a9b7f45d6 ]

xlog_do_recovery_pass() may return before setting first_bad.  The caller
must distinguish that case from an error at a valid log block, including
block zero after the log wraps.

Initialize first_bad to XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL and test it explicitly before
treating the error as a torn write.

Fixes: 7088c4136fa1 ("xfs: detect and trim torn writes during log recovery")
Suggested-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+b7dfbed0c6c2b5e9fd34@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b7dfbed0c6c2b5e9fd34
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.5
Signed-off-by: Yousef Alhouseen &lt;alhouseenyousef@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
[ adjusted hunk offsets for context drift and dropped an inapplicable whitespace-only end-of-file hunk whose context doesn't exist in 5.10 ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: fix unreachable BIGTIME check in dquot flush validation</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Nepomnyashih</name>
<email>sdl@nppct.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-18T11:20:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f171763010aecbd7697b410e2f367d98037bd8a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f171763010aecbd7697b410e2f367d98037bd8a7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 03866d130ed33ab68cc7faaf4bf2c4abef96d42e ]

The dqp-&gt;q_id == 0 check inside the XFS_DQTYPE_BIGTIME block is
unreachable because root dquots return successfully earlier. Reject root
dquots with XFS_DQTYPE_BIGTIME before that early return, preserving the
intended validation and removing the unreachable condition.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Fixes: 4ea1ff3b4968 ("xfs: widen ondisk quota expiration timestamps to handle y2038+")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Alexey Nepomnyashih &lt;sdl@nppct.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Henderson &lt;achender@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: reflect sb features in xfs_mount</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Chinner</name>
<email>dchinner@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-18T11:20:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=06d9223feefa51f9017a0fc3e4c78b0472156422'/>
<id>urn:sha1:06d9223feefa51f9017a0fc3e4c78b0472156422</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a1d86e8dec8c1325d301c9d5594bb794bc428fc3 ]

Currently on-disk feature checks require decoding the superblock
fileds and so can be non-trivial. We have almost 400 hundred
individual feature checks in the XFS code, so this is a significant
amount of code. To reduce runtime check overhead, pre-process all
the version flags into a features field in the xfs_mount at mount
time so we can convert all the feature checks to a simple flag
check.

There is also a need to convert the dynamic feature flags to update
the m_features field. This is required for attr, attr2 and quota
features. New xfs_mount based wrappers are added for this.

Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner &lt;dchinner@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 03866d130ed3 ("xfs: fix unreachable BIGTIME check in dquot flush validation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1)</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-17T19:23:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ae1e630bcaac739f625822078edbaea98366930d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae1e630bcaac739f625822078edbaea98366930d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6650527444dadc63d84aa939d14ecba4fadb2f69 ]

Fix the easy cases where procfs currently calls ptrace_may_access() without
exec_update_lock protection, where the fix is to simply add the extra lock
or use mm_access():

 - do_task_stat(): grab exec_update_lock
 - proc_pid_wchan(): grab exec_update_lock
 - proc_map_files_lookup(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm()
 - proc_map_files_readdir(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm()
 - proc_ns_get_link(): grab exec_update_lock
 - proc_ns_readlink(): grab exec_update_lock

Fixes: f83ce3e6b02d ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518-procfs-lockfix-part1-v1-1-5c3d20e0ac33@google.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
[ converted NULL return from mm_access() to ERR_PTR(-ESRCH) at call sites since 5.15's mm_access() returns NULL when the task has no mm ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links)</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-17T16:38:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6253dfee5afba536bb54fc6fe6c091c3758fafe1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6253dfee5afba536bb54fc6fe6c091c3758fafe1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6255da28d4bb5349fe18e84cb043ccd394eba75d ]

proc_pid_get_link() and proc_pid_readlink() currently look up the task from
the pid once, then do the ptrace access check on that task, then look up
the task from the pid a second time to do the actual access.
That's racy in several ways.

To fix it, pass the task to the -&gt;proc_get_link() handler, and instead of
proc_fd_access_allowed(), introduce a new helper call_proc_get_link() that
looks up and locks the task, does the access check, and calls
-&gt;proc_get_link().

Fixes: 778c1144771f ("[PATCH] proc: Use sane permission checks on the /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/fd/ symlinks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518-procfs-lockfix-part1-v1-2-5c3d20e0ac33@google.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: rename proc_setattr to proc_nochmod_setattr</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-17T16:38:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=11219b699a009601d2e9e5b9fad8c27acf54eed4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:11219b699a009601d2e9e5b9fad8c27acf54eed4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 690005b0b1e6b567c88b7790e6d90d4d6c9e09cc ]

What is currently proc_setattr is a special version added after the more
general procfs -&gt;seattr in commit 6d76fa58b050 ("Don't allow chmod() on
the /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ files").  Give it a name that reflects that to free the
proc_setattr name and better describe what is doing.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260325063711.3298685-5-hch@lst.de
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 6255da28d4bb ("proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links)")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: use generic setattr() for /proc/$PID/net</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:49:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Weißschuh</name>
<email>linux@weissschuh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-17T16:38:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6851be14eb56eb966277961fd5ba897a01958db2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6851be14eb56eb966277961fd5ba897a01958db2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 18e66ae67673f2c8df6f02428798b1355691f2a9 ]

All other files in /proc/$PID/ use proc_setattr().

Not using it allows the usage of chmod() on /proc/$PID/net, even on
other processes owned by the same user.
The same would probably also be true for other attributes to be changed.

As this technically represents an ABI change it is not marked for
stable so any unlikely regressions are caught during a full release cycle.

Fixes: e9720acd728a ("[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3)")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh &lt;linux@weissschuh.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d0d111ef-edae-4760-83fb-36db84278da1@t-8ch.de/
Fixes: b4844fa0bdb4 ("selftests/nolibc: implement a few tests for various syscalls")
Tested-by: Zhangjin Wu &lt;falcon@tinylab.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20230624-proc-net-setattr-v1-2-73176812adee@weissschuh.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 6255da28d4bb ("proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links)")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
